Tag: Merchant

Summary Judgment Affirmed Because Alleged Defect was Open and Obvious

The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed summary judgment in Rainey v. Knight, on grounds that the alleged defect was open and obvious. Its ruling shows that the open and obvious defense remains viable and supports summary judgment when reasonable minds can only agree that a condition is not unreasonably dangerous.

In Rainey, the plaintiff fell and was injured while leaving a veterinary hospital. Evidence showed the plaintiff frequented the premises for nearly twenty years before the incident. The plaintiff attempted to descend four steps from the hospital’s elevated porch but stepped off the porch and fell twenty-one inches to the ground. Rainey filed suit for his injuries, alleging the defendant failed to maintain its property. Specifically, he claimed that the elevated porch lacked a railing, which created a defect.

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and argued (1) the front porch ledge was an open and obvious defect and (2) the plaintiff could not show the defendant had knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition of the porch. The defendant also produced evidence to show it had no prior problems with anyone falling from the porch.

The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion, but his opposition was filed one day late. Because the opposition was not filed timely, the appellate court noted it was unable to consider the plaintiff’s opposition and exhibits under the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Auricchio v. Harriston.

On appeal, the court focused its analysis on whether the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff, applying Louisiana’s risk/utility balancing test to consider the utility of the condition, the likelihood and magnitude of harm, the cost of preventing the harm, and the nature of the plaintiff’s activities.

In examination of the likelihood and the magnitude of the harm, the appellate court noted that summary judgment may be granted if a condition is open and obvious. If reasonable minds could only agree that the condition was not unreasonably dangerous, that condition would be open and obvious, and the plaintiff would be unable to establish the defendant breached any duty owed to the plaintiff. 

Considering the evidence before the court, the First Circuit found a reasonable person would have found the lack of a railing on the porch open and obvious and would have avoided the area where plaintiff fell when exiting the building. Importantly, the court found the lack of a railing was apparent to all who encountered it such that it was open and obvious.

The Rainey court also noted that the lack of reported complaints about the alleged condition indicated a low risk of harm. The height of the porch also showed the likelihood and magnitude of the plaintiff’s harm was minimal.  In light of this evidence, the lack of railing around the entire porch was not an unreasonably dangerous condition. No reasonable factfinder could find that the defendant breached any duty owed to the plaintiff, and summary judgment was appropriately granted.

References:

Rainey v. Knight, 2023-0133 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23) (La. App. 1st Cir. Nov. 3, 2023)

Auricchio v. Harriston, 2020-01167 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So.3d 660

Louisiana Supreme Court Clarifies Analysis for Open & Obvious Conditions

It seems intuitive that people have an obligation to avoid potentially harmful conditions that are open and obvious. Nevertheless, treatment of open and obvious conditions in Louisiana law has proved tricky because many cases did not apply a uniform analytical framework. In Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently offered needed guidance on the appropriate analysis for open and obvious conditions.

The plaintiff stopped at a gas station and decided to walk her dog in a nearby grassy area. To get to the grassy area, Farrell had to cross a pool of water that was “approximately the length of a tractor-trailer.” Farrell attempted to jump across the narrowest part of the pool, but slipped and fell. She sued for damages arising from her injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the condition was open and obvious. The trial court and court of appeal denied the defendants’ motion. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the matter and reversed.

In finding that the condition was open and obvious, the court began its analysis by outlining the elements that a plaintiff must establish to recover for damage arising from a defect under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2316, 2317 and 2317.1:

  • That the defendant owed plaintiff a duty to conform its conduct to a specific standard;
  • That the defendant breached the duty owed;
  • That the defendant’s conduct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries;
  • That the defendant’s conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and,
  • That the plaintiff suffered damages.

The court also highlighted the requirement under La. R.S. 2317.1 that plaintiff show the defendant knew or should have known of the condition before the injury occurred.

The court noted that some courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, while other courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant had breached the duty that was owed. In Farrell, the court found a duty was owed under the code articles referenced above. It clarified that whether a condition was open and obvious should be considered during analysis of whether the duty was breached, pursuant to Louisiana’s “risk/utility” test. This test requires consideration of whether the condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm, which considers whether the condition had any social utility; the likelihood and magnitude of harm the condition presented; the cost of preventing the harm; and the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct, including whether plaintiff’s conduct was socially useful or inherently dangerous.

