Tag: summary judgment

Louisiana Supreme Court Confirms that Statutory Deadline to Oppose Summary Judgment Is Mandatory

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device a party can use to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966 is the statute that governs motions for summary judgment in Louisiana. The statute was amended in 2015 to establish some new procedural rules for filing summary judgment motions. Before the statue was amended, the deadline for opposing a motion for summary judgment was set in the District Court Rules, and courts frequently allowed oppositions to motions for summary judgment to be filed after the statutory delay.

In 2015, the Legislature amended the statute to state that “absent the consent of the parties and the court, an opposition shall be filed” within the new fifteen-day deadline established by the article. In Auricchio v. Harriston, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the amendments to the statute removed the discretionary language that previously allowed a court to allow a party additional time to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled the amendments to art. 966 made the opposition deadline mandatory, and late-filed oppositions should not be considered in connection with a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Mahe v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC. The Court considered whether a trial court may grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment when a party fails to file its opposition within the fifteen-day deadline set in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).

In Mahe, a party requested a continuance of the hearing after the fifteen-day deadline passed. While subsection 966(C)(2) provides that a continuance of the hearing is permitted “for good cause shown,” the Court held that the requested continuance could not serve to circumvent the mandatory deadline for filing an opposition, as described in the Auricchio case. Accordingly, the order granting the continuance was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to rule on the motion for summary judgment without consideration of the untimely filed opposition. In so holding, the Court reinforced the mandatory deadlines set in La. C.C.P. art. 966 and provided additional guidance on the procedural rules for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment.

Supreme Court Settles Circuit Split on Right to Appeal Summary Judgment

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled that a co-defendant who pleads comparative fault as an affirmative defense may appeal a summary judgment that dismisses a co-defendant, even when the plaintiff did not file an appeal. The Court’s decision in Amedee v. Aimbridge Hospitality resolved a circuit split among the Louisiana Courts of Appeal regarding this issue.

The Amedee plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against multiple defendants including the City of New Orleans and Premium Parking of South Texas, LLC. After discovery, the City of New Orleans filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal from the suit. The plaintiff did not oppose the city’s motion. Premium Parking was the only party to file an opposition. The trial court granted the city’s motion and dismissed it from the suit. Premium Parking appealed the court’s judgment.

The Fourth Circuit did not address the merits of Premium Parking’s appeal. Instead, the court dismissed the appeal because it found Premium Parking did not have a legal right to appeal the city’s dismissal when the plaintiff did not appeal the judgment.

The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court’s ruling. The Court noted that “to prohibit appellate review of a summary judgment by a co-defendant, even where a plaintiff did not appeal, diminishes the search for truth—the object of a lawsuit—and denies a defendant the ability to fully defend itself.” To reach this conclusion, the Court first asked, who may appeal a judgment?

To answer this question, the Court looked to La. C.C.P. art. 2082 and observed the article makes no restriction regarding what party may appeal a final judgment. Further, the Court noted that the right to an appeal is even extended third parties, not involved in the suit, when that third party is allegedly aggrieved by the judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 2086.

The Court also considered a defendant’s right to appeal in the context of Louisiana’s pure comparative fault system and summary judgments. Under La. C.C. art. 2323, Louisiana’s comparative fault statute, the fault of all parties is to be quantified. La. C.C.P. art. 966(G), provides that when summary judgment is granted in favor of a party or non-party to a suit, the fault of the dismissed party may not be considered in any subsequent allocation of fault in the matter.

The Court noted that while art. 966(G) precludes an allocation of the fault of a party dismissed under the statute, it does not limit the right of a defendant to appeal the dismissal of a co-defendant. No statute limited a defendant’s right to appeal a summary judgment only to those situations where a plaintiff also filed an appeal. Therefore, a defendant who hopes to keep a co-defendant in the case so that fault still may be allocated to the dismissed party at trial now may appeal the co-defendant’s dismissal, even when the plaintiff fails to do so.

Case Reference: Amedee v. Aimbridge Hosp. LLC, 2021-01906 (La. 10/1/22), — So.3d —, 2022 WL 12338929.

Merchant Liability: No Evidence of Creation or Knowledge of Spill on Premises

In Cooper v. Albertsons Companies, LLC, 20-124 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/21/20), 2020 WL 6163099, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against a merchant and premises owner.  The plaintiff, a vendor, made deliveries to a pharmacy on a regular basis.  He slipped on a clear substance believed to be vinegar. The trial judge granted a defense summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed.

Because there was no evidence of Albertsons’ actual knowledge of the condition, the plaintiff had to demonstrate under Louisiana’s “slip and fall” statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.6, that it either created the condition or possessed “constructive knowledge” to defeat the motion for summary judgment.

No Creation of the Condition– In response to the motion for summary judgment, Cooper argued that the size and dispersal of the liquid provided circumstantial evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the merchant created the condition. The court noted that circumstantial evidence “must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis with a fair amount of certainty.” The plaintiff did not possess evidence to show that Albertsons’ employees stocked shelves that morning or even that any employee worked in the area before the fall.  Simply, no facts supported an inference that Albertsons caused the spill.


No Constructive Knowledge– Cooper also failed to show how long the liquid was on the floor before he slipped. The liquid was clear, and no evidence established the spill was visible to anyone.  No footprints, tracks, grocery-cart wheels, or the like were identified to suggest the length of time the liquid had been on the floor either.

Under the evidence presented, the Third circuit affirmed and found for the merchant. Handled by Keogh Cox attorneys, the Cooper case is a recent example that summary relief should be considered when plaintiff’s proof of a mandatory prerequisite to recovery in a “slip and fall” claim is lacking.