Tag: Louisiana Supreme Court

Claims for Indemnity and Defense Brought Prior to a Liability Determination Are No Longer Premature

11.05.2024

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that a claim for defense and indemnity may be asserted before a judicial finding of liability. The Court’s decision overruled prior decisions that held claims for defense and indemnity were premature until it was determined that damages were actually owed and the party claiming indemnity sustained a loss.

In Daniel Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, the plaintiff alleged he was injured when he drove over a downed power line that belonged to Cox Communications. Evidence showed Cox Communications contracted with Cable Man to provide services, maintenance, and repair for its telecommunication companies. The contract covered maintenance and repair of the subject phone line.

The contract included an indemnification provision that required Cable Man to indemnify and defend Cox Communications from any and all claims relating to Cable Man’s work, Pursuant to the contract, Cox Communications sent Cable Man a request to tender defense and indemnification under the contract. Cable Man refused the tender and Cox Communications filed a cross-claim against Cable Man asserting that it was owed defense and indemnification. In response, Cable Man filed an Exception of Prematurity and maintained that the claim for indemnity had not accrued because there had not been a judgment or a finding a Cable Man’s fault or liability.

The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Exception of Prematurity and stated that “It is well-established that claims for indemnity, as well as claims for defense arising under an indemnity agreement, are premature prior to a determination that damages are actually owed and the indemnitee sustains a loss.” The court reasoned that the lawsuit was still pending against both parties and no liability determination had been made. Therefore, under the “well-established” law, Cable Man owed no obligation to Cox Communications for indemnity and costs at the time Cox asserted its cross-claim.

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit’s decision and Cable Man’s claims of prematurity were denied. Acknowledging such claims for indemnification previously were considered premature, the Court held the law moving forward should allow for a claim for indemnity, whether in a third-party demand or a cross-claim, that is raised during the course of litigation and before a finding of liability. Further, the Court recognized potential inconsistencies with prior judicial determinations and stated, “in light of our ruling today, to the extent any prior jurisprudence can be interpreted otherwise, we now clarify that such a claim for indemnity is not prohibited before a liability adjudication.”

This ruling makes clear that “asserting a claim for indemnity, arising out of the same facts and circumstances, is not premature before a judicial finding of liability.” The right to collect on an indemnity agreement continues to be determined upon a finding of liability or loss, but a claim for indemnity can now be asserted in the same proceeding.

References:

Daniel Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, et al, 2023-CC-01358 (La. 5/10/24); 386 So.3d 270.

Public Health Emergencies, Medical Review Panels, and Gross Negligence – Where Does Louisiana Currently Stand?

08.05.2024

Under the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act (“LHEPA”), a plaintiff must establish a medical provider’s gross negligence in a medical malpractice case when the treatment at issue occurred during a declared state of public health emergency.^ However, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled that a medical review panel shall not consider gross negligence when the medical treatment occurred during a declared state of public health emergency.

In Sebble v. St. Luke’s, the plaintiff instituted a medical review panel for a medical malpractice claim related to medical treatment provided from June 17, 2020 to June 24, 2020. This treatment was received during a declared state of public health emergency. Sebble asked the court for a declaratory judgment to state that the gross negligence standard, usually applied during a state of public health emergency, should not be considered or applied in medical review panel proceedings conducted pursuant to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”).

In response, the health care provider also sought a declaratory judgment that LHEPA’s standard of gross negligence applied and that the medical review panel must consider and analyze the claim under the gross negligence standard. The trial court ruled in favor of Sebble declaring that the gross negligence standard shall not be considered or applied in the medical review panel proceeding. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Louisiana Supreme Court examined provisions of the LMMA and the LHEPA and affirmed the trial court and court of appeal. The court agreed there is a distinction between a medical standard of care (considered by the medical review panel) and a legal standard of care (dictated by the LHEPA). The panel of medical experts is only qualified to render an opinion based on the medical standard of care. The panel’s opinion is then considered by the trier of fact in making a judicial determination.

