Category: Insurance

Louisiana Legislature Enacts Changes to Bad Faith Statutes

The Louisiana Legislature recently enacted Act 3, which reflects an effort to address the handling of insurance claims in Louisiana – particularly for catastrophic losses – and define ambiguities in the law. This blog addresses changes to Louisiana’s “bad faith” statutes. Broadly, Act 3 amends and enacts new sections of La. R.S. 22:1892, repeals La. R.S. 22:1973, and enacts La. R.S. 1892.2 to address situations involving catastrophic losses.

Prior Louisiana Bad Faith Statutes – La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973

                Previously, La. R.S. 22:1892(A) stated an insurer must:

  • Issue payment to an insured within 30 days of receipt of satisfactory proof of loss;
  • Pay the amount of a bona fide third-party’s property damage or reasonable medical expenses within 30 days of a written settlement agreement;
  • Initiate loss adjustment within 14 days of notice of a non-catastrophic loss or within 30 days of receipt of notice of a catastrophic loss;
  • Make a written offer to settle property damage within 30 days of receipt of satisfactory proof of loss.

If an insurer did not follow the requirements of La. R.S. 22:1892(A), the insurer could be required to pay the insured the amount owed under the policy plus a penalty if the insured established that the insurer’s conduct was “arbitrary, capricious and without probable cause.” Courts defined this standard as “vexatious” and without justification. The penalty is calculated as either 50% of the amount owed under the policy or 50% of the difference between the amount owed and a partial tender made by the insurer, if any. Additionally, if the insured established entitlement to the penalty, the insured could also recover attorneys’ fees and costs from the insurer. 

Former La. R.S. 22:1973 codified an insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing. It set an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and make reasonable efforts to settle claims with the insured, a claimant or both. This general duty of good faith and fair dealing applies only to insureds.^ The statute also outlined six prohibits acts that, if knowingly performed, constituted a violation of the statute. Five of these six prohibited acts applied to both insureds and third-party claimants.^*

If an insured proved a knowing violation of La. R.S. 22:1973, the insurer could be required to pay the amount owed under the policy, damages caused by the insurer’s violation of the statute and a penalty of up to 200% of the damages that the insured or claimant incurred as a result of the breach. Such damages were separate and distinct from the amounts owed under the policy but could extend to anything for which the insured could establish a causal link.˚̃  

Revisions to La. R.S. 22:1892

The new revisions enact several important changes. While the text of the new statute should be considered when evaluating any pending or potential claims, a summary is provided here.

  1. Time Delays

Under amended and re-enacted La. R.S. 22:1892(A), insurers must generally adhere to the time delays and conduct outlined under the previous law. Under La. R.S. 22:1892.2, for catastrophic events at residential properties, an insurer’s payment is owed within 60 days of receipt of satisfactory proof of loss.  For catastrophic losses at non-residential properties, the statute provides an insurer’s payment is owed within 90 days of receipt of satisfactory proof of loss.  

Another exception exists when an insurer initiates loss adjustment before the 14-day or 30-day deadline. If this occurs, the insurer’s obligation to issue a written offer to settle is extended by the number of days the insurer initiates loss adjustment before the deadline.

  1. Reciprocal Duty of Good Faith

Under the new law, La. R.S. 22:1973 is repealed and the general duty of “good faith and fair dealing” owed by an insurer to its insured and the prohibited insurer conduct previously outlined in La. R.S. 22:1973 is now encompassed within §1892.

The new statute also provides that the insured, the claimant or the representative of the insured/claimant owes the duty of good faith and fair dealing. If an insured fails to comply with affirmative duties under the policy, misrepresents pertinent facts and coverages, submits an estimate that lacks a basis in the evidence or the policy, then the insured’s conduct may be considered in determining whether the insurer’s conduct warrants an award of penalties. 

