Insight

Claims for Indemnity and Defense Brought Prior to a Liability Determination Are No Longer Premature

Published on: November 5, 2024

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that a claim for defense and indemnity may be asserted before a judicial finding of liability. The Court’s decision overruled prior decisions that held claims for defense and indemnity were premature until it was determined that damages were actually owed and the party claiming indemnity sustained a loss.

In Daniel Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, the plaintiff alleged he was injured when he drove over a downed power line that belonged to Cox Communications. Evidence showed Cox Communications contracted with Cable Man to provide services, maintenance, and repair for its telecommunication companies. The contract covered maintenance and repair of the subject phone line.

The contract included an indemnification provision that required Cable Man to indemnify and defend Cox Communications from any and all claims relating to Cable Man’s work, Pursuant to the contract, Cox Communications sent Cable Man a request to tender defense and indemnification under the contract. Cable Man refused the tender and Cox Communications filed a cross-claim against Cable Man asserting that it was owed defense and indemnification. In response, Cable Man filed an Exception of Prematurity and maintained that the claim for indemnity had not accrued because there had not been a judgment or a finding a Cable Man’s fault or liability.

The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Exception of Prematurity and stated that “It is well-established that claims for indemnity, as well as claims for defense arising under an indemnity agreement, are premature prior to a determination that damages are actually owed and the indemnitee sustains a loss.” The court reasoned that the lawsuit was still pending against both parties and no liability determination had been made. Therefore, under the “well-established” law, Cable Man owed no obligation to Cox Communications for indemnity and costs at the time Cox asserted its cross-claim.

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit’s decision and Cable Man’s claims of prematurity were denied. Acknowledging such claims for indemnification previously were considered premature, the Court held the law moving forward should allow for a claim for indemnity, whether in a third-party demand or a cross-claim, that is raised during the course of litigation and before a finding of liability. Further, the Court recognized potential inconsistencies with prior judicial determinations and stated, “in light of our ruling today, to the extent any prior jurisprudence can be interpreted otherwise, we now clarify that such a claim for indemnity is not prohibited before a liability adjudication.”

This ruling makes clear that “asserting a claim for indemnity, arising out of the same facts and circumstances, is not premature before a judicial finding of liability.” The right to collect on an indemnity agreement continues to be determined upon a finding of liability or loss, but a claim for indemnity can now be asserted in the same proceeding.

References:

Daniel Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, et al, 2023-CC-01358 (La. 5/10/24); 386 So.3d 270.

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Insight

Court holds real estate agents representing sellers are not required to investigate the seller’s representations about the property.

In Casbon v. K.W.E.J., LLC d/b/a Keller Williams Realty, et al, the buyer of a home sued her real estate agent for the seller’s alleged misrepresentation of the home’s living area square footage. The facts of this case are unusual because the seller’s representation was based on a prior appraisal report, and accurately reflected the home’s square footage as stated in that report. Also, the buyer financed the purchase, and her lending institution appraised the home again, which resulted in a nearly identical living area square footage calculation.

The plaintiff sought to refinance about a year after buying the home. She used a different lending institution, which retained a different appraiser. The house included a sunroom which had been converted from a porch. The appraiser chose to classify the sunroom as something other than standard living area. As a result, the appraisal report stated the home’s living area square footage was several hundred square feet smaller than the prior appraisal reports, and the plaintiff was not approved for the refinance. The plaintiff sued her real estate agent on the ground that the agent failed to verify the living area square footage before plaintiff purchased the home.

The defendant agent filed summary judgment, arguing she did not owe the plaintiff a duty to investigate or confirm the home’s square footage. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding an issue of fact regarding the classification of the sunroom, specifically “whether it is living area or not living area.”

Reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment in favor of the real estate agent. The Court noted prior caselaw establishing that agents are not required to confirm square footage as represented by a property owner by measuring or otherwise researching the accuracy of the seller’s representation. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the issue here was how the sunroom was classified rather than how the room was measured. To the Court, this was a “distinction without a difference.”

The Court applied the standard rule that real estate agents only are required to disclose defects which are known or should be known to them. Additionally, the purchase agreement expressly put the obligation to verify the seller’s representation of living area on the buyer. Thus, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed.

