Interrupted by Silence: Medical Malpractice Prescription

It is well-established that a client in legal malpractice shall have no greater rights against their attorney than they had against the original defendant. That is, until the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Ewing v. Westport Insurance Corporation, 20-00339 (LA. 11/19/20), 2020 WL 6789490 where the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the “collectibility“ of the underlying judgment against the defendant is neither part of the plaintiff’s burden of proof nor the proper subject of an affirmative defense.

In Ewing, the defendant/attorney fax-filed a petition for damages but failed to forward the original petition within seven days as required by statute. As a result, the claim he sought to advance on behalf of Elaine Ewing prescribed. Ewing sued her attorney and his insurer.

Prior to trial, the tortfeasor testified that he would have filed for bankruptcy had an excess judgment been entered. On this basis, the defendants obtained a motion for summary judgment establishing that the underlying tortfeasor would have been unable to pay any amount above the $30,000 in available insurance coverage. Following trial, an award of $30,000 was entered in favor of the plaintiff and the plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court reversed citing to the decision in Rodriguez v. Traylor, 468 So.2d 1186, 1188 (La. 1985) which held that “the wealth or poverty of a party to a lawsuit is not a proper consideration in the determination of compensatory damages.“

The Supreme Court upheld the appellate opinion. In the analysis, Chief Justice Johnson on behalf of the majority also cited to the Rodriguez decision for the proposition that the wealth of the tortfeasor is not relevant to damages. The majority acknowledged that a majority of courts nationwide hold that the collectibility of a judgment is an essential element of a plaintiff’s legal malpractice case. It also observed “a growing trend” in other states to allow the defendant/attorney to plead collectability as an affirmative defense. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Ewing chose to follow neither position.

The defendants in Ewing did not argue that collectibility was part of the plaintiff’s burden. However, they did assert an affirmative defense on this basis. In rejecting this defense, the Ewing court found that nothing in statutory law of Louisiana limits damages based upon the collectibility of a judgment against a particular tortfeasor. In Ewing, it was established that the tortfeasor would have been immediately unable to pay an excess judgment. Nevertheless, the majority highlighted that a money judgment is valid for 10 years and may be revived for successive 10-year periods. As such, the court concluded that the money judgment has intrinsic value, regardless of immediate collectibility. To quote the majority, “impecunity is a snapshot in time.”

The concurring opinion by Justice Weimer reasons that there may be certain and rare cases where the underlying tortfeasor is truly judgment proof. In that circumstance, he writes that summary judgment in favor of the defendant may be appropriate but not under the record before the court.

Writing for the dissent, Justice Crain observed: “Thirty states have determined collectibility is relevant in a legal malpractice action. No state has reached a contrary conclusion, until now.” According to the majority, the absence of any statute making collectability a relevant consideration mandated the result under our civilian traditions. Justice Crain disagreed and argued that the majority opinion is inconsistent with the Code of Evidence articles which generally allow the admissibility of relevant evidence such as an inability to pay. La. L.C.E. art. 402. In support of his position, Justice Crain gave a hypothetical scenario involving an insolvent, uninsured driver who rear-ends a world-class professional athlete rendering him a paraplegic, resulting in damages and $50 million. About this hypothetical, he states:

“What did the plaintiff lose, or what harm did the lawyer cause the plaintiff, when the lawyer failed to preserve the claim against the insolvent, uninsured driver? The lawyer did not cause the paraplegia, nor did he caused a loss of $50 million, as that money was clearly uncollectible.“

To Justice Crain, the determinative question is the value of the lost judgment.

Insofar as the majority and concurring opinions highlight the absence of any statutes to support their conclusions, it would not be surprising for this issue to be considered by the legislature in coming years.

Collin is a Keogh Cox partner who litigates injury, commercial, and legal malpractice disputes. He lives in nearby Zachary, Louisiana with his wife Melissa and three all too active children. He is an outdoorsman, a tennis player, a cook, and a hobbyist writer.

This blog was written in partnership with Andrew "Drew" Blanchfield whose practice also includes professional liability defense.

“Prescription” is the timeperiod in which a litigant must file suit, or the action is barred. Oneof the first lessons a Louisiana law student learns is the importance ofdetermining the prescriptive period of a cause of action. Filing a causeof action too late is fatal. A recent decision from the Louisiana FifthCircuit Court of Appeal reads like a law school exam and illustrates thatdetermining which prescriptive period applies is sometimes the key to the case.

In DeFelice v. FederatedNat'l Ins. Co., 18-374 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/19), mold was discovered inplaintiff’s home on June 10, 2016. Plaintiffs notified their insurancecompany, who hired a mold remediation company to inspect the home. Whenthe home was inspected on June 22, 2016, the inspector verbally informedplaintiffs that the home was safe. On the same day, a separate moldinspector collected samples. The second mold inspector issued a report on June23, 2016 advising that mold remediation may be necessary. This reportspecifically stated that “certain mold and mold spores in buildings and housingcan result in mild to severe health effects in humans and can deteriorate thestructure of the dwelling resulting in content or structure damage.” Thesecond report was provided to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs continued to live inthe home. In August of 2016, plaintiffs’ infant son was born. Shortly thereafter, the infant began to experience breathing issues and wasdiagnosed with a lung condition by December of 2016. Plaintiffs vacatedthe premises in January of 2017.

More than one year after receiptof the second mold report, plaintiffs filed suit on July 24, 2017 against theirinsurer and the inspector who advised that the home had no mold problems. Plaintiffs raised claims for property damage, damage to the health of theparents, damage to the health of the minor child, and consortium claims onbehalf of the parents for the damage to the minor child.

The DeFelice court foundthat prescription began to run on June 23, 2016 with regard to the parents’individual and property damage claims. Because suit was not filed withina year of the second mold report advising of possible health and propertydamages, the parents’ individual health claims and the claims for propertydamage were prescribed under the one-year period set by Civil Code article3492.

The minor child was not bornwhen the report was issued on June 23, 2016. Plaintiffs argued that thoseclaims were brought within a year of the child’s birth, and were thereforetimely. The DeFelice court agreed and held that prescription could notbegan to run until the child was born. While Louisiana law provides that a childis a “person” upon conception, this “legal fiction” applies only to protect theinterests of the child. The court reasoned that a finding that prescriptioncommenced prior to birth would not “protect the interests” of the child. While the parent’s claims were prescribed, the claim filed on behalf of theinfant, and any claims that the parents had related to their infant’s healthcondition, were timely.

The court's analysis inDeFelice reminds that determining which prescriptive period applies to whichclaim is often the most important issue.

The Louisiana legislature recently enacted laws that set new prescription periods for most delictual/tort actions and claims for damage caused to immovable property. Civil Code articles 3492 and 3493 previously established a prescription period of one year for these types of claims. The legislature repealed these articles and enacted Louisiana Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 in their place.

Louisiana Code Article 3493.1 now establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years for delictual actions/tort claims that runs from the day injury occurred or damage is sustained. It contains language previously included in Louisiana Civil Code Article 3492, which states that prescriptive period does not run against minors or interdicts in actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3493.2 also establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years when damage is caused to immovable property. This prescriptive period runs from the day the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage.

These changes went into effect of July 1, 2024. Louisiana Civil Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 apply prospectively only and apply to delictual actions arising after July 1, 2024.