  1. Cure Period

For catastrophic losses, the new law states suits may only be brought if the insured first provides the insurer with “cure period notice.”  This notice requires that the insured provide the insurer with written notice of the violation, a written formal demand and notice of the facts and circumstances of the dispute. After this notice, several options exist:

  1. The insurer can pay the demand in full (along with the insured’s actual expenses and attorney fees no greater than 20%) within 60 days of the notice and extinguish any further cause of action.
  • The insurer can issue partial payment on the claim within 60 days of the notice and reduce the penalty owed, if any, by half.
  • The insurer can request additional information, but this does not extend the insurer’s other deadlines.
  1. Revised Penalty Provisions

The amendments also modify the recoverable penalty. The statute specifies the calculation of the penalty based on the type of violation, the type of property and the type of loss event. Generally, the insured is no longer entitled to recover all damages sustained by a breach of the statute: now the claimant may only recover “proven economic damages.” Notably, the potential for a penalty of up to 200% of the damages sustained as a result of the breach no longer exists.

  1. Timing

The law also formalizes and codifies the prescriptive period for claims brought under La. R.S. 22:1892 or La. R.S. 22:1892.2 to two years.

References:

^Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 1995-2895 (La. 5/20/97) 694 So.2d 184.

* Team Contractors, L.L.C. v. Waypoint NOLA, L.L.C., 780 Fed.Appx. 132 (5th Cir. 2019).

˚Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 2011-0084 (La. 10/24/11) 74 So.3d 1159.

̃  Audubon Orthopedic and Sports Medicine, APMC v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2009-0007 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/21/10) 38 So.3d 963.

Preparing for a Storm

Fortunately, the 2024 hurricane season has been relatively calm. We previously blogged about steps that can be taken after your property is damaged by a hurricane or other natural disaster. (Click here to access our prior blog). With a Tropical Storm, and potential Hurricane, threatening our coast, here are some steps to consider taking to prepare before a storm arrives in the event you must make a property insurance claim for damages after the storm:

  • DOCUMENT, DOCUMENT, DOCUMENT – The best way to prove the condition of your property before damage is caused is to document it. Take pictures and videos of the interior and exterior of your home or business. Create an inventory of your contents. Narrate the video to provide better descriptions. If your property is damaged, this documentation will be used to verify its condition and make it easier for your insurer to adjust and pay your claim.
  • INSPECT YOUR PROPERTY – As you are making your preparations, you may consider taking a walk around your property to notice any prior damage to your property. Identify any issues that could affect a potential insurance claim.
  • KNOW YOUR INSURANCE COVERAGES – Make sure you are aware of the coverages that your insurance policy provides. The Declarations Page to your policy should provide much of this information – the coverage limits, types of coverage provided, deductible, etc. While your insurance agent likely maintains this for you, it is good practice to maintain and know this information, which lets you know what will or will not be covered.
  • MITIGATE YOUR DAMAGES – You can take steps to prevent damage to your property during the storm. You can pick up items around the property that could become airborne and take whatever precautions you can to prevent damage to your property, particularly the exterior. If your property is damaged, you can make temporary repairs to prevent further damage until your insurance company can get to you (like placing a tarp on the roof).

Compelling Arbitration of Commercial Property Insurance Claims under the New York Convention

In the wake of recent hurricanes, Louisiana courts were flooded with cases property owners filed against their insurers alleging improper denial or underpayment of hurricane claims. Many of those cases were stayed and the parties were compelled to arbitration, despite Louisiana law prohibiting arbitration provisions in insurance contracts, La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2).

In a typical case involving commercial property, a property owner filed suit against its insurers, often including both domestic and foreign companies. One or more insurance policies contained an arbitration agreement requiring all disputes to be resolved by arbitration in a specified U.S. city. Undeterred, the insured filed suit in Louisiana state court. The insurers removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration.

The foreign insurers sought to enforce the arbitration agreement under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (aka the New York Convention). The New York Convention is an international treaty that requires signatory countries to enforce an arbitration agreement where four requirements are met: (1) a written arbitration agreement exists, (2) that provides for arbitration in a signatory country, (3) which arises from a commercial legal relationship, and (4) at least one party is not a U.S. citizen. These conditions are met where a foreign insurer issues a commercial policy that contains an arbitration provision to a U.S. property owner. Under such circumstances, the courts were bound to compel the parties to arbitration.

The cases presented some interesting questions. For example, could domestic insurers also compel arbitration? Yes. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, where the claims against the insurers are interdependent, the domestic insurers, even if they were not signatories to the arbitration agreement, could compel arbitration.

