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News

Keogh Cox Attorneys Presented a CLE on Electronic Professionalism to the Dean Henry George McMahon American Inn of Court.

Keogh Cox Attorneys John Wolff, George Wright, and Cole Frazier presented a CLE on electronic professionalism to the Dean Henry George McMahon American Inn of Court.

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News

Keogh Cox Attorneys John Wolff (Civil Litigation), Andrew Blanchfield (Professional Liability), and Chris Jones (Class Action) were selected an 2023 Louisiana Super Lawyers. George Wright was selected as a 2023 Rising Star.

Congratulations to John P. Wolff, Andrew Blanchfield, and Chris Jones for being honored in the 2023 list of Louisiana Super Lawyers. John was selected for Civil Litigation. Andrew was selected for Professional Liability. Chris was selected for Class Action & Mass Torts. This selection is based on an evaluation of 12 indicators including peer recognition and professional achievement in legal practice. The Super Lawyers list recognizes no more than 5 percent of attorneys in each state.

Congratulations to George A. Wright for being honored in the 2023 list of Louisiana Super Lawyers Rising Stars. The Rising Stars list recognizes no more than 2.5 percent of attorneys in each state.

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Insight

Pass-Through Claims and Prescription

In Couvillion Group, LLC v. Plaquemine Parish Government, the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the general contractor could recover “pass-through claims” against the owner where those claims would be time-barred if brought directly by the subcontractors. “Pass-through claims” have been described as damage claims that subcontractors “pass through” to the contractor to prosecute an action against the project owner to recover those damages.

In Couvillion, the contractor sued the Parish for delay damages. The trial court awarded $2,782,724 in delay damages, $300,000 of which was for delays incurred by two of the subcontractors.

On appeal, the Parish argued that the contractor could not recover the pass-through claims because any claims for delay that the subcontractors had against the contractor were prescribed (time-barred). The subcontractors sent demand letters after substantial completion in 2013 but did not file suit against the contractor. Under Louisiana law, contract claims are subject to a 10-year prescriptive period. The Parish asserted that by the time trial occurred in 2024, the subcontractor claims had prescribed.

The Fourth Circuit recognized that subcontractors often pass their claims through the contractor to prosecute against the owner to recover those damages. The contractor included those claims in the lawsuit filed against the owner in 2015. When several parties share a cause of action, suit by one party interrupts prescription as to all parties. As such, the court held that prescription was interrupted, and the contractor could recover the pass-through claims against the owner.

This case highlights the importance of identifying and properly preserving pass-through claims early in litigation.

References:

Couvillion Grp., LLC v. Plaquemines Par. Gov't, 2025-0356 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/7/26), 430 So. 3d 1175, writ denied, 2026-00217 (La. 5/12/26), 430 So. 3d 1090.

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Prescription
Construction
Contractors
News

Keogh Cox congratulates Kirk L. Landry, member of the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel Board of Directors.

Keogh Cox is pleased to congratulate Partner, Kirk L. Landry, who recently began his three-year term on the Board of Directors of the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel!

https://www.ladc.org/leadership

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Insight

Louisiana Court Finds No Coverage Under Policy Based Upon Insured’s Failure to Cooperate

In South Alexander Development I, LLC v. Markel American Insurance Co., the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted an insurer’s motion for summary judgment finding that the insured’s failure to cooperate violated the policy’s coverage terms and voided coverage.

The dispute arose from a commercial first-party property loss following Hurricane Ida. The insurer moved quickly to adjust the claim by retaining an independent adjuster and engineers to evaluate the damage to and value of the insured property. It also asked the insured to produce documentation needed to complete the adjustment, including records of installation costs, monthly revenues, and repair estimates. The insured did not respond.

Additionally, the insurer sent numerous emails over the course of the claim requesting information about (1) the costs the insured had incurred; (2) documentation supporting the income loss claim, along with quotes, estimates, and proposals for repairs; and (3) the scope of work for testing and repairs. However, most of these requests went unanswered.

Based on this evidence, the court determined that the insured violated the terms of the policy because it failed to cooperate with the insurer’s investigation. Most notably, the insured obtained repair estimates and proposals from its own contractor and withheld them from the insurer until after suit was filed. The insured also never submitted a completed proof of loss, even though the policy required submission of such a document that included estimates and “other reasonable information” the insurer needed to settle the loss. These acts showed the insured failed to “cooperate with [the insurer] in performing all acts required by this policy.”

The insurer showed that it pursued the information diligently and that the insured’s breach was both material and prejudicial. The court found (1) the insurer had documented repeated, specific requests for nearly a year, (2) the withheld documents went directly to quantifying the loss, and (3) the insured’s noncompliance deprived the insurer of its right to investigate the insured’s claim.

As a result, the court granted summary judgment finding no genuine issue of material fact relating to the insured’s breach of the policy’s cooperation clause. The insured was precluded from bringing a breach of insurance contract claim and therefore, without a valid contractual claim, the insured also could not pursue a bad faith claim against the insurer.

