Author: C. Reynolds LeBlanc

Louisiana Supreme Court Confirms that Statutory Deadline to Oppose Summary Judgment Is Mandatory

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device a party can use to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966 is the statute that governs motions for summary judgment in Louisiana. The statute was amended in 2015 to establish some new procedural rules for filing summary judgment motions. Before the statue was amended, the deadline for opposing a motion for summary judgment was set in the District Court Rules, and courts frequently allowed oppositions to motions for summary judgment to be filed after the statutory delay.

In 2015, the Legislature amended the statute to state that “absent the consent of the parties and the court, an opposition shall be filed” within the new fifteen-day deadline established by the article. In Auricchio v. Harriston, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the amendments to the statute removed the discretionary language that previously allowed a court to allow a party additional time to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled the amendments to art. 966 made the opposition deadline mandatory, and late-filed oppositions should not be considered in connection with a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Mahe v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC. The Court considered whether a trial court may grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment when a party fails to file its opposition within the fifteen-day deadline set in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).

In Mahe, a party requested a continuance of the hearing after the fifteen-day deadline passed. While subsection 966(C)(2) provides that a continuance of the hearing is permitted “for good cause shown,” the Court held that the requested continuance could not serve to circumvent the mandatory deadline for filing an opposition, as described in the Auricchio case. Accordingly, the order granting the continuance was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to rule on the motion for summary judgment without consideration of the untimely filed opposition. In so holding, the Court reinforced the mandatory deadlines set in La. C.C.P. art. 966 and provided additional guidance on the procedural rules for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment.

Appellate Court Rules a Waiver of UM Coverage Can Only Be Changed at the Insured’s Written Request

Under Louisiana law, all automobile liability policies include uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM coverage”) unless the insured affirmatively rejects such coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic only coverage in writing. The question of what qualifies as a valid rejection of UM coverage has been debated in numerous lawsuits across the state. In Barbera v. Andrade, examination of this issue continued, and the court ruled that an initial rejection of UM coverage remains effective until changed by the insured’s written request.

In Barbera, the court examined whether UM coverage was triggered under a policy when the insured, who previously waived coverage, failed to respond to the insurer’s request to complete a new UM waiver form. It was undisputed that the insured executed a valid waiver of UM coverage in 2001. In 2014, the insurer sent the insured a letter that asked the insured to complete an updated coverage selection form and return it to the insurer’s office. The insured did not execute the updated form. A driver insured under the policy was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2017 and filed a claim for UM benefits.

The insured argued the letter sent with the waiver form in 2014 was ambiguous and could be read to mean that failure to respond would mean that UM coverage would be read into the policy by default. Evidence also showed that some of the insurer’s employees also thought the failure to respond with the updated form would result in UM coverage.

However, La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) provides, “An insured may change the original uninsured motorist selection or rejection on a policy at any time during the life of the policy by submitting a new uninsured motorist selection form to the insurer on the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance.” Thus, the Court ruled that the insured’s initial rejection of UM coverage could only be changed via written request by submitting a waiver form to the insurer. The intent of the parties was inconsequential.

Because the insured executed a valid UM waiver in 2001, it remained part of the existing policy. No event, such as a change in the policy’s liability limits, occurred that required the execution of a new UM selection waiver form, and the insured did not submit a new form to the insurer to obtain UM coverage. Therefore, UM coverage was not afforded under the policy, and summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the insurer.

Case Reference: Barbera v. Andrade, 22-147 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/30/22), 2022 WL 1733087, — So.3d —.

Renewed or Was it New? Dispute over UM Coverage in Auto Policy

Louisiana law requires UM coverage in automobile liability insurance policies in the same amount as the policy’s bodily injury liability coverage. UM coverage will be included in the policy unless the insured rejects UM coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage. This rejection, selection of lower limits, or selection of economic-only coverage must be made on a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance and must be signed by the insured or its legal representative. See La. R.S. 22:1295. If a rejection form is not completed, UM coverage will be read into the policy. However, a valid UM waiver form executed for a policy of insurance remains in effect when that policy is renewed with a few exceptions. Generally, execution of a new waiver form is not required unless a new policy is issued or the liability limits increased. These basic principles were considered in the recent First Circuit decision in Johnson, et al. v.  Bass, Geico General Ins. Co., and GoAuto Management Services, LLC, 2021 CA 0139 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21).

