Tag: premises liability

Court Addresses the Reach of the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act’s Immunity Provision for Claims Against Health Care Providers

The Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act (LHEPA), La. R.S. 29:760 et seq, was enacted in 2003 to allow the government to use extraordinary powers in order to respond to potential or actual public health emergencies. Historically, claims against medical providers have been governed by a negligence standard, which requires a plaintiff to prove the provider failed to act with reasonable care. However, La. R.S. 29:771(2)(c), which was enacted as part of the LHEPA, provides what has been described as a limited or quasi-immunity for health care providers:

During a state of public health emergency, any health care providers shall not be civilly liable for causing the death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property except in the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

This provision imposes a heightened standard of gross negligence or willful misconduct for claims against health care providers and their employees. “Gross negligence” has been defined as “the entire absence of care and the utter disregard of the dictates of prudence, amounting to complete neglect of the rights of others.”* Therefore, absent a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the provision provides immunity from civil liability for all claims against all health care providers.

The reach and application of this heightened standard of gross negligence under the LHEPA has been the subject of recent rulings from Louisiana courts. In Lejeune v. Steck, which was decided before COVID-19 in connection with a public health emergency declared following Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the LHEPA’s heightened standard applied to all medical providers in the state while the state was in a public health emergency.^

In Lejeune, a doctor left a sponge in a patient during a surgery. The plaintiff argued that a general negligence standard should apply because the surgery occurred outside the Hurricane Katrina emergency area. However, the Court found that the plaintiff must prove gross negligence or willful misconduct because the LHEPA “does not provide for a limited set of health care providers, nor does it limit its application to only those medical personnel rendering emergency assistance voluntarily due to the emergency in the area.” Thus, the Court ruled the LHEPA was broad reaching and covered all health care providers in all areas of Louisiana during the public health emergency.

More recently, Governor Edwards invoked the LHEPA on March 11, 2020 in response to COVID-19. In line with the all-inclusive application seen in Lejeune, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the LHEPA applied to all claims against health care providers that arose during the public health emergency declared for COVID-19.

In Lathon v. Leslie Lakes Ret. Ctr., the Second Circuit applied the LHEPA to a premises liability claim.^^ The plaintiff slipped and fell in a puddle at Leslie Lakes Retirement Center. The accident occurred during the declared public health emergency. The retirement center filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that because it qualified as a health care provider, the gross negligence standard set forth in the LHEPA should apply to the plaintiff’s claim.

The court agreed and found that the statute dictated that immunity applied in favor of any healthcare provider for any personal injury or property damage claim as long as it arose during a public health emergency. In so holding, the Court stated that the purpose of the LHEPA was to alleviate the liability burden on healthcare providers during public health emergencies. Therefore, the Court found its ruling aligned with the purpose of the act. The Lathon decision is significant because it applied the LHEPA’s statutory immunity to personal injury claims against healthcare providers outside of a medical malpractice setting.

At least one justice on the Louisiana Supreme Court voiced a desire to address the constitutionality of this statutory immunity provision. However, the Court ultimately declined to review the Second Circuit’s ruling. Therefore, under Lathon, it appears the statutory immunity granted under the LHEPA applies to any claim brought against any healthcare provider for acts that occur during a public health emergency. While it remains to be seen how courts will address this issue in the future, these decisions show the reach and application of the LHEPA continue to evolve.

References:
*Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep’t Ambulance Serv., 93-3099 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So. 2d 216.

^Lejeune v. Steck, 13-1017 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/21/14), 138 So. 3d 1280, writ denied sub nom. Daigle v. Steck, 2014-1408 (La. 10/3/14), 149 So. 3d 800.

^^Lathon v. Leslie Lakes Ret. Ctr., 54,479 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22); 348 So.3d 888, writ denied, 2022-01566 (La. 12/20/22); 352 So.3d 80.

Louisiana Supreme Court Clarifies Analysis for Open & Obvious Conditions

It seems intuitive that people have an obligation to avoid potentially harmful conditions that are open and obvious. Nevertheless, treatment of open and obvious conditions in Louisiana law has proved tricky because many cases did not apply a uniform analytical framework. In Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently offered needed guidance on the appropriate analysis for open and obvious conditions.