Medical review panels include an attorney chairperson. However, the Supreme Court stated that the attorney chairperson is not authorized to instruct the panel on gross negligence. The Supreme Court also rejected a proposed two-step process where the panel would first determine whether the medical provider breached the standard of care; and only if the panel found a breach would it consider whether there was gross negligence. The Court rejected this proposal because the legislature did not provide for this process in the statute.

Although the Court agreed that the LHEPA is an immunity statute, it made clear that immunity is an affirmative defense that can only be plead in civil litigation. The statute provides for two defenses at the panel stage: right of action and prescription. Therefore, immunity provided under the LHEPA may not be invoked until a civil action is instituted district court.

However, Sebble was 4-3 decision, with a dissent by Justices Weimer, Cain, and McCallum, which may suggest this issue could resurface in the future. For now, under Sebble, gross negligence is not to be considered by the medical review panel.

References:

Sebble v. St. Luke’s, 2023-C-00483 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So.3d 615.

^ La. R.S. 29:766(A).

Louisiana Supreme Court Vacates Prior Decision and Finds Prescriptive Periods for Child Abuse Claims Can Be Revived

06.17.2024

In 2021, the Louisiana Legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to provide that a legal action against a person for sexual abuse of a minor, if barred by liberative prescription prior to the effective date of the amendment, is revived for a three-year period after the effective date of the amendment. In 2022, La. R.S. 9:2800.9 was amended again to specifically state the Legislature’s intent to revive any cause of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period.

On March 22, 2024, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in Douglas Bienvenu, et al. v. Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, and found the statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with due process protections set forth in the Louisiana Constitution. Specifically, the Court found that a defendant has a vested property right in accrued prescription and that revival of a prescribed cause of action violated due process.

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ request for rehearing, and on June 12, 2024, the Court vacated its prior ruling and found that the amendments to La. R.S. 9:2800.9 were constitutional.

On rehearing, the court agreed that a defendant has a vested property right in accrued prescription but found another step in constitutional analysis was required— examination of whether the legislature’s revival of prescribed causes of action for sexual abuse of minors “comports with substantive due process.” The Court noted, “The essence of substantive due process is protection from arbitrary and capricious action.”

In Bienvenu, the defendants’ right to plead prescription was an economic interest that did not implicate fundamental rights. The statute at issue was social welfare legislation, enacted to address societal costs of child sexual abuse. Therefore, the Court found the applicable due process test was whether the legislation was reasonable in relation to the goal to be attained and was adopted in the interest of the community as a whole. The statute needed only to have a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest to survive due process scrutiny.

The Court found the amendments to La. R.S. 9:2800.9 passed this test because (1) the provision assists in identifying hidden child predators so children will not be abused in the future; (2) shifts the costs of the abuse from the victims and society to those who actually caused it; and (3) educates the public about the prevalence and harm from child sexual abuse to prevent future abuse. These interests were found legitimate and compelling. Thus, the statute was constitutional and could be applied retroactively “to revive, for the period stated, all causes of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period.”

References:

Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, 2023-01194 (La. 3/22/24), 382 So. 3d 38, reh’g granted, 2023-01194 (La. 5/10/24), and opinion vacated on reh’g, 2023-01194 (La. 6/12/24).

Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, 2023-01194 (La. 6/12/24).

Louisiana Supreme Court Sets New Standard for Review of General Damage Awards

03.25.2024

In recent years, the dollar amount of general damage awards to personal injury plaintiffs has been on the rise. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently issued an opinion that may signal greater scrutiny for heightened general damage awards going forward. In Pete, v. Boland Marine and Manufacturing Co., the state’s highest court changed the standard of review in quantum disputes to require courts of appeal to consider general damage awards in similar cases when determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in awarding a specific general damage award.