Does the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a federal law that maintains the states’ power to regulate the insurance industry, cause Louisiana’s law prohibiting arbitration in insurance contracts to reverse-preempt the Convention? No, the Act does not apply to treaties.

What about the arguments that the contract was not freely negotiated, or that under conflict of laws principles Louisiana law should apply, or that the federal courts should abstain because the state has a vital interest in regulating insurance? The courts rejected these arguments as well.^

Recently, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., affirmed that equitable estoppel applied to allow domestic insurers to compel arbitration under the New York Convention even where the insured dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice.* However, the U.S. Second Circuit has held the opposite in two recent cases involving insurance contracts between foreign insurers and Louisiana property owners – that Louisiana law applied to prohibit the enforcement of the arbitration provision in the insurance policy.^^

With the exception of the Second Circuit split, the numerous cases arising from recent hurricanes confirm a strong policy favoring arbitration under the New York Convention, which overrides potential state law obstacles to enforcing arbitration provisions in insurance policies.

Mary Anne Wolf is an arbitrator on the commercial, construction and large, complex cases panels of the American Arbitration Association and is a neutral at Perry Dampf Dispute Solutions.

References:

^ See for example, General Mill Supplies, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, et al, 23-6464, 2024 WL 216924 (E.D. La. 1/19/2024), – F.Supp.3d – (2024); Dryades YMCA v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, et al, 23-3411, 2024 WL 398429 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2024); Parish of Lafourche v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., et al, 23-3472, 2024 WL 397785 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2024).

* Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., et al, 96 F.4th 726 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2024).

^^ See Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. 3131 Veterans Blvd. LLC, 22-9849, 2023 WL 5237514 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2023); and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Mpire Properties, LLC, 22-9607, 2023 WL 6318034 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023) (appeal filed).

The Louisiana Legislature Overhauls the “Direct Action” Statute

For decades, Louisiana law provided a claimant or injured person an uncommon opportunity (1) to directly name an insurer in a lawsuit, and (2) to make the jury aware of the presence of insurance. This was known nationally as the “Louisiana Direct Action Statute.” This statute, embodied in LSA—R.S. 22:1269, has long been a topic of debate.

The Louisiana Legislature recently amended the “direct action statute” in Act 275 and declared that the injured person “shall have no right of direct action against the insurer” unless at least one of the exceptions applies: the insured files for bankruptcy, the insured is insolvent, service cannot be made on the insured, a tort cause of action exists against a family member, uninsured motorist claims, the insured is deceased, or when the insurer issues a reservation of rights or coverage denial (but only for the purpose of establishing coverage). The Act further provides that the insurer shall not be included in the caption of the case. And, the existence of insurance is not to be disclosed unless the Louisiana Code of Evidence requires it. This new legislation is effective August 1, 2024.

But, the Act also provides for new provisions that allow for the joinder of an insurer after settlement or in connection with a final judgment. The Act further includes specific provisions enacted to provide notice to an insurer of an action and outlines the procedures and timelines for how insurers assert reservation of rights or a denial of coverage.

The revisions to LSA—R.S. 1269 represent a significant change in how lawsuits involving insurance companies will proceed.

Bad Faith Action Brought Against an Insurer Less than Ten Years after the Date of Loss Dismissed As Prescribed

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled a plaintiff’s bad faith insurance claim was prescribed where the policy at issue required actions to be brought within two years after the date of loss.

In Phyllis Wilson v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, the plaintiff asserted a bad faith claim against an insurer. The applicable policy of insurance provided “[n]o action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with and the action is started within two years after the date of loss.” The plaintiff alleged that the insurer failed to timely tender payments for losses that occurred on August 27, 2020 and October 20, 2020. However, the plaintiff did not file her suit unit January 9, 2023.

Prior to the Wilson decision, courts frequently relied on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Citadel Ins. Co., which held that actions against insurers under Louisiana’s bad faith statutes are subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. In Smith, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a bad faith action against an insurer was a delictual or tort action subject to a one-year prescriptive period, or a contractual action, which is subject to a ten-year prescriptive period under Louisiana law. The Smith court concluded that the duty of good faith owed by the insurer to the insured “emanates from the contract between the parties” such that the “insured’s cause of action is personal and subject to a ten-year prescriptive period.”

In Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined whether Smith required the Court to uphold a ten-year prescriptive period for bad faith actions even though the insurance policy at issue prohibited actions brought more than two years after the date of loss. The Wilson court ultimately concluded that an action against an insurer brought more than two years after the date of loss is prescribed where the applicable insurance policy set a term of two years for filing a claim against the insurer.

To reach this conclusion, the Wilson court cited Taranto v. Louisiana citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., which held “in the absence a statutory prohibition, a clause in an insurance policy fixing a reasonable time to institute suit is valid.” The Wilson court then turned to the applicable statute and noted that La. R.S. 22:868(B) “expressly provides that no policy ‘shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement limiting right of action against the insurer to a period of less than twenty-four months next after the inception of the loss when the claim is a first-party claim…’” The Wilson court noted the two-year limitation in the applicable policy was consistent with La. R.S. 22:868(B).

The court’s ruling supports the argument that policy provisions requiring actions to be filed within two years of the date of loss are enforceable. However, the Court did not disturb its holding in Smith, noting the Smith case was factually distinguishable because it did not involve a policy that contained a contractual limitation on the insured’s institution of suits. 

References:

Phyllis Wilson v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, No. 2023-CC-01320 (La. 1/10/2024) (per curiam), 2024 WL 108714.

Smith v. Citadel Ins. Co., 2019-00052 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So.3d 1062.

Taranto v. Louisiana citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2010-0105 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 728.

Louisiana Supreme Court Finds Business Interruption Coverage Does Not Apply to Losses Attributable to COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic had a profound impact on the global economy. Louisiana was not spared, and many businesses had to close as sales to their customers slowed or stopped altogether. Not surprisingly, the question arose regarding whether business interruption insurance would provide coverage to businesses in this situation. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently was asked this question in Cajun Conti, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and found that the policy at issue did not provide such coverage.

The mayor of New Orleans issued a proclamation on March 16, 2020, that prohibited most public and private gatherings. This applied to restaurants, whose business initially was limited to takeout and delivery services. Before the pandemic, Oceana Grill, a restaurant located in the French Quarter, could serve up to 500 customers at one time. However, it had to limit its business to takeout and delivery services when the mayor’s proclamation was announced. Because of social distancing guidelines, it remained at 60% or less capacity throughout the pandemic.

Oceana maintained a commercial insurance policy with loss of business income coverage and filed suit to request a declaratory judgment that the “policy provides business income coverage from the contamination of the insured premises by COVID-19.” Oceana’s insurer argued that there was no coverage under the policy because COVID-19 did not cause “direct physical loss of or damage to property” under the policy’s terms.

The trial court denied Oceana’s request for declaratory relief at trial. The appellate court reversed and found the policy’s terms ambiguous because it held “direct physical loss” could mean loss of use of the property. Because the pandemic prevented the full use of the property due to capacity limitations, the appellate court found coverage was triggered.

The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court’s decision, finding its focus on the use of the property to be misguided. The Court found that suspension of operations “caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property,” as defined by the policy, required “the insured’s property to sustain a physical, meaning tangible or corporeal, loss or damage.” The Court noted that the restaurant’s physical structure was not lost or damaged because of the pandemic. COVID-19 restrictions did not cause damage or loss that was physical in nature. Therefore, the policy did not provide coverage for loss of business income.

Whether a policy affords coverage depends on the terms and conditions of each policy and the facts of each case. However, in light of this decision, businesses with insurance policies that include provisions with language like that at issue in Cajun Conti should not anticipate coverage for loss of business income allegedly caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case References:

Cajun Conti LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2022-01349 (La. 3/17/23), 2023 WL 2549132.

Appellate Court Rules a Waiver of UM Coverage Can Only Be Changed at the Insured’s Written Request

Under Louisiana law, all automobile liability policies include uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM coverage”) unless the insured affirmatively rejects such coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic only coverage in writing. The question of what qualifies as a valid rejection of UM coverage has been debated in numerous lawsuits across the state. In Barbera v. Andrade, examination of this issue continued, and the court ruled that an initial rejection of UM coverage remains effective until changed by the insured’s written request.