In Johnson, the plaintiff obtained a policy of insurance from GoAuto on July 17, 2015 and validly rejected UM coverage on the commissioner’s UM rejection form. The plaintiff renewed the policy multiple times and also completed an “Application for Personal Automobile Insurance” on February 23, 2018 to add her husband and an additional vehicle to the policy. 

The Johnson plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident on November 26, 2019 and claimed UM benefits under the policy. She argued that the insurance application she completed in February 2018 to add a new driver and a new vehicle to the policy created a new policy of insurance that required completion of a new UM waiver form. Because a new UM waiver form was not executed in February 2018, the plaintiff argued that UM coverage should be read into the policy. Thus, the question posed to the court was whether the 2018  policy became new or was simply a renewal. The trial court found that the policy was a renewal and dismissed the UM claim.

The First Circuit affirmed and rejected the plaintiff’s argument holding, “the language of La. R.S. 22:1295 is clear and unambiguous; only changes in the ‘limits of liability’ to an existing policy will create a new policy that requires the completion of a new UM selection form.” Despite multiple renewals, the liability limits of the policy did not change from the date it was issued through the date of the accident. Importantly, the limits also did not change when the new driver and vehicle were added to the policy in February 2018. Thus, no new policy was created. The original rejection of UM coverage remained in effect, and the plaintiff’s claims against her alleged UM insurer were dismissed.

Louisiana Supreme Court Provides Updated Guidance on Execution of UM Waiver Forms

Under Louisiana law, uninsured/underinsured insurance coverage is implied in any automobile policy of insurance, and UM coverage will be read into the policy unless it is validly rejected. This rejection of UM coverage must be “clear and unmistakable.” The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of what qualifies as a valid rejection of UM coverage in Baack v. McIntosh, 2021-01054 (La. 6/30/21), — So.3d —.

The Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance provides a form which must be completed to reject UM coverage. This form allows the insured to initial one of four selections regarding UM coverage: (1) UM coverage at lower limits than liability coverage; (2) economic-only coverage with same limits; (3) economic-only UM coverage at lower limits; or (4) no UM coverage. A representative of the insured must initial one of these options for that option to apply to the policy at issue. This list does not include an option to select UM coverage. Therefore, the Baack Court held that “the only way to ‘select’ UM coverage on the form is to not initial any of the provided choices.”

The insured in Baack properly rejected UM coverage through the UM form in 2002. A proper rejection of UM coverage remains valid for the life of the policy, and a new form is not required when a policy is renewed. However, the Court found that, under La. R.S. 22:1295, an insured may change its rejection of UM coverage at any time by submitting a new UM form to the insurer. 

In 2011, the insured increased its liability limits under the policy, which required completion of a new form. UM coverage again was properly rejected. Even though not legally required, the insurer sent new UM waiver forms to the insured in 2012, 2013, and 2014 when the policy was renewed. However, the insured completed each of these forms without initialing any of the four selections related to UM coverage. The insurer later issued the insurance policies without objection. The court found that the insured changed its rejection of UM coverage when it submitted the new forms in 2012, 2013, and 2014.

Because the insurer did not initial these forms when they were resubmitted, the insured “selected” UM coverage under Baack’s analysis, and UM coverage was afforded under the policy. Importantly, the Court held that, if the insurer believed the failure to make a selection on the forms was a mistake, it was the insurer’s responsibility to follow-up with the insured to make any necessary corrections. Three justices dissented and argued that the majority opinion negates other law which provides that an insured must make a “written request” to add UM on a policy where UM is rejected. UM cases are often fact-intensive and each case should therefore be assessed under their own specific facts.

