Arbitration Awards: U.S. Fifth Circuit Confirms Judicial Deference

In a decision released October 9, 2013, the U.S. Fifth Circuit upheld the grant of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss by concluding that the Federal Power Act ("FPA") preempts property damage claims based in Louisiana state tort law where the alleged damage is the result of operations that comply with the FERC-issued license. Simmons v. Sabine River Authority, No. 12-30494, - F.3d - , (5th Cir. 10/09/2013).

This issue, recognized as a question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, arose in a case where the plaintiffs, all Louisiana owners and residents of property located downstream from the federally-licensed hydroelectric Toledo Bend Dam situated on the Sabine River, sued Sabine River Authority of Louisiana and various Entergy defendants to recover damages for flooding incidents and to enjoin the opening of the Dam's flood gates in such a way as to cause inundation of the downstream properties.

On behalf of defendants, Keogh Cox moved to dismiss the suit by claiming state tort law claims for damages and injunctive relief interferes with the exclusive authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ["FERC"] to regulate and control the operations of the federally-licensed Toledo Bend project such that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted under the FPA. The District Court granted the motion after extensive briefing and argument by Keogh Cox attorneys, John P. Wolff, III, Nancy B. Gilbert, Martin E. Golden, and Virginia J. McLin.

In affirming the district court's ruling, the Fifth Circuit recognized U.S. Supreme Court precedent that has interpreted the FPA as "occupying the field of public water use and power generation except for water use rights." As a result, in accord with Ninth Circuit law, it interpreted the general savings clause in the FPA [16 U.S.C. § 821] narrowly to exempt only "a state property law regime [that] enables users of streams and wells to obtain proprietary rights in a continuing quantity of water." The Court also recognized that state damage claims can have the same effect as a state regulation and may serve as a collateral attack on a federal license, such that it refused to interpret the limited savings clause [16 U.S.C. § 803(c)] to permit "state tort law to supplant FERC's exclusive control of dam operations." Because "applying state tort law to set the duty of care for the operation of the FERC-licensed project would 'stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the FPA," the Fifth Circuit held plaintiffs' state law property damages claims were conflict preempted under the FPA.

That a single federal agency should control public water use and dam operations was noted to be especially appropriate because the Toledo Bend Dam spans Texas and Louisiana state lines and, if not preempted, different causes of action and standards of conduct could have been imposed under the laws of the two states.

Clients frequently ask their attorneys whether they should arbitrate their commercial and construction disputes instead of litigating in the court system. This question arises either when drafting the contract or, if the contract contains an arbitration clause, once a claim occurs. Claims that require analysis of complex contracts, government regulations, and technical issues, such as those that arise in the construction, environmental, and energy industries, are well-suited to arbitration.

Parties typically want the quickest and least expensive means to a fair result. This is true even for highly sophisticated businesses where the amount in dispute is high. Arbitration gives parties a high level of control in the dispute resolution process. It is specifically designed to provide an alternative to the onerous and expensive discovery and trial procedures required in litigation. Parties can tailor the discovery and schedule to the needs of the case, which drastically reduces the overall time and cost of reaching resolution.

Arbitration also allows parties to select an arbitrator with specialized knowledge necessary to decide the case, which is especially beneficial in complex cases. Because parties agree to arbitration in their contract, they have control over the process in a way that is not available in litigation. For example, the parties may designate the administrative body and applicable rules, require a three-arbitrator panel for a complex case, name a particular arbitrator, require confidentiality, or dictate the timeframe for the hearing.

The following four factors are key considerations in assessing arbitration:

Expertise of decision-maker – One of the most important benefits of arbitration is the parties’ ability to select the arbitrator. This affords parties an opportunity to designate a decision-maker with specific qualifications and expertise needed to understand the contracts, legal issues, engineering and technical facts, and expert evidence to be presented. The parties can also select someone with strong management skills to handle complex matters or difficult decisions. The benefit is two-fold: Fewer resources are needed to educate the decision-maker in the critical industry background information, and the risk of an unreasonable ruling is reduced.

Timeframe for resolution – The median time to resolution in commercial arbitrations is less than one year, whereas the time to trial in federal court is two to three years.* Because appeal rights in arbitration are limited, the award typically terminates the dispute and the expense. However, after a trial, the case could linger through the appeal process for several more years, thus increasing the expense.