In Barbera, the court examined whether UM coverage was triggered under a policy when the insured, who previously waived coverage, failed to respond to the insurer’s request to complete a new UM waiver form. It was undisputed that the insured executed a valid waiver of UM coverage in 2001. In 2014, the insurer sent the insured a letter that asked the insured to complete an updated coverage selection form and return it to the insurer’s office. The insured did not execute the updated form. A driver insured under the policy was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2017 and filed a claim for UM benefits.

The insured argued the letter sent with the waiver form in 2014 was ambiguous and could be read to mean that failure to respond would mean that UM coverage would be read into the policy by default. Evidence also showed that some of the insurer’s employees also thought the failure to respond with the updated form would result in UM coverage.

However, La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) provides, “An insured may change the original uninsured motorist selection or rejection on a policy at any time during the life of the policy by submitting a new uninsured motorist selection form to the insurer on the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance.” Thus, the Court ruled that the insured’s initial rejection of UM coverage could only be changed via written request by submitting a waiver form to the insurer. The intent of the parties was inconsequential.

Because the insured executed a valid UM waiver in 2001, it remained part of the existing policy. No event, such as a change in the policy’s liability limits, occurred that required the execution of a new UM selection waiver form, and the insured did not submit a new form to the insurer to obtain UM coverage. Therefore, UM coverage was not afforded under the policy, and summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the insurer.

Case Reference: Barbera v. Andrade, 22-147 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/30/22), 2022 WL 1733087, — So.3d —.

Legislature Responds to Louisiana Supreme Court Decision and Sets New Public Policy Regarding Insurance Coverage for Permissive Use of Non-Owned Vehicles

Imagine you are visiting family during the holidays. As a favor, you take a family member’s vehicle to the gas station for a fill-up. While in transit, you get into an accident where you are at fault. Does your insurance policy provide coverage for the accident?

According to La. R.S. 22:1296.1, a new statute that went into effect on August 1, 2022, the answer to this question is “yes,” your insurance may afford coverage under these facts.

La. R.S. 22:1296.1 now requires insurance policies issued in Louisiana to provide coverage when the driver insured under the policy operates a non-owned vehicle with the express or implied permission of the vehicle’s owner. The statue was enacted to declare a new public policy regarding this issue and was passed in response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Landry v. Progressive Security Insurance Company, 2021-00621 (La. 1/28/22), reh’g denied, 2021-00621 (La. 3/25/22); 338 So.3d 1162.

The Landry case involved a motor vehicle accident that occurred as the defendant-driver, as a favor to the vehicle’s owner, drove the vehicle to a tire shop to repair a tire. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant-driver, the driver’s insurer, and the insurer of the vehicle that he drove at the time of the collision.

The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a provision in the driver’s policy that stated coverage under such circumstances was only available when the driver’s own vehicle was out of service. Because the driver’s vehicle was not out of service, no coverage was found under the driver’s policy. In so holding, the Landry court found that public policy did not  require automobile insurance liability coverage for a driver’s negligent operation of a non-owned vehicle.

The Louisiana legislature enacted La. R.S. 22:1296.1 in response to the Landry decision. The statute provides that an insurer writing automobile liability, uninsured, underinsured, or medical payments coverage shall not exclude the benefits of such coverage under its policy to an insured operating a non-owned vehicle if all of the following requirements are satisfied:

  • The coverage is in full force and effect.
  • The insured is operating a vehicle owned by another with the express or implied permission of the vehicle’s owner.
  • The non-owned vehicle that is being operated by the insured is not provided, furnished, or available to the insured on a regular basis.

The statute also provides this coverage is secondary to the vehicle owner’s insurance policy. Furthermore, if the coverage provided under the statute is included within the coverage provided pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1296, which addresses coverage for temporary, substitute, and rental vehicles, the provisions of La. R.S. 22:1296 determine which coverage is primary. (For additional information regarding La. R.S. 22:1296 click here.) [Sophia, please include link to blog from 5/25/22].

Let’s return to real life scenarios like those we addressed above. Perhaps you are blocked in at a party, so a friend tosses you the keys to move their car, or, like the situation in Landry, maybe you are trying to do a good deed by driving your parents’ car to a gas station for a fill-up when an accident occurs. While it remains to be seen how courts will interpret this statute in these circumstances, under the new legislation, these actions may now implicate coverage under your insurance policy.