The plaintiff stopped at a gas station and decided to walk her dog in a nearby grassy area. To get to the grassy area, Farrell had to cross a pool of water that was “approximately the length of a tractor-trailer.” Farrell attempted to jump across the narrowest part of the pool, but slipped and fell. She sued for damages arising from her injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the condition was open and obvious. The trial court and court of appeal denied the defendants’ motion. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the matter and reversed.

In finding that the condition was open and obvious, the court began its analysis by outlining the elements that a plaintiff must establish to recover for damage arising from a defect under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2316, 2317 and 2317.1:

  • That the defendant owed plaintiff a duty to conform its conduct to a specific standard;
  • That the defendant breached the duty owed;
  • That the defendant’s conduct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries;
  • That the defendant’s conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and,
  • That the plaintiff suffered damages.

The court also highlighted the requirement under La. R.S. 2317.1 that plaintiff show the defendant knew or should have known of the condition before the injury occurred.

The court noted that some courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, while other courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant had breached the duty that was owed. In Farrell, the court found a duty was owed under the code articles referenced above. It clarified that whether a condition was open and obvious should be considered during analysis of whether the duty was breached, pursuant to Louisiana’s “risk/utility” test. This test requires consideration of whether the condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm, which considers whether the condition had any social utility; the likelihood and magnitude of harm the condition presented; the cost of preventing the harm; and the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct, including whether plaintiff’s conduct was socially useful or inherently dangerous.

Specifically, whether a condition is open and obvious should be considered in determining the likelihood of harm and magnitude of harm to an objectively reasonable person. The court further advised that the specific nature of the condition should be considered, such as its location and size. In contrast, a plaintiff’s particular and subjective knowledge of the condition is not relevant in determining whether defendant has breached a duty.

The Farrell court applied this analysis to the facts. It found that the pool served no useful purpose. No evidence existed regarding the cost to eliminate the risk. With respect to Farrell’s conduct, the court found that walking a dog was not dangerous by nature and may have an important social function, but this did not weigh heavily in the analysis. However, with respect to whether the condition as open and obvious, the court considered the location of the pool at the edge of the parking lot, the size of the pool, and the fact that it was apparent to all who encountered it. Thus, the condition was open and obvious, and the likelihood of and magnitude of the harm was minimal.

The court concluded that these factors collectively showed the condition was not unreasonably dangerous. The defendants did not breach their duty to plaintiff, and summary judgment should have issued for the defendants. In so holding, the Supreme Court provided clarifying guidance on analysis of open and obvious conditions under Louisiana law.

Case Reference:

Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, 2022-000849 (La. 3/17/23), — So.3d —-, 2023 WL 2550503.

Summary Judgment Affirmed in Premises Liability Case Upon Court’s De Novo Review

In Marrero v. I. Manheim Auctions, Inc., the plaintiff fell after he exited a building during a rainstorm and stepped off a curb into a parking lot. He claimed he stepped into a divot where asphalt had washed away. The defendant moved for summary judgment.

In opposition, the plaintiff offered an expert affidavit that cited a lack of handrails, code violations, and loose pebbles as contributing to the plaintiff’s fall. To recover in the case, the plaintiff possessed the burden under La. R.S. 9:2800.6 to establish three elements: 1) the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm, 2) this risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, and 3) the defendant possessed actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect.

The defense argued the plaintiff could not show the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable and produced an expert affidavit to show the divot was only 3/16” deep. Evidence also showed the plaintiff was familiar with the area where he fell. The defendant also had received no prior complaints about the area. The trial court found that the parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm because the divot was only 3/16” deep and granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in light of the competing expert affidavits regarding whether the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm. However, when a motion for summary judgment is appealed, the court uses a de novo standard of review. Under this standard, the appellate court reviews all issues and considers all evidence submitted to the trial court in its ruling.

The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment but did so for different reasons than the trial court. The Marrero court found the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of the third element, i.e., whether the defendant knew or should have known of the defect. Because the plaintiff failed to establish a material issue of fact as to all three required elements, summary judgment was granted. Marrero reminds that appellate courts may consider facts and legal issues the trial court did not address in its ruling.