Tag: notice

Court Holds Knowledge of a Condition Does Not Equal Knowledge that Condition Is Unreasonably Dangerous

In Webber v. City of Shreveport, No. 56,705-CA (La. App. 2 Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), the Louisiana Second Circuit recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a trip-and-fall case involving a cracked sidewalk.

The plaintiff alleged she tripped and fell over an uneven area of the sidewalk in front of the defendant’s business. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish (1) a defect creating an unreasonable risk of harm or (2) the defendant knew or should have known of any defect. The defendant produced evidence to show it had no notice of any defect and no prior accidents in the area where the plaintiff fell. The defendant also produced photographs showing no holes in the area and no differences in elevation exceeding one inch.

In support of her claims, the plaintiff provided evidence including testimony from a corporate representative of the defendant who admitted to knowledge of cracks in the sidewalk prior to the plaintiff’s accident.

However, the court importantly distinguished that knowledge of a condition is not the same as knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition. The defendant maintained that not all cracks in sidewalks present unreasonably dangerous conditions. It also offered proof that the subject portion of the sidewalk was traveled every day as the building’s main passage. There were no prior complaints regarding its condition, nor were there any prior accidents.

Based upon this evidence, the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the cracks in the sidewalk were unreasonably dangerous or that the defendants had any actual or constructive notice of the defect’s existence. Summary judgment was affirmed in the defendant’s favor.

Reference: Webber v. City of Shreveport, 56,705 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/17/25), 425 So. 3d 485.

The Louisiana Legislature Overhauls the “Direct Action” Statute

For decades, Louisiana law provided a claimant or injured person an uncommon opportunity (1) to directly name an insurer in a lawsuit, and (2) to make the jury aware of the presence of insurance. This was known nationally as the “Louisiana Direct Action Statute.” This statute, embodied in LSA—R.S. 22:1269, has long been a topic of debate.

The Louisiana Legislature recently amended the “direct action statute” in Act 275 and declared that the injured person “shall have no right of direct action against the insurer” unless at least one of the exceptions applies: the insured files for bankruptcy, the insured is insolvent, service cannot be made on the insured, a tort cause of action exists against a family member, uninsured motorist claims, the insured is deceased, or when the insurer issues a reservation of rights or coverage denial (but only for the purpose of establishing coverage). The Act further provides that the insurer shall not be included in the caption of the case. And, the existence of insurance is not to be disclosed unless the Louisiana Code of Evidence requires it. This new legislation is effective August 1, 2024.

But, the Act also provides for new provisions that allow for the joinder of an insurer after settlement or in connection with a final judgment. The Act further includes specific provisions enacted to provide notice to an insurer of an action and outlines the procedures and timelines for how insurers assert reservation of rights or a denial of coverage.

The revisions to LSA—R.S. 1269 represent a significant change in how lawsuits involving insurance companies will proceed.