Tag: insurance claims

An Insurer’s Duty: To Defend or Not To Defend

Primary insurance policies include the duty to defend an insured in connection with a covered loss. The insurer is sometimes presented with the question of whether a defense is owed when many of the allegations are not apparently covered by a particular policy. In this circumstance, how does an insurer determine its obligation? The law provides the answer: the “eight corners” rule—do the four corners of the policy unambiguously exclude coverage in all respects when viewed within the context of the four corners of the petition? If the answer is “no,” the duty to defend arises. Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Cameras America, 2004-0726 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 602, 606.

Courts generally hold that the duty to defend the case extends to ALL claims, not just the covered claims. This duty can often prove quite costly, especially when non-covered claims are high-value or involve extensive factual development or testimony to defend. In some instances, the answer under the eight corners analysis is not so clear. The safe choice for the insurer is to provide a defense and hire separate counsel to handle the coverage side of the case.

In this scenario, where an insurer has serious coverage defenses, but agrees to provide the defense, when does the duty to defend terminate? The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal recently ruled on this issue again in Ponchartrain Natural Gas System, K/D/S Promix, L.L.C. and Acadian Gas Pipeline System v. Texas Brine Company, L.L.C., No. 2018 CA 0254 (La. App. 12/12/19), stating:

            “Our previous decisions in the related sinkhole appeals clearly set out the well-established rule of law that an insurer’ s duty to defend terminates once the undisputed facts establish, or a judicial determination is made, that the claims asserted are not covered under the policy. See Florida Gas, 272 So. 3d at 551; Pontchartrain, 264 So.3d at 553- 54; Crosstex, 240 So.3d at 1032.”

So, the duty to defend ends when undisputed facts establish OR a judicial determination is made that the asserted claims are not covered. Of course, who is to say that the facts are “undisputed” without a judicial determination that confirms this conclusion.  An insurer could unilaterally determine that facts are undisputed and terminate the defense before a judicial determination, but if the court does not agree, the insurer may have issues. Accordingly, the safe course is to await a judicial determination before an insurer terminates the defense.

It is important to distinguish the duty of an excess carrier because such policies generally do not provide an obligation to defend. Instead, the excess carrier may exercise its “right to defend.”

The Louisiana Supreme Court rules that amount billed by healthcare providers beyond what has been paid by a Workers Compensation insurer is NOT a collateral source that is recoverable against tort defendants

In a very important ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court, a tort defendant is no longer liable for any “actual charges” by medical providers above the amount paid by a Workers Compensation insurer pursuant to promulgated Workers Compensation fee schedule . In Simmons v. Cornerstone Investments, LLC,  2018-cc-0735 (La. 5/18/19), the court concluded:

“…the amount of medical expenses charged above the amount actually incurred is not a collateral source and its exclusion from the purview of the jury was proper.” See http://www.lasc.org/opinions/2019/18-0735.CC.OPN.pdf

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the development of the collateral source rule under applicable jurisprudence noting that the genesis of the collateral source rule:

“Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution. Under this well-established doctrine, the payments received from the independent source are not deducted from the award the aggrieved party would otherwise receive from the wrongdoer.” See Louisiana Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 02-2349, p. 6 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 734, 739.

Essentially, the court asks two questions when assessing whether the collateral source rule should apply. First, does the claimed benefit arise from some payment, wage deduction or other contribution by the Plaintiff that would diminish the plaintiff’s patrimony?  Second, will the goal of tort deterrence be promoted by allowing the windfall?  In a series of cases culminating in the case at bar, the court has been limiting the application of the collateral source rule in a number of contexts.

The court in Bozeman v. State, 03-1016 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So.2d 692, found that the collateral source rule did not apply when Medicaid was the payor such that the defendant could not be responsible for any amounts above what Medicaid paid to the provider. The court reasoned that it would be “unconscionable” to require taxpayers to pay the bills and then let a plaintiff recover the full undiscounted medical expenses and “pocket the windfall.” The court continued by noting in “Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607 (La. 5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945, this court found the collateral source rule did not apply to prevent the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier from receiving a credit for workers’ compensation benefits paid by her employer, even though the plaintiff paid for the UM coverage herself.” In Hoffman v. 21st Century North American Ins. Co., 14-2279 (La. 10/2/15), 209 So.3d 702, the court held that the collateral source rule does not apply to attorney-negotiated medical discounts. The court also looked at the US 5th Circuit in Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2016), that the collateral source rule does not apply above any amounts actually paid by the employer in the context of the LHWCA.

In each of the instances outlined, the court noted that the patrimony of the plaintiff was not impacted by limiting recovery to the amount of medical bills actually paid. Moreover, the court noted that the goal of tort deterrence is not negatively impacted, and that allowing a plaintiff to recover a windfall in this context is tantamount to an award of punitive damages that are not recoverable absent statutory authority which is not present in this context.   The Simmons decision now extends that same logic to cases where a Workers Compensation insurer has paid the medical benefits pursuant to the Louisiana Workers Compensation Law.

This ruling will have significant impact on the evaluation, settlement and trial of tort cases that have corresponding Workers Compensation claims.

Submitted by John P. Wolff, III (Partner)

The “Great Flood of 2016”–Update and Resources

“Disaster Declaration” Expanded. The list of parishes now declared disaster areas by the federal government has increased to include the following parishes: Acadia, Ascension, East Feliciana, Iberia, Lafayette, Pointe Coupee, St. Landry, and Vermilion.

http://gov.louisiana.gov/news/additional-parishes-added-to-federal-disaster-declaration-8-16-16

Potential Tax Implications for Flood Victim. For those insured, it is critical that you document your losses with as much detail as possible; serial numbers, make/model/description—the more detail the better. Keep receipts and credit card statements. Time-dated photos are also important. Even those without flood insurance should do the same as it may assist in obtaining FEMA assistance. However, the same documentation of your losses could also help to reduce your tax exposure. The attached link provides key information and outlines the impact the flooding may have on tax-filing and other deadlines.

https://www.irs.gov/uac/tax-relief-for-victims-of-severe-storms-flooding-in-louisiana