Summary Judgment Affirmed in Premises Liability Case Upon Court’s De Novo Review

In Marrero v. I. Manheim Auctions, Inc., the plaintiff fell after he exited a building during a rainstorm and stepped off a curb into a parking lot. He claimed he stepped into a divot where asphalt had washed away. The defendant moved for summary judgment.

In opposition, the plaintiff offered an expert affidavit that cited a lack of handrails, code violations, and loose pebbles as contributing to the plaintiff’s fall. To recover in the case, the plaintiff possessed the burden under La. R.S. 9:2800.6 to establish three elements: 1) the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm, 2) this risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, and 3) the defendant possessed actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect.

The defense argued the plaintiff could not show the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable and produced an expert affidavit to show the divot was only 3/16” deep. Evidence also showed the plaintiff was familiar with the area where he fell. The defendant also had received no prior complaints about the area. The trial court found that the parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm because the divot was only 3/16” deep and granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in light of the competing expert affidavits regarding whether the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm. However, when a motion for summary judgment is appealed, the court uses a de novo standard of review. Under this standard, the appellate court reviews all issues and considers all evidence submitted to the trial court in its ruling.

The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment but did so for different reasons than the trial court. The Marrero court found the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of the third element, i.e., whether the defendant knew or should have known of the defect. Because the plaintiff failed to establish a material issue of fact as to all three required elements, summary judgment was granted. Marrero reminds that appellate courts may consider facts and legal issues the trial court did not address in its ruling.

A Matter of Control of a Bike Results in No Liability under the LPLA

A Louisiana man logged onto eBay. To save some money, he bought a used racing bicycle. While riding this bike through his neighborhood, he noticed an unlevel section of the roadway and attempted a “bunny hop” over the gap in the pavement. The front wheel disconnected when he landed. The cyclist lost control and flipped over the handlebars, sustaining serious injuries. He later filed suit against Specialized, the manufacturer of the bicycle, under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”). See Delahoussaye v. Boelter, — So.3d—, 2019-0026 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/15/19).

The evidence in Delahoussaye showed that the bike was missing its “secondary retention device,” which keeps the wheel from disengaging if the “quick release” on clamp on the front fork is not engaged properly. Also, no warnings were found on the bike. Based upon this evidence, the cyclist claimed Specialized should be liable because the bike was defective; unreasonably dangerous in its design, construction, and manufacture; and inadequate in its instructions and warnings.

To recover from a manufacturer under the LPLA, a plaintiff must show that the product (here, the bike) was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the manufacturer’s control. Photographs of the bike showed a light, silver spot on the bike where the secondary retention device had been located. This confirmed that the secondary retention device was removed after it originally was manufactured. Evidence also showed that warning stickers originally on the bike had been removed.

These changes were made after Specialized lost control of the bike. Because the bike was not defective when the product left Specialized’s control, Specialized, as the bike’s manufacturer, could not be liable under the LPLA for injuries the plaintiff sustained when he lost control of the bike. In short, this case came down to a matter of control.


Reynolds LeBlanc is a partner at Keogh Cox. His practice areas include commercial litigation, personal injury claims, appeals, and other matters. Reynolds is a former teacher, who in his free time plays music and perpetually talks himself into training for his next marathon.

Interrupted by Silence: Medical Malpractice Prescription

By C. Reynolds LeBlanc

La. R.S. 9:5628 provides that a patient/medical malpractice plaintiff must assert his or her claim within one year of the alleged negligent act or from when that act is discovered. If a claim is not raised within this time frame, it is “prescribed,” i.e., untimely. The statute also declares that all claims must be asserted within three years of the alleged negligent act, even if the patient was unaware of the malpractice. However, there are exceptions.

Under the doctrine of contra non valentem, prescription does not run if the defendant has done something to prevent the plaintiff from filing within the prescriptive period. In In re Medical Review Panel of Gerard Lindquist, 18-444 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/19), 274 So.3d 750, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit considered whether a decision not to tell a patient about malpractice exempted from prescription a claim which was not filed within three years of the alleged malpractice.