Case reference: Casbon v. K.W.E.J, LLC, et al, 23-321 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/4/23), 375 So.3d 524.

Insight

Workers' Comp: "Failure to Answer" Results in Forfeiture of Benefits

A worker’s benefits may be forfeited if the employee is untruthful on a medical questionnaire (if the misrepresentations directly relate to the alleged injury) or prejudices the employer’s ability to recovery from the “Louisiana Second Injury Fund.” La. R.S. 23:1208.1 Some Louisiana courts have shown reluctance to deny workers’ compensation benefits based on the employee’s alleged failure to truthfully answer a medical history questionnaire. However, the court in Spillman v. Career Adventures, Inc., --- So.3d ---- 2021 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/11/21), 2021 WL 3523959, held that benefits were forfeited because the claimant provided false responses to several medical history questions and failed to answer a number of specific questions on a post-hire medical history questionnaire provided by his employer.

At trial, it was established that Spillman had pre-incident medical conditions to include: 1) injuries related to a 2007 work-related accident; 2) regional sympathetic dystrophy of the left foot; 3) COPD; 4) chronic pain from a gunshot wound in his left leg; 5) surgery to the AC joint of his right shoulder; 6) injuries from a 2018 motor vehicle accident to the right shoulder and right knee; 7) anxiety; 8) bipolar disorder; and 9) many other ailments.

Like many other employers, Spillman’s employer Career Adventures included with its employment packet a “Office of Workers’ Compensation Second Injury Board Questionnaire.” Spillman failed to truthfully complete this questionnaire and checked “no” to specific questions which asked if he had experienced many of his known conditions such as COPD and bipolar disorder. Although Spillman took the time to respond to numerous “fill in the blank” questions, he purposefully skipped at least 10 inquiries.

Eleven months after hire, Spillman alleged he was injured at work while performing his duties as a welder. At trial, Spillman’s family physician identified a torn tendon in the left elbow as a work-related injury. He further testified that the tendon injury limited his activities and merged with his pre-existing injuries to create a greater total disability. The workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) ruled that Spillman violated La. 23:1208.1 by failing to truthfully answer certain questions. The Second Circuit “went further” in affirming the workers’ compensation judge, stating:

“We go further than the WCJ. All information which would have been disclosed had Mr. Spillman truthfully answered each and every question on the preemployment questionnaire must be considered …”

Therefore, the appellate court in Spillman found that both false answers and a failure to answer certain questions can qualify as a willful misrepresentation sufficient to cause a forfeiture of benefits under La. R.S. 23:1208.1 under certain circumstances.

Insight

An Exercise in Inaction

"I never worry about action, only inaction."

- Winston Churchill

The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision not to take up a case is sometimes just as important as a decision to grant Writs and issue a ruling. Recently, much attention has been given to the Court's decision not to grant a Writ filed by Louisiana State University.

On August 28, 2013, the Court denied a Writ brought by LSU in a case filed by local media outlets in the 19th JDC demanding access to information regarding LSU's presidential candidates. The media appears interested in the interview process and why only one of the 35 candidates was formally interviewed. The media outlets argue that the information concerning the candidates is "public record" under Louisiana law.

Prior to the Writ filing, the state District Court had ruled that the information was public record and ordered LSU to produce the requested documents. LSU did not comply with this order. On August 14, 2013, LSU was held in contempt of court and fined $500 per day. LSU filed a Writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Writ, stating that LSU had a "sufficient remedy" through a suspensive appeal. The Court offered no further explanation of its ruling.

Attorneys on both sides have publically offered differing opinions as to the significance of the Court's Writ denial. The attorney for the media outlets stated to Nola.com that LSU now must comply with the district court's order and produce the requested information. However, the attorney for LSU argues that the Court's Writ denial is functionally a "stay" of the District Court's order because the Supreme Court specifically expressed that LSU could file a suspensive appeal. LSU has expressed an intention to appeal the entire case to the Louisiana First Circuit.

Richard W. Wolff

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Louisiana Supreme Court