Specifically, whether a condition is open and obvious should be considered in determining the likelihood of harm and magnitude of harm to an objectively reasonable person. The court further advised that the specific nature of the condition should be considered, such as its location and size. In contrast, a plaintiff’s particular and subjective knowledge of the condition is not relevant in determining whether defendant has breached a duty.

The Farrell court applied this analysis to the facts. It found that the pool served no useful purpose. No evidence existed regarding the cost to eliminate the risk. With respect to Farrell’s conduct, the court found that walking a dog was not dangerous by nature and may have an important social function, but this did not weigh heavily in the analysis. However, with respect to whether the condition as open and obvious, the court considered the location of the pool at the edge of the parking lot, the size of the pool, and the fact that it was apparent to all who encountered it. Thus, the condition was open and obvious, and the likelihood of and magnitude of the harm was minimal.

The court concluded that these factors collectively showed the condition was not unreasonably dangerous. The defendants did not breach their duty to plaintiff, and summary judgment should have issued for the defendants. In so holding, the Supreme Court provided clarifying guidance on analysis of open and obvious conditions under Louisiana law.

Case Reference:

Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, 2022-000849 (La. 3/17/23), — So.3d —-, 2023 WL 2550503.

Outdoor Living:  Federal Court Rules That Uneven Terrain in Parking Lot Does Not Present an Unreasonable Risk of Harm

A federal court for the Middle District of Louisiana recently ruled that a 1½ inch elevation change in a Walmart parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff patron in Lacaze v. Walmart Stores, Inc. The case involved a slip and fall/trip and fall accident in the parking lot of Walmart’s Burbank Drive store in Baton Rouge. The defendant moved to dismiss the suit where the plaintiff claimed she tripped and fell as she crossed the area where the black asphalt parking lot adjoined the concrete crosswalk as pictured below.

In the area where the asphalt meets the crosswalk, the surface presented a ¼ inch to 1½ inch change in elevation. Plaintiff admitted the black pavement was distinct in appearance and color from the concrete crosswalk. Surveillance showed that plaintiff looked down at her cell phone at the time she tripped and fell. Though in a high pedestrian traffic area, Wal-Mart maintained this was the first reported incident.

The Court found the condition was open and obvious and did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. To reach this decision, the Court made the following observations:

  1. Parking lots have clear and apparent utility. Crosswalks do as well. Crosswalks give patrons a designated area to traverse the lot safely.
  2. The likelihood and magnitude of the risk posed by the condition was low. The Court noted it is common for surfaces of parking lots and sidewalks to be irregular, and no other patrons reported problems or accidents.
  3. The cost of preventing the harm was high. The Court would not consider only the cost of fixing the specific injury-causing defect. Rather, it considered the cost of eliminating all defects in the Walmart parking lot.
  4. Plaintiff conducted an ordinary commercial activity that was not dangerous in nature.

The Court concluded that all but factor four pointed to a single conclusion: the 1½ inch elevation difference did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. The Court reached this conclusion even though the plaintiff retained an expert who gave opinions regarding possible violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and OSHA regulations. The expert’s opinions were insufficient to defeat summary judgment when the condition was open and obvious. In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court joined with several other courts, including the following:

  • Chambers v. Vill. of Moreauville, where a one-and-one half inch deviation did not present an unreasonable risk of harm;
  • Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, where a height variance of one-fourth to one-half inch between concrete blocks in parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm; and
  • Boyle v. Board of Sup’rs, Louisiana State University, where a depression of up to one inch in a sidewalk did not pose unreasonable risk of harm.

Case References: Lacaze v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. CV 20-696-JWD-EWD, 2022 WL 4227240 (M.D. La. Sept. 13, 2022); Chambers v. Vill. of Moreauville, 2011-0898 (La. 01/24/12), 85 So.3d 593; Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, 97-1174 (La. 03/04/98), 708 So.2d 362; and Boyle v. Board of Sup’rs, Louisiana State University, 96-1158 (La. 01/14/97), 685 So.2d 1080.