In the case, Lindquist had spinal surgery on August 22, 2013. He returned on August 24, 2013 with complaints of pain. Although an x-ray showed a metal artifact in the operative site of his back, he was not informed and was discharged. He returned the next day with continued complaints of pain and an MRI was ordered. Like the x-ray, the MRI showed the metal artifact. Again, the plaintiff was not informed.

Lindquist continued to experience pain for years. When another MRI was performed on May 25, 2017, Lindquist was first informed of the metal object in his back. Within months,  he filed a claim against the doctor who performed the 2013 surgery. In response, the doctor argued that the claim was prescribed under La. R.S. 9:5628 because it was filed more than three years after the surgery.

Contra non valentem applies where a plaintiff has been lulled into inaction because of concealment or fraudulent conduct by the defendant. The doctor argued that this standard was not met simply because the doctor was silent about the patient’s condition. However, the Lindquist court held that a doctor possesses an affirmative duty to advise a patient of pertinent medical information such as the presence of a metal artifact near the spine.  Therefore, if the doctor, as alleged in Lindquist, failed to disclose a metal foreign object, this would constitute a fraudulent act which prevented the plaintiff from filing his claim timely.  In Lindquist, prescription was interrupted by silence and the plaintiff/patient was allowed to pursue his claim.

Reynolds LeBlanc is a partner at Keogh Cox. His practice areas include commercial litigation, personal injury claims, appeals, and other matters. Reynolds is a former teacher, who in his free time plays music and perpetually talks himself into training for his next marathon.

Court Gives Guidance on Elements of a Slip and Fall: You’ve Got to Keep them Separated

Louisiana law does not recognize “strict liability” for slip and falls and a merchant is not automatically liable for someone’s injuries simply because he or she fell on the merchant’s premises. Before plaintiffs can recover damages for a slip and fall that occurs in a merchant’s store, La. R.S. 9:2800.6 requires plaintiffs to prove three separate elements in addition to causation and damages: 1) that the condition that caused the accident presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable; 2) that the merchant either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition (the “notice element”); and 3) that the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. A recent decision from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit highlights that evidence used to establish one element is not always good enough to establish another. Instead, all three of these elements are required for liability to attach.

In Batiste v. United Fire and Casualty Company, 17-482 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/18), the plaintiff claimed she slipped and fell on water in a grocery store aisle. Batiste admitted that she did not know where the water came from, how long the water had been on the ground, or whether any employees knew the water was present. As such, the plaintiff conceded that she could not show that the grocery store created the condition or had actual knowledge of the puddle before she fell.

However, Batiste claimed the store had constructive notice of the condition. To support this argument, the plaintiff pointed to evidence that a grocery store employee failed to confirm she completed a walk-around inspection of the store before the accident, in violation of company policy. Batiste argued that the puddle of water would have been discovered had the inspection been performed and that the failure to perform the inspection was proof that the grocery store possessed “constructive notice.”

The court disagreed. To establish constructive notice, plaintiffs “must come forward with ‘positive evidence’ showing the damage-causing condition existed for some period of time” sufficient to place the merchant on notice of the defect. Without this “temporal element,” constructive notice cannot be inferred. An employee’s failure to perform a pre-incident inspection could not establish this temporal element. Therefore, the court found that plaintiff’s claims were properly dismissed. In closing, the court observed:

While the evidence regarding the adequacy and timing of the floor inspection may be relevant for proving a failure to exercise reasonable care to discovery a hazardous condition, a delay in the performance of such procedures offers no proof of how long any such condition may have been on the floor, a separate and equally essential requirement of the Batistes’ burden of proof under Section 9:2800.6.

The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed because she could not establish each element of her claim. Evidence of one element was not evidence of another.

 

Reynolds LeBlanc is a partner at Keogh Cox. His practice areas include commercial litigation, personal injury claims, appeals, and other matters. Reynolds is a former teacher, who in his free time plays music and perpetually talks himself into training for his next marathon.

Did You Just Create a Contract?