References:

South Alexander Development I, LLC v. Markel American Insurance Co., CV 23-1436-JWD-SDJ, 2026 WL 1819120 (M.D. La. June 24, 2026).

Bad Faith
Hurricane
Insurance
Summary Judgment
News

Keogh Cox has been ranked in the 2026 edition of Chambers USA.

Keogh Cox is pleased to announce that our firm has been ranked in the 2026 edition of Chambers USA for Construction in Louisiana for the second year. Additionally, Partner Mary Anne Wolf has been individually ranked by Chambers for her work in Construction. We are proud of the outstanding work done by our Construction Group who made this ranking possible.

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Insight

Court Affirms Generalized Knowledge of Risk Should Not Trigger Intentional Act Exception to Workers’ Compensation Law

In Saizon v. Dow Chem. Co., the plaintiff was injured while he was working for Turner Industrial Group at the Dow Chemical Plant in Plaquemine, Louisiana. The plaintiff named Dow and three of its employees as defendants. The Dow defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that the plaintiff was Dow’s statutory employee at the time of the accident and therefore the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (“LWCL”) provided plaintiff with his exclusive remedy for the claims he asserted against Dow and its employees.

The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment on appeal.

The Court found the contract executed between Dow and Turner Industries created a rebuttable presumption under La. R.S. 23:1061(A)(3) that Dow was the plaintiff’s statutory employer at the time of the accident. The plaintiff failed to produce evidence to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, the defendants argued plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was found in workers’ compensation, not in tort.

The LWCL generally holds that an employer is immune from tort actions brought against it by its employee. However, the LWCL includes an “intentional act exception,” where an employee can maintain a tort claim if he can show that his accident and injuries resulted from his employer’s intentional act. A plaintiff can establish the intentional act exception if he can show the employer “knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct.”

The plaintiff argued that the defendants were aware of the risk that a fire or explosion could occur before the accident. He also argued the defendants failed to follow Dow’s safety policies and OSHA guidelines at the time of the accident. Plaintiff argued this created an issue of fact regarding whether the accident was “substantially certain.”

The First Circuit disagreed, finding this evidence amounted to only “generalized knowledge of risk” that “falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character.” In short, the court agreed with the defendants’ position that “an employer’s generalized knowledge of risk does not meet the intentional act test without proof of specific knowledge of risk to this plaintiff and moving ahead with operations anyway.” Plaintiff had no such evidence, and his claims were dismissed.

Reference:

Saizon v. Dow Chem. Co., 2025-1139 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/26), 2026 WL 1122621

Employer Liability
Insight

New Collateral Source Rule Changes How Medical Specials Are Evaluated

On January 1, 2026, the Louisiana Legislature fundamentally changed how damages for medical specials are evaluated. By amending Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:2800.27, the Louisiana Legislature redefined how medical write-offs, “attorney discounts” and medical funding agreements are handled in personal injury cases. Following these amendments, a plaintiff’s financial recovery should be limited to the amounts actually paid to medical providers.

Louisiana’s collateral source framework historically created a significant gap between billed medical costs and actual medical payouts. Previously, juries only reviewed the plaintiff’s gross, unadjusted medical bills, while any discounted portion of those bills was not introduced as evidence. For example, even if a medical provider billed $100,000 but only received $25,000 in payment, the jury still reviewed and calculated a potential damage award based upon the billed $100,000 amount.

Generally, the trial judge was instructed to reduce the award, after the verdict, to the actual paid rate, and then apply a discretionary penalty, up to 40% of the write-off differential, to offset the plaintiff’s costs and attorney’s fees. This system established a higher baseline for initial evaluation, which influenced settlement negotiations and the claimed value of the alleged injury.

Act 466 of the 2025 Legislative Session eliminated the post-trial hearing mechanism and repealed the 40% procurement allowance. Under the current language of La. R.S. § 9:2800.27(B), a plaintiff’s past medical expense recovery is strictly limited to the amount actually paid to the contracted healthcare provider by a health insurance issuer, Medicare, or Medicaid, along with any applicable cost-sharing liabilities like deductibles or copays.  The statute now provides that juries must now be shown both the amount billed and the amount actually paid. Additionally, when counsel secures a pre-negotiated rate with a medical provider, the recovery is capped at that negotiated rate rather than the inflated “sticker price.”

It is unclear what impact these changes will have on leverage and negotiation tactics during litigation. For example, will plaintiffs shift their strategy to now include an increased medical costs projection to recoup the “billed” medicals they previously claimed under the prior rule? The answer remains unknown. However, the amendments to the collateral source rule represent a substantial shift in how personal injury damages are evaluated, to which both plaintiff and defense counsel must adjust.

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Insight

Louisiana Supreme Court Provides Guidance on “Going and Coming” Rule

In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Lacy v. Ibarra, et al, the Court provided further instruction and clarification on exceptions to the “going and coming” rule, which provides employers generally are not liable for acts or omissions of their employees as they travel to or from work.