In Pete, a 74-year old mesothelioma patient was awarded $9.8 million in general damages after it was found he was exposed to asbestos. The jury awarded $2 million for past and future physical pain and suffering, $2.3 million for past and future mental pain and suffering, $3 million for past and future disability, and $2.5 million for past and future loss of enjoyment of life. The appellate court held the defendant failed to demonstrate the general damage award “shocks the conscience,” and found the jury did not abuse its discretion.

The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the decision. In so holding, it also changed the standard by which appellate courts evaluate whether a trial court abused its discretion in awarding general damages. The Louisiana Supreme Court now instructs appellate courts to compare general damage awards to those awarded in similar cases in their review of the reasonableness of the trial court’s award. Applying the new standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the trial court abused its discretion and reduced the Pete plaintiff’s general damage award from $9.8 million to $5 million.

Previously, Louisiana courts employed a two-step analysis in evaluating general damage awards. First, the court of appeal determined whether the trial court’s award constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Second, and only if the court first determined that there was an abuse of discretion, the appellate court would consider prior damage awards in similar cases to determine what an appropriate award should have been. This test had proven problematic because there were no clear objective standards for determining whether the trial court’s award was an abuse of discretion.

The appellate court’s decision in Pete v. Boland Marine serves as an excellent example of the problems this test presented. While the majority found that the $9.8 million awarded to Pete did not “shock the conscience,” a dissenting judge believed the award did shock the conscience, because it far exceeded general damage awards in similar cases. The “shocking the conscience” test has been long criticized because of its lack of objectivity, as the result ultimately depended on the thoughts and feeling of the presiding judges. Critics argued this led to unpredictability within the law.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision reforms the two part test in an attempt to resolve this issue. The new test mandates that appellate courts consider damage awards in similar cases in the initial inquiry, to objectively consider whether the trial court abused its discretion under the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand. The second step of the test remains unchanged. If the court finds that the trial court abused its discretion, then the appellate court will look to recent cases to determine what is the highest or lowest award a reasonable trier of fact could have found and then reform the damage award accordingly.

This decision is a significant change in the law. It aims to increase predictability within the law and affords defendants objective standards by which to challenge damage awards. However, it remains to be seen how courts will implement this new test in practice.

References:

Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., LLC, 23-170 (La. 10/20/23), reh’g denied, 23-170 (La. 12/7/23), 374 So. 3d 135.

Louisiana Supreme Court Rules on Admissibility of Expert Opinion on “Ultimate Issues”

08.14.2023

La Code Evid. Art. 704 addresses the use of expert testimony in Louisiana Courts and provides, “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Though the text of this article is simple, Louisiana trial courts often face questions about when an expert’s opinion crosses a line and invades the jury’s fact-finding function. These questions often arise in the context of Daubert hearings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1425.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Hulin v. Snow, where the Court was asked to review the extent to which an expert in a civil case could offer testimony that addressed the ultimate issues of law and fact in the case. The ultimate issue in the Hulin case, which involved parental care, was the alleged negligence of the defendants. The Court examined multiple tendered opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert, including expert testimony about the defendants’ negligence and credibility.

In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court ruled that it was improper for the expert to testify on the ultimate issues of whether the defendants were negligent or credible. It held that “(a)lthough experts may aid the trial court in the determinations of ultimate facts, the final conclusions drawn from those facts belong exclusively to the trier of fact.” The testimony of plaintiffs’ expert stated conclusions about these ultimate issues. Therefore, it was inadmissible.

However, the Court did allow the expert, a board-certified pediatrician, to opine on the parental care of the defendants. “Even though this testimony may embrace some of the ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, it is permissible.” It appears the Court found that this testimony did not state conclusions about ultimate issues, as the Court held that the trier of fact could accept or reject the expert’s opinions on parental care as they relate to ultimate facts.

Reference:

Hulin v. Snow, 2023-00530 (La. 6/26/23), — So.3d —, 2023 WL 4199310.