Merchant Liability: No Evidence of Creation or Knowledge of Spill on Premises

In Cooper v. Albertsons Companies, LLC, 20-124 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/21/20), 2020 WL 6163099, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against a merchant and premises owner.  The plaintiff, a vendor, made deliveries to a pharmacy on a regular basis.  He slipped on a clear substance believed to be vinegar. The trial judge granted a defense summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed.

Because there was no evidence of Albertsons’ actual knowledge of the condition, the plaintiff had to demonstrate under Louisiana’s “slip and fall” statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.6, that it either created the condition or possessed “constructive knowledge” to defeat the motion for summary judgment.

No Creation of the Condition– In response to the motion for summary judgment, Cooper argued that the size and dispersal of the liquid provided circumstantial evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the merchant created the condition. The court noted that circumstantial evidence “must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis with a fair amount of certainty.” The plaintiff did not possess evidence to show that Albertsons’ employees stocked shelves that morning or even that any employee worked in the area before the fall.  Simply, no facts supported an inference that Albertsons caused the spill.


No Constructive Knowledge– Cooper also failed to show how long the liquid was on the floor before he slipped. The liquid was clear, and no evidence established the spill was visible to anyone.  No footprints, tracks, grocery-cart wheels, or the like were identified to suggest the length of time the liquid had been on the floor either.

Under the evidence presented, the Third circuit affirmed and found for the merchant. Handled by Keogh Cox attorneys, the Cooper case is a recent example that summary relief should be considered when plaintiff’s proof of a mandatory prerequisite to recovery in a “slip and fall” claim is lacking.

Premises Liability: Defense Summary Judgment in an Accident Involving Rolling Chair

A recent decision from the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal re-affirms the merchant liability rules.  In Carolyn R. Miller and Steven Rathjen v. Willis Communications, et. al., 19-787 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/24/20), the plaintiff was an elderly patron of an AT&T store.  Plaintiff and her daughter were assisted at the customer service desk, and plaintiff took a seat in a rolling chair.  When she attempted to stand up, the rolling chair moved, and she fell to the floor breaking a hip.

Plaintiff filed suit under the merchant’s liability statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.6.  Per the statute, if a negligence claim is brought against a merchant by a person lawfully on the merchant’s premises for injuries sustained because of a fall, then plaintiff must prove: 1) that the condition of the merchant’s premises presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable; 2) that the merchant created the risk or had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition; and 3) that the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care to address the unreasonable risk of harm.  Plaintiff argued that an unreasonable risk of harm was created when she was given a chair on rollers on flooring allegedly unsafe for use with a rolling chair.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court.  The appellate court reversed and entered summary judgment.  The appellate court found that the critical element of plaintiff’s burden of proof was missing – any defect in the rolling chair.  Plaintiff admitted that the chair was not defective.  Instead, she argued that she should not have been given a rolling chair to sit in because of her age, obvious mobility issues, and because the rolling chair was unsafe on the flooring of the store. 

Evidence was presented that: 1) plaintiff’s daughter was able to maneuver the rolling chair without incident; 2) the daughter did not believe that plaintiff would have trouble navigating the rolling chair; and 3) no other customer had ever fallen out of one of the rolling chairs.  Simply, what occurred at the AT&T store was an accident, for which AT&T and its employees were not responsible.  Plaintiff, well aware of her own physical limitations, chose to sit in a rolling chair that she physically was unable to get out of on her own.  Based upon this evidence, the court reasoned that plaintiff did not prove that: 1) the rolling chair posed an unreasonable risk of harm; or 2) the merchant possessed actual or constructive knowledge of any defect.

Following decisions which imposed harsh standards upon retailers, the Louisiana Legislature adopted the merchant’s liability statute to limit recovery to cases involving true negligence.  The Carolyn R. Miller decision demonstrates that the statute is properly used in motion practice to resolve cases where the merchant lacks advance knowledge of the claimed unreasonable risk. Sometimes, an accident is just an accident.


Virginia “Jenny” McLin is a partner at Keogh Cox who practices in the fields of corporate litigation, insurance defense and workers compensation defense.  When she is not practicing law, Jenny can be found volunteering with the Junior League of Baton Rouge; cheering for the LSU Tigers with her husband Ryan; or shuffling her two kids to and from dance practice.