Case Reference: Landry v. Progressive Security Insurance Company, 2021-00621 (La. 1/28/22), reh’g denied, 2021-00621 (La. 3/25/22); 338 So.3d 1162.

When Buying a House with a Flooding History, Let the Buyer Beware

In Dunlap v. Empire Trading Group, LLC, the buyers of a home sued the seller and the seller’s real estate agent for fraud after the home flooded three times in the first year after they bought the home. The seller was a home-flipper who disclosed two prior flooding incidents, both of which occurred during the ten months the seller owned the home.

However, the plaintiffs later discovered the home had a substantial flooding history when they requested a flood insurance quote from the National Flood Insurance Program. The quote included a report that identified eighteen incidents of flooding and flood insurance claims at the property over the ten years before the plaintiffs purchased their home.

The plaintiffs argued the seller’s agent committed fraud because she concealed her knowledge of previous flood claims. The seller’s agent moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove that she knew about any of the prior undisclosed flooding incidents. The plaintiffs had no direct evidence to dispute the agent’s defense.

Instead, they argued that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to defeat the motion. They claimed that because the seller had a flood policy on the home, it also would have received the same flood claim history the plaintiffs received in connection with the same federal program. However, the plaintiffs had no evidence to show the seller, or anyone affiliated with the agent’s firm, actually received the flood claim history as they alleged.

Based upon these facts, the court agreed that without evidence that the seller’s agent actually received the flood claim history or otherwise had knowledge of it, the plaintiffs could not carry their burden of proving misrepresentation by the agent.

Case Reference: Dunlap v. Empire Trading Group, LLC, 2021-0180 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/18/21), 331 So. 3d 932.

Louisiana Supreme Court Uses Reason to Decide Case Involving Tragic Facts

Sometimes in law, the facts of a case may threaten to eclipse the legal issue. However, Louisiana law instructs the fact finder to see through the facts, and their sometimes tragic nature, and apply the law as written. As Aristotle once wisely said, “The Law is reason free from passion.”

In Kazan, et. al. v. Red Lion Hotels Corporation, et. al., 2021-CC-01820 (La. 6/29/22), the Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled on a case with tragic facts, and its ruling provides an example of Aristotle’s description of law in action. In Kazan, a female patron was in the parking lot of a motel when a male patron approached her and used Kazan’s vehicle to abduct her from the premises. The car was later found submerged in a lake, and Kazan’s body was recovered from the water. The family filed a tort suit against several parties, including the motel’s owner and its insurer, the Great Lakes Insurance Company SE.

Great Lakes filed a motion for summary judgment and asked to be dismissed on grounds that coverage for the event was excluded from its policy. Specifically, the insurer argued that bodily injury caused by an “assault,” “battery,” or “physical altercation” was excluded under the policy’s terms. Great Lakes further argued that the kidnapping and ultimate death of the patron was excluded under the policy as bodily injury caused by an assault, battery, or physical altercation. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed and reversed the decision of the trial and appellate courts.

Under Louisiana law, “[a]n insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules for the interpretation of contracts.” Id. at p. 3. “When the words of an insurance policy are clear and explicit and do not lead to absurd consequences, courts must enforce the language as written.”  Id. at p. 3. “Courts lack authority to alter the terms of an insurance policy under the guise of interpretation and should not create an ambiguity where none exists.”  Id. at p. 3.

With these basic rules in mind, the Court carefully reviewed the wording of the exclusion in the Great Lakes policy which stated as follows: “This insurance does not apply to ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage,’ or ‘personal advertising injury’ arising out of an ‘assault,’ ‘battery,’ or ‘physical altercation.’” “Physical altercation” was defined in the policy as “a dispute between individual [sic] in which one or more persons sustain bodily injury arising out of the dispute.” Citing Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, the Court defined the term “dispute” as  “verbal controversy” or “quarrel.”

Based upon the evidence in the case, the Court found the female patron was involved in a “dispute” with her male attacker, and ultimately sustained bodily injury as a result of the dispute. Therefore, the patron was injured in a physical altercation, as defined under the specific terms of the Policy, and coverage for the event was excluded under the policy’s terms.