Louisiana Supreme Court Confirms that Statutory Deadline to Oppose Summary Judgment Is Mandatory

06.05.2023

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device a party can use to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966 is the statute that governs motions for summary judgment in Louisiana. The statute was amended in 2015 to establish some new procedural rules for filing summary judgment motions. Before the statue was amended, the deadline for opposing a motion for summary judgment was set in the District Court Rules, and courts frequently allowed oppositions to motions for summary judgment to be filed after the statutory delay.

In 2015, the Legislature amended the statute to state that “absent the consent of the parties and the court, an opposition shall be filed” within the new fifteen-day deadline established by the article. In Auricchio v. Harriston, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the amendments to the statute removed the discretionary language that previously allowed a court to allow a party additional time to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled the amendments to art. 966 made the opposition deadline mandatory, and late-filed oppositions should not be considered in connection with a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Mahe v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC. The Court considered whether a trial court may grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment when a party fails to file its opposition within the fifteen-day deadline set in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).

In Mahe, a party requested a continuance of the hearing after the fifteen-day deadline passed. While subsection 966(C)(2) provides that a continuance of the hearing is permitted “for good cause shown,” the Court held that the requested continuance could not serve to circumvent the mandatory deadline for filing an opposition, as described in the Auricchio case. Accordingly, the order granting the continuance was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to rule on the motion for summary judgment without consideration of the untimely filed opposition. In so holding, the Court reinforced the mandatory deadlines set in La. C.C.P. art. 966 and provided additional guidance on the procedural rules for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment.

Louisiana Supreme Court Clarifies Analysis for Open & Obvious Conditions

05.03.2023

It seems intuitive that people have an obligation to avoid potentially harmful conditions that are open and obvious. Nevertheless, treatment of open and obvious conditions in Louisiana law has proved tricky because many cases did not apply a uniform analytical framework. In Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently offered needed guidance on the appropriate analysis for open and obvious conditions.

The plaintiff stopped at a gas station and decided to walk her dog in a nearby grassy area. To get to the grassy area, Farrell had to cross a pool of water that was “approximately the length of a tractor-trailer.” Farrell attempted to jump across the narrowest part of the pool, but slipped and fell. She sued for damages arising from her injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the condition was open and obvious. The trial court and court of appeal denied the defendants’ motion. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the matter and reversed.

In finding that the condition was open and obvious, the court began its analysis by outlining the elements that a plaintiff must establish to recover for damage arising from a defect under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2316, 2317 and 2317.1:

That the defendant owed plaintiff a duty to conform its conduct to a specific standard;
That the defendant breached the duty owed;
That the defendant’s conduct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries;
That the defendant’s conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and,
That the plaintiff suffered damages.

The court also highlighted the requirement under La. R.S. 2317.1 that plaintiff show the defendant knew or should have known of the condition before the injury occurred.

The court noted that some courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, while other courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant had breached the duty that was owed. In Farrell, the court found a duty was owed under the code articles referenced above. It clarified that whether a condition was open and obvious should be considered during analysis of whether the duty was breached, pursuant to Louisiana’s “risk/utility” test. This test requires consideration of whether the condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm, which considers whether the condition had any social utility; the likelihood and magnitude of harm the condition presented; the cost of preventing the harm; and the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct, including whether plaintiff’s conduct was socially useful or inherently dangerous.

Specifically, whether a condition is open and obvious should be considered in determining the likelihood of harm and magnitude of harm to an objectively reasonable person. The court further advised that the specific nature of the condition should be considered, such as its location and size. In contrast, a plaintiff’s particular and subjective knowledge of the condition is not relevant in determining whether defendant has breached a duty.

The Farrell court applied this analysis to the facts. It found that the pool served no useful purpose. No evidence existed regarding the cost to eliminate the risk. With respect to Farrell’s conduct, the court found that walking a dog was not dangerous by nature and may have an important social function, but this did not weigh heavily in the analysis. However, with respect to whether the condition as open and obvious, the court considered the location of the pool at the edge of the parking lot, the size of the pool, and the fact that it was apparent to all who encountered it. Thus, the condition was open and obvious, and the likelihood of and magnitude of the harm was minimal.