In addition to direct cost saving, decreasing the resolution time creates an indirect cost benefit to industry. Because “time is money,” shaving years off the process results in significant savings that likely can be better used advancing the business than litigating a case. Businesses lose billions of dollars every year because of the inherent delays in the litigation process.^ These losses stem from uncertainty in the outcome, capital set aside as reserves for potential losses, open claims reported to insurers, investors, potential clients and auditors, and loss of employee hours and administrative costs expended in litigation. Arbitration offers an alternative to mitigate and control these costs.

Expense – Arbitration typically costs more upfront than litigation. The parties must pay the administrative costs and arbitrator fees, which vary depending on the time and complexity involved, but generally range from $20,000 for a $100,000 claim to $60,000 for a $1 million claim. The costs are shared among the parties, which decreases the per-party cost in multiparty claims.

However, parties can control the cost of arbitration. Discovery, depositions, and document production in complex cases can come with staggering costs. In arbitration, the rules governing discovery and evidence are less formal. Additionally, discovery is more limited, which encourages a streamlined process and reduces costs and time significantly.

Risks – An often-cited risk of arbitration is the lack of appeal right. An arbitration award can only be vacated on limited grounds of fraud, corruption, misconduct, or where an arbitrator exceeds their power.~ However, if the initial decision-maker has expertise in the industry and law involved, the expectation is that the decision will be a well-reasoned one that the parties can accept.

In contrast, a major risk of litigating a complex commercial dispute is the fact-finder’s lack of understanding of the issues, the escalating potential for nuclear verdicts, and the appellate court’s limited power to correct factual findings.

In sum, arbitration is a good choice for dispute resolution where parties want to control the risk of an unreasonable outcome, reduce the time and expense of the process, and select a decision-maker with special expertise in their industry.

About the author: Mary Anne Wolf is an engineer and attorney. She is on the panel of commercial and construction arbitrators for the American Arbitration Association. Her goal as an arbitrator is to assist parties in managing their case for efficient resolution, give a high level of attention to each party’s position, and achieve a fair result.

References:

* AAA, Measuring the Costs of Delays in Dispute Resolution [online]; Micronomics, (March 2017), Efficiency and Economic Benefits of Dispute Resolution through Arbitration Compared with U.S. District Court Proceedings.

^ Efficiency and Economic Benefits, pp. 4-5, 16-23.

~ La. R.S. 9:4210 (LA Binding Arbitration Act); 9 USCA §10 (FAA).

The question addressed in MR Pittman Group, LLC versus Plaquemines Parish Government, 2015-0396 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/2/15) was whether the five-year peremptive period set by La. R.S. 9:5607 displaces Louisiana’s general one-year prescriptive period set by La. C.C. art. 3492, when applied to tort claims against design professionals. Finding a contractor’s claim against the project engineers prescribed, the MR Pittman court held that the one-year prescriptive period governs tort claims against design professionals.

La. R.S. 9:5607 explicitly provides a peremptive period that extinguishes all claims against architects, engineers and other design professionals five years after the project is completed, thus limiting design professional liability associated with the project. The MR Pittman plaintiff/contractor argued that the statute also eliminates the one-year prescriptive period and instead creates a special five-year prescriptive period, which allowed the contractor up to five years to bring its claim against the engineers to recover for delay and other extra costs allegedly resulting from deficiencies in the construction plans. This interpretation effectively expands tort liability by increasing the time period for bringing a tort claim from one to five years. In rejecting this argument, the MR Pittman court clarified that under the statute any claimant has no more than five years after project completion to bring suit against the design professional for any cause. However, a tort claimant still has only one year to file suit from the date he “knew or should have known” of damage caused by the alleged wrongful actions of the design professional.

A secondary question addressed in MR Pittman was the date of commencement of the one-year prescriptive period, which under La. C.C. 3492 commences to run from the day damage is sustained. The defendant/engineers argued that prescription commenced when the contractor first became aware of the alleged design deficiencies early in construction, as evidenced by the contractor’s notice to the owner of the deficiencies. The contractor argued that it could not fully appreciate its damages until the change orders were resolved later in the project. Citing Louisiana Supreme Court precedent holding that the quantum of damages need not be certain or fully incurred to trigger commencement of prescription, Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 593 So.2d 351, 354 (La. 1992), the court agreed with the engineers’ position and dismissed the claims.