“Forensic Defendants” Dismissed from Wrongful Conviction Suit

Can a nonresident corporation, who is not a party to a pending action, be compelled to respond to discovery in Louisiana? The Louisiana Fifth Circuit says YES. See Molaison v Cust-O-Fab Specialty Services, LLC, a case where Keogh Cox successfully handled the appeal.

The Molaison case involved an industrial accident claim where catastrophic injuries were alleged. In this context, the appellate court found that a non-resident company has sufficient presence in Louisiana to subject it to the court’s subpoena power. However, the trial court must first assess the scope of discovery to ensure it is calculated to lead to discoverable evidence and is not too onerous.

In Molaison, the owner of an industrial plant who employed the plaintiff claimed that its nonresident status prevented the parties from requiring it to respond to discovery by deposition or otherwise. The plant owner cited a Louisiana Supreme Court case that held personal jurisdiction, without more, did not subject a nonparty, out-of-state defendant to submit to discovery in this state.

But, in this case, the nonparty maintained a facility in Louisiana and employed the plaintiff. As a consequence, the Molaison court found that the Louisiana “discovery rules control” and “the trial court did not err in finding that (the company) was subject to the subpoena power of a Louisiana court.”

The contractor established it issued the subpoena to obtain evidence from the chemical plant owner that was relevant to the allocation of fault under Louisiana’s pure comparative fault tort system. Therefore, the appeal court reasoned that the nonresident plant owner was subject to the subpoena, “even if (the company) is not obligated to pay in tort by operation of workers compensation immunity.”

Of note, the court also held that the review of a discovery order that finds a nonresident company subject to the subpoena power is a final appealable judgment, as opposed to an interlocutory order subject the discretionary review on supervisory writ.

Case Reference: Molaison v Cust-O-Fab Specialty Services, LLC, 21-585 (La. App 5 Cir. 6/1/22); 343 So. 3d 866.

Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

"An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration."

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

• After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
• The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
• The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
• After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
• The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
• Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
• The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont'l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.

This blog is one of a two-part series regarding perhaps the most important aspect of the attorney-client relationship -- the attorney-client privilege. So, what is it and why is the privilege so important? In short, the attorney-client privilege is a legal doctrine that protects communications between a client and his or her attorney. Unlike most other relationships, the privilege stays in place even after the relationship is terminated. The purpose of the privilege is to allow clients to have open and honest communications with their attorney. LSA-L.C.E. art. 506. However, not all communications between a client and attorney are privileged and certain requirements must be met for the privilege to attach.

-Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship. An attorney-client relationship must be in place. Louisiana law does not require that the attorney be formally retained or payment made for the privilege to attach. The privilege may apply even when the client merely discusses a legal matter with an attorney when the client reasonably believes the attorney is acting as his or her attorney.

-Confidential Communications. While the communication can take many forms (oral, written, digital, etc.) it is protected only if it was intended to be confidential, which generally means that the communication was not intended to be disclosed to others not involved in the attorney-client relationship or the legal representation. For example, if a client meets with his attorney and brings a friend along, then the meeting may not be protected by the privilege. Because the privilege is for the protection of the client, the client may choose to intentionally waive the privilege, or may do so inadvertently through their actions.

-Legal Services. The communication must be related to obtaining or facilitating the legal services offered by the attorney. The privilege has been held to apply to the employees of the attorney and sometimes experts retained to assist in the case.

When applicable, the attorney-client privilege applies not only to what was said, but also to your attorney’s observations of your mental, emotional, and physical state at the time you communicate. The privilege does not generally apply to information gathered by the attorney from other sources; however, another doctrine, the “work product” doctrine, may nevertheless protect such information.It is important that clients understand that the privilege does not apply merely because the client chooses to involve the attorney in the communication. Generally, the privilege only applies when the communication was intended as confidential and to further the legal services offered by the attorney. In this way, the client may not be allowed to utilize the privilege where they include the attorney in a communication with a third-party that is not otherwise protected.While the attorney-client privilege safeguards the attorney-client relationship, ensures that clients can tell their attorney the things they need to know about a case, and assists the attorney to provide the best legal help possible, it is also subject to restrictions. These restrictions are explored in Part 2 of this series.