The plaintiff in Lacy alleged that she and her daughter were injured after they were involved in a car accident with the defendant. The defendant was an employee of Exxon who recently relocated to Baton Rouge, Louisiana from Houston, Texas. The employee had not secured a permanent residence in Louisiana. His family remained in Houston. At the time of the accident, the defendant was driving to work in his personal vehicle.

Plaintiff claimed that Exxon should be liable under the “special mission” and/or the “interest in transportation” exceptions to the “going and coming” rule. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected both exceptions.

The Court noted the “special mission” exception applies in circumstances where the employee’s travel is a special or unusual, employment-related task outside the scope of the defendant’s normal job duties. The Lacy Court found that the defendant “was simply going to work” at the time of the accident. Therefore, the “special mission” exception did not apply. The Court also explained the employee’s recent relocation was not the type of “unusual” circumstance usually needed for the exception to apply.

The Court also found that the “interest in transportation” exception did not apply. This exception applies when an employer specifically pays the employee for the travel that is being done at the time of the accident. This can occur when an employer pays an employee for actual mileage for transportation from one point to another and, from both the employee and employer’s perspective, the purpose of the transportation is primarily for the employee’s benefit. In Lacy, the employer provides its employee with general transportation and relocation expenses. However, those general payments did not transform an ordinary commute into an employment-related activity or establish that the employer became interested in the employee’s transportation to trigger the exception.

The Lacy decision further solidifies Louisiana law that an employee’s travel to or from work, without any special circumstances, is not within the course and scope of an employee’s employment for purposes of vicarious liability.

Reference:

Lacy v. Ibarra, et al, 2025-01599 (La. 4/21/26), --- So.3d ----, 2026 WL 1074083.

Employer Liability
Louisiana Supreme Court
Insight

Keogh Cox Obtains Summary Judgment in Premises Liability Action

The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s ruling that granted summary judgment in a premises liability case filed following an accident that occurred at the LSU Hilltop Arboretum. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently denied writs seeking review of the lower courts’ rulings. Keogh Cox attorneys, Brian T. Butler and C. Reynolds LeBlanc, defended the case.

In Hebert v. Louisiana State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Supervisors Through Louisiana State Univ., the plaintiff went to the LSU Hilltop Arboretum to attend a wedding. Before the wedding, she went to the ladies’ room located in the outdoor pavilion area. The door to the restroom is controlled by an automatic door closer. The plaintiff alleged that the door began to close with “excessive force” when she exited the ladies’ room, and her finger was injured when it slid into the hinge-side of the door.

The plaintiff claimed the automatic door closer was defective because it was not properly adjusted at the time of the accident. The plaintiff retained an expert professional engineer to support her claims. The expert inspected the door and the door closer approximately 19 months after the incident. He testified that when he inspected the door, it was closing too fast, was out of adjustment, and had been improperly maintained. The plaintiff argued these findings showed the door was also defective at the time of the accident.

The expert also said the doors should have been inspected and adjusted every six months. The plaintiff argued the alleged problem with the door would have been discovered if it was inspected as her expert recommended.

Keogh Cox filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the defendants. First, we argued the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the door was defective on the date of the accident. While the expert opined the door was defective when it was inspected nineteen months after the accident, the plaintiff had no evidence to show the alleged defect existed at the time of the accident. Keogh Cox asserted that the expert’s testimony claiming a defect was pure speculation. The court agreed and found the plaintiff failed to show the door presented an unreasonable risk of harm.

Second, we argued the plaintiff could not show LSU had prior notice that the door was defective at the time of the accident. As the door to the primary restroom on the premises, it was frequently used. There was no evidence of any prior complaints or reports of problems with the door before the accident. The plaintiff argued that notice could be found because LSU did not have a set inspection plan for the door as her expert recommended.

The court rejected this argument, stating “The opposite is true; in the absence of other facts such as recorded complaints about a defect or hazard, the lack of a plan of inspection implies that the public entity has no knowledge of dangerous defects or conditions.” Thus, the court found the plaintiff failed to show LSU had notice of the alleged problem with the door.

Reference:

Hebert v. Louisiana State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Supervisors Through Louisiana State Univ., 2025-0246 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/25), 424 So. 3d 809, writ denied, 2025-01542 (La. 2/10/26), 425 So. 3d 1205.

Constructive Notice
Summary Judgment
News

Keogh Cox Recognizes its Attorneys Selected to the 2026 Louisiana Super Lawyers list.

Keogh Cox is pleased to announce that seven attorneys were named to the 2026 Louisiana Super Lawyers list:

Partner Christopher K. Jones is also recognized as a 2026 Louisiana Top 50 Super Lawyer.Four attorneys were selected to the 2026 Louisiana Super Lawyers “Rising Stars” list:

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News

Keogh Cox congratulates Firm Administrator, Misty Methvin, on 40 Years of Service.

Keogh Cox would like to congratulate Misty Methvin, our Firm Administrator, on 40 years of service to our firm. We are grateful for her loyalty, hard work, and dedication.

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