You tell a contractor you want him to repair a problem. Before leaving your house, the contractor says he will “look into it” and “get back to you.” Have you just made an oral contract for the repair? The answer to this question is no, according to Hodson v. Daron Cavaness Builder, Inc., 2017-1235 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/27/18), a recent First Circuit Decision.

In Louisiana, an oral contract for over $500 must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances. See La. C.C. art. 1846. The person trying to enforce the oral contract may serve as her own witness to meet this standard, but evidence of the corroborating circumstances must come from some other source. In Hodson, the plaintiff observed cracks in her floor and called a contractor to examine the problem. The plaintiff made it clear she wanted the contractor to repair the floor. While the contractor denied promising to fix the floor, he admitted that he promised to “look into it and get back with her in a week or two.” Despite his promise, he never called the homeowner back.

The plaintiff filed suit and claimed she was entitled to recover damages for the cost of repairing her floor. The Trial Court found the contractor’s admissions to be enough “corroborating evidence” to establish an oral contract for the repair. However, the First Circuit found the parties did not make an oral contract to repair the floor. Instead, the contractor only agreed to “look into it.” According to the Hodson Court, a “broken promise to look into a situation does not equate to an oral agreement to repair.”

The Hodson decision shows that while Louisiana law allows parties to create oral contracts, it can be difficult to prove that a contract was actually formed or to define the details of the agreement. If you put the agreement in writing, you won’t be left wondering whether you just created a contract.

 

Reynolds LeBlanc is a partner at Keogh Cox. His practice areas include commercial litigation, personal injury claims, appeals, and other matters. Reynolds is a former teacher, who in his free time plays music and perpetually talks himself into training for his next marathon.

Homeowners Awarded Money Damages Against “Good Faith” Seller of In-Ground Swimming Pool

Anyone who has spent time in the humid South knows why swimming pools are popular. The Hoffmanns, Louisiana residents, tried to purchase an in-ground swimming pool to entertain their grandchildren but found the pool was far from the oasis they imagined. Recently, in Hoffmann v. B & G, Inc., 2016-1001 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/17), 215 So.3d 273, the First Circuit upheld an award in their favor which returned the price of the pool and additional costs related to its installation even though the seller was unaware of the problems with the pool at the time of sale.

The Hoffmanns asserted what is known in Louisiana law as a “redhibition” claim. Redhibition allows purchasers to void a sale if the thing bought has a “vice or defect” that makes it either:

(1) useless, or

(2) so inconvenient that the buyers would not have bought the thing had they known of the problem.

When the Hoffmanns purchased the pool, the seller arranged to have it installed, which was included in the price. The Hoffmanns used the pool for two summers. However, when they uncovered the pool for its third summer of use, they discovered that the pool liner had detached. The Hoffmanns later learned that the manufacturer no longer recommended their specific pool to be installed completely in-ground.

With redhibition, “good faith” sellers (sellers who did not know of the defect) must be given the chance to repair or replace the defective thing. Instead of repairing the pool, the seller of the Hoffmanns’ pool arranged for a new pool to be installed by a third party. Unfortunately, this second “replacement” pool also failed, this time because of an installation issue.  After the second pool failed, the Hoffmanns filed suit.

The pool company argued that the Hoffmanns could not support a redhibition claim because the second pool they provided did not have a defect, but instead failed because of faulty installation. It claimed that it discharged its redhibition duties with respect to the first pool when it replaced the pool. The court disagreed and found that the “object” of the sale was a functioning in-ground swimming pool and that, after all of the efforts to repair and/or replace the original pool, the Hoffmanns still did not have a “defect-free useable in-ground swimming pool.”

The Hoffmanns won, making their summer a little more bearable.

Who Gives a Fuss about an Oxford Comma?

Who Gives a Fuss about an Oxford Comma?

Some judges do. And a missing comma might cost $10 million.