The court concluded that these factors collectively showed the condition was not unreasonably dangerous. The defendants did not breach their duty to plaintiff, and summary judgment should have issued for the defendants. In so holding, the Supreme Court provided clarifying guidance on analysis of open and obvious conditions under Louisiana law.

Case Reference:

Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, 2022-000849 (La. 3/17/23), — So.3d —-, 2023 WL 2550503.

Louisiana Supreme Court Finds Business Interruption Coverage Does Not Apply to Losses Attributable to COVID-19

04.17.2023

The COVID-19 pandemic had a profound impact on the global economy. Louisiana was not spared, and many businesses had to close as sales to their customers slowed or stopped altogether. Not surprisingly, the question arose regarding whether business interruption insurance would provide coverage to businesses in this situation. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently was asked this question in Cajun Conti, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and found that the policy at issue did not provide such coverage.

The mayor of New Orleans issued a proclamation on March 16, 2020, that prohibited most public and private gatherings. This applied to restaurants, whose business initially was limited to takeout and delivery services. Before the pandemic, Oceana Grill, a restaurant located in the French Quarter, could serve up to 500 customers at one time. However, it had to limit its business to takeout and delivery services when the mayor’s proclamation was announced. Because of social distancing guidelines, it remained at 60% or less capacity throughout the pandemic.

Oceana maintained a commercial insurance policy with loss of business income coverage and filed suit to request a declaratory judgment that the “policy provides business income coverage from the contamination of the insured premises by COVID-19.” Oceana’s insurer argued that there was no coverage under the policy because COVID-19 did not cause “direct physical loss of or damage to property” under the policy’s terms.

The trial court denied Oceana’s request for declaratory relief at trial. The appellate court reversed and found the policy’s terms ambiguous because it held “direct physical loss” could mean loss of use of the property. Because the pandemic prevented the full use of the property due to capacity limitations, the appellate court found coverage was triggered.

The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court’s decision, finding its focus on the use of the property to be misguided. The Court found that suspension of operations “caused by direct physical loss of or damage to property,” as defined by the policy, required “the insured’s property to sustain a physical, meaning tangible or corporeal, loss or damage.” The Court noted that the restaurant’s physical structure was not lost or damaged because of the pandemic. COVID-19 restrictions did not cause damage or loss that was physical in nature. Therefore, the policy did not provide coverage for loss of business income.

Whether a policy affords coverage depends on the terms and conditions of each policy and the facts of each case. However, in light of this decision, businesses with insurance policies that include provisions with language like that at issue in Cajun Conti should not anticipate coverage for loss of business income allegedly caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case References:

Cajun Conti LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2022-01349 (La. 3/17/23), 2023 WL 2549132.

Class Action Basics: What Are They and When Are They Certified?

03.21.2023

Sometimes, a number of people or parties will file claims, in which each party alleges the same or similar injuries that were caused by the same or similar conduct. In these circumstances, federal and Louisiana law recognize class actions as procedural devices that can be used to aggregate the parties’ claims into a single action.

The purpose and intent of class action procedure is to adjudicate and obtain res judicata effect on all common issues applicable to the representatives who bring the action. However, this res judicata effect also applies to all others who are “similarly situated,” provided they are given adequate notice of the pending class action and do not timely exercise the option to exclude themselves from the class. Class actions are commonly filed in matters that involve common facts and damages such as plant explosions, claims based upon allegedly defective products, or claims involving employment practices or civil rights violations.

Before a court can hold a trial on the merits of a class action, the court must determine whether all of the procedural requirements are met for certification of the class. In making this determination, the court rules on whether the matter may proceed as a class action or whether the named parties must bring individual claims. In Louisiana, the threshold requirements for class certification are found in La. C.C.P. art. 591(A), which provides:

A. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all, only if:

(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class.

