Arbitration Awards: U.S. Fifth Circuit Confirms Judicial Deference

Under Louisiana law, unjust enrichment is a cause of action that is based in equity and provides that no one should be enriched at the expense of another. The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) no other available remedy at law. The Supreme Court recently addressed the fourth element regarding the absence of justification for the enrichment.

In H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, a grass cutting contractor entered into a contract with the Parish for grass cutting in certain areas. The Parish separately contracted with a second contractor for weed control of the same areas. During the contract period, the grass cutting contractor notified the Parish that there was unanticipated weed growth and suggested that the weed control contractor was not properly applying the herbicide. The grass cutting contractor alleged that its work became more expensive because of the weed control contractor’s failure to perform its contractual obligation.

The grass cutting contractor sued the Parish alleging unjust enrichment. The Parish filed an exception of no cause of action, claiming that there was no claim for unjust enrichment because a contract existed between the parties. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that the contractor could bring a claim for unjust enrichment because there was no contractual claim between the contractor and the Parish, as both parties fulfilled their contract obligations.

The Supreme Court reversed, noting that a claim for unjust enrichment requires a showing that there was an “absence of justification or cause for the enrichment.” The Supreme Court held that when a contract exists between the parties, it serves as the law between them, and that contract is the legal cause or justification for the enrichment. Therefore, the contract between the contractor and the Parish was in fact the justification for the enrichment such that it could not be “unjust.” The Supreme Court dismissed the contractor’s suit against the Parish.

Reference:

H&O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson, 24-554 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), writ granted, decision rev'd sub nom. H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, 2025-00086 (La. 5/20/25), 408 So.3d 958.

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Hurricanes Laura and Delta caused substantial damage in Louisiana, resulting in extensive litigation that continues to develop. In a July 8, 2024 blog post, we reported that the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., affirmed that equitable estoppel applied to allow domestic insurers to compel arbitration under the New York Convention even where the insured dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice. Click here to read more.

New case law from the LA Supreme Court warrants supplementation of our prior blog post. The Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish (“Calcasieu”) filed suit in federal court to recover alleged underpaid and untimely insurance claim payments. Various domestic insurers moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses found in two foreign insurers’ policies. The foreign policies required all claims be submitted to arbitration in New York under New York law. The insurers relied upon Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., and Calcasieu moved to certify questions to the LA Supreme Court.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of LA certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court to address this issue. In Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held:

1. Arbitration is prohibited by statute. The case involved the interpretation of La. R.S. 22:868, as amended in 2020. Generally, La. R.S. 22:868(A) prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in insurance policies. The Court held this prohibition is rooted in public policy because compulsory arbitration clauses deprive courts of jurisdiction over actions against insurers. The Court noted it historically has held arbitration clauses within insurance policies are unenforceable, and it did not deviate from its historical position.

2. As a matter of first impression, an insurance policy with a political subdivision is a “public contract” within meaning of the statute banning any provision in public contracts which requires a suit or arbitration proceeding to be brought in a forum or jurisdiction outside of the state. It was undisputed that Calcasieu is a political subdivision of this state. Also, it was undisputed the Defendants contracted with Calcasieu to provide insurance coverage for approximately 300 properties that Calcasieu owned for the benefit of the public. No private actors involved. Thus, the Court found, “The Defendants’ insurance policies clearly covered public properties owned by Calcasieu, purchased with public funds––taxpayer dollars. As such, we easily find insurance contracts with political subdivisions, like the policies at issue, are public contracts within the meaning of La. R.S. 9:2778.” Thus, the statute precludes arbitration or venue outside of LA, or the application of foreign law, in claims involving the State and its political subdivisions.

3. A domestic insurer may not use equitable estoppel to enforce arbitration via a foreign insurer's policy. Citing its disagreement with the Federal Court’s ruling in Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins., the Court held “[E]quitable estoppel is not available under these circumstances because it conflicts with the positive law of La. R.S. 22:868, which prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies. As such, domestic insurers may not employ this common law doctrine to compel arbitration through the clause of another insurer's policies, as it clearly contravenes La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2). A contrary finding would (1) violate Louisiana's positive law prohibiting arbitration in Louisiana-issued insurance policies; and (2) invite domestic insurers’ misuse a doctrine of ‘last resort’ to ceaselessly rely on insurance policies of foreign insurers to compel arbitration.”

