The Runaway Railroad Jury Verdict: A Cautionary Tale for Attorneys and Jury Members

Keogh Cox attorneys Andrew Blanchfield, Chris Jones, and Chelsea Payne successfully defeated class certification in an action students brought to recover a partial refund of tuition and fees they claim they were owed after in-person classes were converted to remote learning because of the COVID-19 global pandemic. See Miazza v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College.

In 2021, plaintiffs Taylor Gunter and Michael Miazza filed a lawsuit seeking a partial refund of the tuition they paid to LSU for Spring 2020 classes. They alleged that they were entitled to a partial refund of tuition and certain fees because in-person classes were cancelled in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In lieu of in-person classes, remote learning went into effect after spring break, from March 30, 2020 through the end of the spring semester.

In addition to their own claims for partial refunds, the plaintiffs tried to bring the case as a class action and moved to certify a class defined as: “All students who, as of March 13, 2020, were enrolled at Louisiana State University's main campus in Baton Rouge who paid Tuition and/or Fees for the Spring 2020 semester, or on whose behalf such payment was made.”

After the completion of discovery for class certification, and after the dismissal of Plaintiff Michael Miazza’s claim, Plaintiff Taylor Gunter filed a Motion for Class Certification. After hearing, the Trial Court certified the class as alleged, finding all the requirements for class certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591 were satisfied. LSU appealed the decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

The First Circuit reversed the Trial Court’s judgment and found the Plaintiff failed to satisfy all of the requirements for class certification. After conducting a rigorous analysis of the class certification requirements, the Court concluded that “a multitude of individualized inquiries and proof make up the liability and damages issues essential to the putative plaintiffs’ implied contract claims.” The Court identified some of these “individualized inquiries” as follows:

• which representations in each school’s or college’s catalogs, bulletins, and website materials did the putative plaintiff rely upon in developing his or her expectation and what particular facilities and on-campus opportunities did a putative plaintiff expect to utilize;

• whether the putative plaintiff has historically utilized on-campus facilities and opportunities; which facilities and/or on-campus opportunities, if any, were necessary for a particular school's or college's course completion;

• whether a putative plaintiff was satisfied with the online instruction, course credits received, and grading options provided; and

• whether a putative plaintiff actually suffered any financial loss, mindful of each student’s particular situation.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the record lacked sufficient evidence to support findings of offers and acceptances, where were necessary (1) to establish meetings of the mind and (2) conclude each putative plaintiff and LSU consented to an implied contract. Any determination of liability for an implied contract also is dependent upon proof of facts individual to each putative class member. Therefore, the class would degenerate into a series of individual trials.

The First Circuit concluded that certification of the case as a class action was an abuse of discretion. It reversed the Trial Court’s judgment and decertified the matter. Plaintiff filed a Writ Application with the Louisiana Supreme Court. On January 14, 2025, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s Writ Application, finally resolving the class certification issue. As a result, Plaintiff cannot pursue class certification, but rather may only pursue her own individual claim.

References:

Miazza v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2023-1194 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/9/24), 394 So.3d 874, writ denied, 2025 WL 87255 (La. 1/14/25).

A deputy arrives at your home or office and announces that you have been served. You quickly realize you have been named as a defendant in a lawsuit. Now what?Whether the suit involves a breach of contract, an automobile accident, or the one and a million other circumstances that can lead to a suit being filed, the process is essentially the same in Louisiana state courts. This blog provides a general roadmap of Louisiana’s “pre-trial” procedure, which applies in most situations. Different procedures are involved with workers’ compensation claims, administrative proceedings, medical malpractice claims, and other areas.Petition/Answer - When a person or company believes they have been damaged by fault, breach, or neglect, Louisiana law provides that the person allegedly wronged, the plaintiff, may file a Petition for Damages. Louisiana does not have a “loser pays” system. For this reason, there is little disincentive to a plaintiff who wants to sue. Once the Petition is filed with the Clerk of Court, the Sheriff serves the defendant with a certified copy of the Petition and the “Citation.”A defendant has fifteen days to file an Answer or to secure an extension from either the plaintiff attorney or the Judge, by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings. A failure to respond to a suit or obtain an extension within 15 days of service may result in a default judgment.Trial by Judge or Jury -The parties advise if they desire a judge or jury trial in the initial filings. There is no right to a jury in cases which do not have a possible value of more than $50,000. If a plaintiff “stipulates” that case value is at or below $50,000, the defendant has no right to demand a jury trial under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1732.Exceptions - Defendants have the right to raise “exceptions” to the suit. Common exceptions include a claim that the suit is vague; is filed in the wrong venue (i.e., the wrong location); or is untimely, and therefore “prescribed.” Defendants can use the exception process to challenge the plaintiff’s legal ability to recover. Many exceptions are waived if they are not filed before or with the Answer.Discovery