(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.

(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(5) The class is or may be defined objectively in terms of ascertainable criteria, such that the court may determine the constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of any judgment that may be rendered in the case.

Every one of these requirements must be met for an action to be maintained as a class action. Stated differently, the class cannot be certified if even one of these threshold requirements is not met. A party seeking class certification must also establish one of the additional requirements outlined in La. C.C.P. art. 591(B).

In Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of the class certification requirements, to ensure that every one of them are satisfied before a case is certified as a class action. Moreover, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that every requirement of La. C.C.P. art. 591 is satisfied. While only the procedural requirements for class certifications are relevant to determine if a matter should be certified, the “rigorous analysis” required of the court oftentimes requires analysis of the overlapping merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.

Whether a matter should be certified as a class action is often a contested issue involving high stakes. If it is certified, the matter proceeds as a class action, where the claims are asserted on behalf of the entire class and can result in substantial damage awards. If the matter is not certified, the claim representatives must pursue their claims individually, which leads to significantly less exposure for defendants named in the action.

Case References:

Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC, 2012-1566 (La. 3/19/13), 112 So.3d 822, 829.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011).

Supreme Court Settles Circuit Split on Right to Appeal Summary Judgment

12.12.2022

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled that a co-defendant who pleads comparative fault as an affirmative defense may appeal a summary judgment that dismisses a co-defendant, even when the plaintiff did not file an appeal. The Court’s decision in Amedee v. Aimbridge Hospitality resolved a circuit split among the Louisiana Courts of Appeal regarding this issue.

The Amedee plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against multiple defendants including the City of New Orleans and Premium Parking of South Texas, LLC. After discovery, the City of New Orleans filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal from the suit. The plaintiff did not oppose the city’s motion. Premium Parking was the only party to file an opposition. The trial court granted the city’s motion and dismissed it from the suit. Premium Parking appealed the court’s judgment.

The Fourth Circuit did not address the merits of Premium Parking’s appeal. Instead, the court dismissed the appeal because it found Premium Parking did not have a legal right to appeal the city’s dismissal when the plaintiff did not appeal the judgment.

The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court’s ruling. The Court noted that “to prohibit appellate review of a summary judgment by a co-defendant, even where a plaintiff did not appeal, diminishes the search for truth—the object of a lawsuit—and denies a defendant the ability to fully defend itself.” To reach this conclusion, the Court first asked, who may appeal a judgment?

To answer this question, the Court looked to La. C.C.P. art. 2082 and observed the article makes no restriction regarding what party may appeal a final judgment. Further, the Court noted that the right to an appeal is even extended third parties, not involved in the suit, when that third party is allegedly aggrieved by the judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 2086.

The Court also considered a defendant’s right to appeal in the context of Louisiana’s pure comparative fault system and summary judgments. Under La. C.C. art. 2323, Louisiana’s comparative fault statute, the fault of all parties is to be quantified. La. C.C.P. art. 966(G), provides that when summary judgment is granted in favor of a party or non-party to a suit, the fault of the dismissed party may not be considered in any subsequent allocation of fault in the matter.

The Court noted that while art. 966(G) precludes an allocation of the fault of a party dismissed under the statute, it does not limit the right of a defendant to appeal the dismissal of a co-defendant. No statute limited a defendant’s right to appeal a summary judgment only to those situations where a plaintiff also filed an appeal. Therefore, a defendant who hopes to keep a co-defendant in the case so that fault still may be allocated to the dismissed party at trial now may appeal the co-defendant’s dismissal, even when the plaintiff fails to do so.

Case Reference: Amedee v. Aimbridge Hosp. LLC, 2021-01906 (La. 10/1/22), — So.3d —, 2022 WL 12338929.