References:

Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., 2024 WL 4579035 (La.), 9, 2024-00449 (La. 10/25/24).

Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. 96 F.4th 726 (5th Cir. 2024).

The longstanding rule that the analysis for "piercing the corporate veil" of an LLC is substantially the same as the analysis for piercing the veil of corporations has been called into question by the recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Ogea v. Travis Merritt and Merrit Construction, LLC, 2013-1085, --- So.3d ---. In Ogea, the Court addressed "the extent of the limitation of liability afforded to a member of an LLC" and the statutory basis for exceptions to this limited liability.

Typical of a veil piercing case, the Ogea Court began its discussion by citing familiar Louisiana cases on the topic: Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So.2d 1164 (La. 1991) and the more recent Charming Charlie, Inc. v. Perkins Rowe Associates, L.L.C., 11-2254 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/10/12), 97 So.3d 595. However, the similarities stopped there.

The Court noted that traditional veil piercing doctrine was not invoked by the lower courts or the plaintiff. Instead, the Court's analysis turned on the interpretation of an infrequently cited statute within Title 12 that addresses the limitation of liability for LLC members. La. R.S. 12:1320(A) states that the liability of members and managers of an LLC "shall at all times be determined solely and exclusively by the provisions of this Chapter." Subsection (B) provides that members and managers are generally not liable for the debts, obligations, or liabilities of the LLC. Subsection (D) prescribes the exceptions to this limitation of liability, to include fraud, breach of professional duty, and any other negligent or wrongful act by the member or manager.

Addressing this statute as a matter of first impression, the Ogea Court applied the statute to the facts of the case. Merritt Construction, LLC was hired to build a home for plaintiff, Mary Ogea. As part of the process, Ms. Ogea requested that she have a friend prepare the site for the foundation. Travis Merritt, the sole member of Merritt Construction, LLC, informed Ms. Ogea that having someone else prepare the site would waive the warranty. Mr. Merritt subsequently operated the bulldozer to prepare the site for a subcontractor to pour the concrete slab. A dispute arose when a concrete contractor informed Ms. Ogea of problems with the home's foundation. Under these facts, the Court concluded Mr. Merritt was not personally liable under the exclusive exceptions to limited liability found in La. R.S. 12:1320(D).

The first exception, fraud, was rejected because no evidence in the record supported a finding that Mr. Merritt committed fraud.

Turning to the next exception, the Court also rejected the argument that plaintiff breached a professional duty as the sole member of the construction company. The professions recognized in Louisiana's corporate laws do not include individuals who perform construction work. Thus, Mr. Merritt could not breach a "professional duty" as contemplated by the statute. The Court also noted that the contract at issue only recognized Merritt Construction, LLC as a licensed contractor and did not reference any contractor's license held by Mr. Merritt personally.

Finally, the Court addressed the final exception to limited liability: "negligent or wrongful act." Plaintiff asserted that the term "negligence" in the statute only required proof of a tort by the individual. The Court quickly rejected this argument, noting that such an interpretation would improperly expand the liability of LLC members.

Rather, the Court set forth four factors to assist in the analysis under the last "negligence" exception: 1) whether a member's conduct could be fairly characterized as a traditionally recognized tort; 2) whether a member's conduct could be fairly characterized as a crime, for which a natural person, not a juridical person, could be held culpable; 3) whether the conduct at issue was required by, or was in furtherance of, a contract between the claimant and the LLC; and 4) whether the conduct at issue was done outside the member's capacity as a member.

It appears from the Ogea Court's focus that the prior analysis for "piercing the veil" of an LLC has perhaps been set aside and replaced with a new analysis which considers the exceptions to limited liability listed in La. R.S. 12:1320. However, the Court failed to expressly state that the prior analysis is improper and therefore no longer applicable. For now, it appears that the rules for piercing the veil of an LLC have changed but the true impact of Ogea remains to be seen.