• Written - After the Answer is filed, the discovery process typically begins. Discovery is an information-gathering process done through different methods. The parties to a lawsuit may issue written Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, and Requests for Production of Documents.
• Depositions - Depositions are a key component of discovery. A deposition allows the attorneys (or the parties themselves, if unrepresented) to ask questions of witnesses before a court reporter. The testimony is taken under oath and can be used later for certain purposes. For example, if the witness is not available to testify at trial, the deposition testimony can often be introduced in lieu of live testimony. Also, if a witness changes his testimony at trial, the deposition can be used to attack the testimony and credibility of the witness.

Case Deadlines - Typically, the court will establish a scheduling order to establish key dates such as deadlines to identify witnesses, exhibits, and any experts who may testify on behalf of the parties. The court often sets a deadline to file “dispositive” motions, such as motions for summary judgment where the plaintiff or the defendant tries to have the case determined before the trial.Alternative Dispute Resolution - Frequently, the parties agree to attempt to mediate the case with the assistance of a mediator. This is a voluntary process. In some cases, the parties will be bound by an agreement to arbitrate which will be conducted outside of the normal court process.There is no law or statute which sets the time frame for the “pre-trial” process. Depending upon the complexity of the suit, the pre-trial phase of a suit may take months, and often years.

In Madden v. Fairburn, the plaintiff amended her petition to assert a UM claim against an insurer based upon the alleged negligence of a new defendant not named in the original petition. The amended petition asserted a new theory of liability but sought the same recovery under the same UM policy.

The issue presented to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit was whether the original petition interrupted prescription for the claim brought against the UM insurer. Because the insurer did not receive notice in the original petition that it could be liable for damages based upon the new defendant’s fault, the court found prescription could not be interrupted.

Madden was a passenger in a vehicle driven by John Seibert that collided with Steven Ray Fairburn. Madden timely filed suit against Fairburn and Capitol Specialty Insurance Corporation (Capitol Specialty), claiming uninsured motorist (UM) coverage under its policy. The Trial Court later dismissed Madden’s claims against Fairburn. While the appeal of that ruling was pending, and over five years after the accident, Madden amended her petition to allege Seibert was at fault and sought the same UM coverage any damages he caused. Capitol Specialty argued the claim brought against it in the amended petition had prescribed.

At the time of the accident, claims for torts/delictual actions had a one-year prescriptive period that commenced from the date of the injury or damage sustained* Claims to recover damages under a UM policy are subject to a prescription period of two years.^ Madden argued her original claim against Capitol Specialty interrupted prescription because her amended claim arose from the same accident and sought to recover damages under the same UM policy.

La. C.C. art. 3462 states that prescription is interrupted when an obligee (Madden) commences an action against an obligor (Capitol Specialty) in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. However, in Kling v. Hebert, the Louisiana Supreme Court has clarified that the “essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved.” The Kling judges emphasized that prescription serves to protect defendants from unexpected liability years after an event, particularly when a new legal theory or a different alleged tortfeasor is introduced.

The court also considered Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which held that a claim against an insurer based on one party’s negligence does not interrupt prescription for a later claim against the same insurer based on another party’s negligence. Because Madden’s original suit was based on Fairburn’s negligence, Capitol Specialty did not receive timely notice that she would later seek UM coverage based on Seibert’s alleged fault. Thus, the appellate court ruled in favor of the insurer, affirming the prescription of the plaintiff’s claims.

References:

Madden v. Fairburn, 2024-0513 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), --- So.3d ---, 2024 WL 5232995.

Kling v. Hebert, 23- 00257, p. 4 (La. 1/ 26/24), 378 So. 3d 54.

Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975).

*La. C.C. art. 3492. See As of July 1, 2024, delictual actions are subject to a two-year liberative prescriptive period, applying to delictual actions that arose or after the effective date.

^ La. R.S. 9:5629.