Louisiana Supreme Court Now Allows Direct Negligence Claims Against Employer

07.01.2022

In a previous blog, we outlined developing law in the Louisiana appeals courts, and federal district courts in Louisiana on the issue of whether a claimant may maintain a separate cause of action against an employer for independent negligence when it is stipulated that the employee was in the course and scope of employment.¹ Most courts held a claimant could not maintain a separate action against the employer under these circumstances, reasoning that the employee’s fault would impute to the employer, and therefore, additional inquiry was not appropriate. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue and stated:

“(A) plaintiff may pursue both a negligence cause of action against an employee for which the employer is vicariously liable and a direct claim against the employer for its own negligence in hiring, supervision, training, and retention as well as a negligent entrustment claim, when the employer stipulates that the employee was in the course and scope of employment at the time of the injury.” (Emphasis added) See Martin v. Thomas et al., 21-1490 (La. 12/21/21), 328 So. 3d 1164.

This holding notably overturned the 1^st Circuit Court of Appeal ruling in Elee v. White, – – So.3d – – (La. App. 1 Cir 7/24/20), 2020 WL 4251974 and other Louisiana 5^th Circuit Court of Appeals decisions. The Supreme Court in Martin reasoned that “the initial assessment of fault required by the law is not bypassed due to the employer-employee relationship” and “shielding a potential tortfeasor from liability is not compatible with a comparative negligence regime.” The Court further stated that the possibility that both the employee and employer may be at fault is not “subsumed” by the employer’s admission on course and scope. In fact, if the fault of the employee is shown, then the issue of whether there is also fault on the part of the employer remains and must be decided by the evidence on a case-by-case basis.

The consequences of this decision remain to be seen, but it is expected that claimants may also pursue employers separately on theories such as negligent hiring, supervision, and entrustment. The scope of such discovery will remain within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

By: John P. Wolff, III and Richard W. Wolff

¹Louisiana Appeal Courts Prohibit Direct Negligence Claims Against Employer; US District Court Uses Rule to Limit Discovery – Keogh Cox

Louisiana Supreme Court issued a significant ruling in a class action case involving tax credits for solar panels

05.10.2019

Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a significant ruling in a class action case handled by Keogh Cox partners Chris Jones and Nancy Gilbert. The case involved tax credits for solar panels. The Court’s ruling overturned a lower court decision that held an Act of the Legislature unconstitutional. After the plaintiffs’ Application for Rehearing was denied, the Court’s decision is now final.

In Ulrich, et al. v. Kimberly Robinson, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Revenue, 2018-0534 (La. 3/26/19), 2019 WL 1395316, the class action plaintiffs were persons who purchased and installed residential solar panel systems in their homes. When they claimed the solar electric system tax credits on their 2015 state tax returns pursuant to La. R.S. 47:6030, the tax credits were denied by the Louisiana Department of Revenue, based on Act 131 of the 2015 legislative session. Act 131 capped the maximum amount of solar panel tax credits to be granted by the Department of Revenue, and the plaintiffs’ claims were made after the cap was exhausted.

When their claims for the tax credits were denied, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare Act 131 unconstitutional. During the pendency of the suit in the district court, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 413 which provided additional funding for solar tax credits. Under Act 131, all taxpayers whose solar panel tax credit claims were previously denied would receive the entirety of their tax credits over installments. The district court declared Act 131 unconstitutional and concluded that Act 413 did not moot the controversy.

Because the district court declared Act 131 unconstitutional, the Department directly appealed the decision to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Oral arguments occurred in October of 2018. In the Court’s recent opinion, it concluded that Act 413 mooted the controversy. According to the Court, the plaintiffs no longer maintained a “justiciable controversy” because Act 413 provided for the payment of the entirety of the previously denied tax credits. Accordingly, the Court overruled the district court’s judgment that declared Act 131 unconstitutional. Plaintiffs filed an Application for Rehearing and that request was recently denied, making this decision final.

Chris Jones is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, LA. He focuses his practice on class actions and mass torts, and handles these matters in courts throughout the country. He is a life-long resident of Baton Rouge, where he lives with his wife and four children.