By: C. Reynolds LeBlanc

Let’s take a trip back to middle school for a quick grammar review. Before I was a lawyer, I taught English. Diligently, I taught my students the importance of proper comma usage but never imagined that the fate of a multi-million dollar lawsuit would rest on how this simple mark on the page can change the meaning of a sentence.

As I taught my students, the Oxford comma comes into play when you have a series of words, phrases, or clauses. Take a look at the previous sentence. I used an Oxford comma. It is the one between “phrases” and “or.” People who like the Oxford comma say that it makes it easier for the reader to understand what the author is trying to say.

Not everyone thinks the comma is necessary. Every now and then, a student, whose curiosity would override their fear of appearing “too interested” in grammar, would ask, “Why do you even need a comma if you can tell what the author is trying to say without it?” It is a good question, and grammar nerds have been arguing about its answer for more than a century.

But the Oxford comma can make a dramatic difference. Consider these two sentences:

Darren is excited about his vacation with his wife, his best friend, and his cousin.

vs.

Darren is excited about his vacation with his wife, his best friend and his cousin.

Here, the Oxford comma makes all the difference. It distinguishes between (1) a nice vacation Darren will have with three other people and (2) an awkward situation where Darren should be advised that he is living a weird, taboo lifestyle and that his marriage to his best friend and cousin is absolutely null under La. C.C. art. 94.  While we can safely assume that Darren was excited about a group trip, this example makes the point.

In O’Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy, 851 F. 3d 69 (1 Cir. 3/13/17), a federal court refused to make a similar assumption, and it might cost more than $10 million, all because a statute did not use an Oxford comma. In O’Connor, dairy truck drivers filed a lawsuit to recover overtime pay. In Maine, overtime pay law does not apply to “canning, processing, preserving, freezing, drying, marketing, storing, packing for shipment or distribution of” food.

The defendant (the Oakhurst dairy) argued that the case should be dismissed because the drivers were involved in the “distribution of” food and were not entitled to overtime pay. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

On appeal, the drivers countered that because there was no Oxford comma after “shipment,” the statute only applied to the act of “packing” food (for shipment or distribution), which they did not do. An Oxford comma would have made the dairy’s argument correct and the case would have been dismissed. However, no comma was used and the federal court of appeals found that the statute was ambiguous. The case was sent back to district court, where the dairy may now get squeezed for someone else’s $10 million comma omission.

Maybe the Maine legislators should have paid a little more attention in class.

Louisiana Courts Continue Re-Establishment of the Open and Obvious Defense

Under traditional Louisiana law, if somebody tripped and fell, the property owner would not be liable for an injury (1) if the person reasonably should have seen the thing that caused them to fall or (2) if it was as obvious to the person as it was to the property owner. Stated another way, if the alleged condition was “open” and “obvious,” then that condition could not be “unreasonably dangerous,” and the property owner would not be liable. This thinking formed the basis of the “open and obvious defense” in Louisiana law.

A few years ago, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a ruling in Broussard v. State, 2012-1238 (La. 2013), 113 So.3d 175 that raised doubts about the usefulness of the open and obvious defense. However, recent decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court and various courts of appeal have clarified that the open and obvious defense is not dead.

A recent example of this trend is seen in Morel v. Cheema Properties, LLC, 16-666 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/12/17), — So.3d —. This case involved a trip-and-fall accident at a gas station. On her way inside to pay for her gas, an elderly plaintiff saw two hoses next to a curb where she stepped up to enter the store. When she exited the store, she saw that the two hoses had separated and now blocked her path. She fell and was injured when she tried to navigate through these hoses. The property owner asserted the open and obvious defense and plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.

The court found that the plaintiff “was aware of the open and obvious risk” and that she fell while attempting to step over the hoses. The court observed that the plaintiff could have avoided the risk by asking for assistance or for the hoses to be moved. To the court, it was significant “that the plaintiff saw the hoses and was aware that the hoses could cause her to fall.” Therefore, because the alleged condition was open and obvious, it did not present an unreasonable risk.

This recent Fifth Circuit decision is consistent with recent trends in Louisiana law and shows that the open and obvious defense remains alive and well.