The Court noted as follows: “The facts of this case are undoubtedly tragic. Nonetheless, absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers are entitled to limit their liability by imposing reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations they contractually assume. That is what Great Lakes did in the insurance policy at issue here.” Despite the tragic facts presented in the case, in so holding, it appears the court agreed with Aristotle’s belief that the Law is Reason Free from Passion.

UM Waiver Completed by Insured’s Assistant Found Invalid

Uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM coverage”) is included in all automobile liability policies by Louisiana law unless the insured “rejects [UM] coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic only coverage.”  What constitutes an adequate rejection of UM coverage has been the crux of countless lawsuits across the state. Recently, in Havard v. Jeanlouis, et al, 2021-C-00810 (La. 6/29/22), the Louisiana Supreme Court examined the validity of a corporate representative’s signature in the context of execution of a UM waiver form. Louisiana courts have found that without a valid signature, UM coverage generally may not be waived.  

The Havard court recognized that a corporation cannot “sign” its own name, and that an authorized representative must act on its behalf. Under the facts of this case, an administrative assistant attempted to execute a UM waiver form at the corporate representative’s direction with a stamp of the representative’s signature. The plaintiff argued that the use of the stamp did not meet the requirements for proper execution of the UM waiver form at issue. 

Considering these facts, the court noted that Louisiana law of mandate provides that “when the law prescribes a certain form for an act, a mandate authorizing the act must be in that form.” The court continued: “Accordingly, where one individual signs a UM form on behalf of another individual and authority is not conferred by law, our Civil Code requires this authority be in writing.”

While the corporate representative in Havard verbally instructed his administrative assistant to complete the waiver with his signature stamp, no written mandate existed between the representative and the assistant to confirm this authority. Absent the written mandate, the court disregarded the express intention of the corporate representative and held the form invalid.

The court recognized the impracticality of its holding. However, it also commented “Concerns over the practical impact within the insurance industry in scrutinizing stamped signed UM forms are unavailing. Inconvenience is not absurdity. The insurer has the authority, opportunity, and responsibility to assure the UM form is completed properly. … Practical considerations regarding increased due diligence requirements are matters of policy best directed to the legislature.”

Cases involving UM waiver forms are fact-sensitive. Havard involved unique facts where the company’s authorized agent did not sign the UM waiver form personally. While Havard may be limited to its facts, it reminds that proper execution of a UM waiver form is necessary for UM coverage to be properly waived.

Louisiana Supreme Court Provides Updated Guidance on Execution of UM Waiver Forms

Insurance Coverage for “Temporary Substitute Autos” in Louisiana

Louisiana insurance law recognizes a practical problem faced by many: the need to obtain alternative transportation when the car won’t start. Under La. R.S. 22:1296, any insurance on your personal vehicle must also extend to vehicles that are used as “temporary substitute autos.”

The statute provides that a car’s status as a “temporary substitute auto” depends on how the term is defined in the particular auto policy at issue. However, some rules typically apply to determine whether the auto is a “temporary substitute.” First, the use must be temporary, i.e. limited in duration. Second, the car must be a substitute for the auto insured under the policy and used for the same purpose. Third, policies typically limit coverage to substitute vehicles that the driver does not own.

Some policies also limit coverage by requiring that the substitution be needed for a purpose identified in the policy, such as the breakdown, repair, or destruction of the covered auto.

While the statute generally defers to the definition of “temporary substitute auto” provided in the policy, sometimes courts will overrule the insurer’s definition. For instance, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Safeway Insurance Company, 50-098 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 180 So.3d 450, the relevant policy defined a “temporary substitute auto” as a substitute for the owned auto when the owned auto was “being serviced or repaired by a person engaged in the business of selling, repairing, or servicing motor vehicles.” The case involved a motor vehicle accident that occurred while the policy holder operated a borrowed vehicle but before she brought her usual vehicle to a mechanic.

Citing the terms of the policy, the insurer denied coverage on grounds that the policy required the “temporary substitute auto” not only take the place of the driver’s usual vehicle, but also that the driver take the car to a mechanic before coverage would extend to the substitute vehicle. However, the court found this requirement to be against the public policies behind La. R.S. 22:1296 and found coverage under the policy extended to the borrowed vehicle.