Category: Litigation

CORPORATE DEPOSITIONS: Recent Amendment to Federal Rules Mark a Positive Change

Litigation is increasingly a “part of doing business.” In federal court, corporate depositions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) (frequently referred to as a “30(b)(6) deposition”).  When a corporate representative is appointed to testify on behalf of a company, they are typically provided a deposition notice which identifies the subjects he or she will be asked to address in their testimony. However, the process is not always smooth when the parties disagree about what is fairly covered in the notice. A recent amendment to Rule 30 aims to improve the process.

Preparing for a 30(b)(6) deposition can be overwhelming and time-consuming.  Often, the imprecise identification of subjects in the notice leaves the corporation wondering what the noticing party really seeks to explore or even who is the best individual to testify to the topics identified.  The federal judiciary has observed that corporate representative(s) under the current practice are often unprepared to provide the necessary testimony and/or that the entity’s interpretation of the deposition topics does not match the intent of the noticing party.  The result is aborted or suspended depositions, extended litigation, increased costs, and the birth of theories that the deponent intentionally obstructed the deposition, which is usually not the case.

To address these issues, effective December 1, 2020, Rule 30(b)(6) now reads as follows (changes in bold):

Notice or Subpoena Directed to an Organization.  In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.  The named organization must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify.  Before or promptly after the notice or subpoena is served, the serving party and the organization must confer in good faith about the matters for examination.  A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to confer with the serving party and to designate each person who will testify. …

The recent amendment directs the serving party and the named organization to confer before or promptly after the notice or subpoena is served about the matters for examination.  The intent is to “facilitate collaborative efforts” and to encourage “candid exchanges about the purposes of the deposition and the organization’s information structure [which] may clarify and focus the matters for examination and enable the organization to designate and to prepare an appropriate witness or witnesses, thereby avoiding later disagreements.”  (Committee Notes; Rule 30).  The Committee Notes even suggest that the notice of the deposition may be “refined as the parties confer.”  The Committee Notes further provide that the obligation is to “confer in good faith,” not to reach agreement, and remind that “it may be desirable to seek guidance from the court.” 

The recent changes to Rule 30 are subtle but may prove impactful. Because the new procedure is now in effect, we should know soon.

Novel Coronavirus Breeds Novel Litigation: Business Interruption Suits in the Age of COVID-19

The nation’s first suit seeking a declaration of coverage under a commercial property policy for business interruption and extra expenses incurred as a result of COVID-19 was filed in a Louisiana state court on March 20, 2020. Since then, similar suits have been filed across the nation by restaurants, casinos, dentists, dive shops, movie theatres, repertory theatre companies, etc.  Clearly, the same coverage issues raised in the Louisiana case will be litigated throughout the nation.

The suit in Cajun Conti, LLC, et al v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, et al, Suit No. 2020-02558, was filed on March 16, 2020, in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. Plaintiffs, doing business as Oceana Grill, a restaurant in the French Quarter, allege coverage should be declared to exist because: 1) the property policy is an “all risks” policy such that all risks are covered unless the insurer can clearly and specifically establish an exclusion from coverage; 2) the policy does not contain any exclusion “for losses from a virus or global pandemic;” 3) the virus has “physically impact[ed] public and private property” as it “physically infects and stays on the surface of objects or materials, ‘fomites,’ for up to twenty-eight days;” 4) such “contamination … [is] a direct physical loss needing remediation;” and, alternatively and in addition, 5) the current and future state orders limiting its operations serve to trigger the civil authority provisions of its policy.

A key issue in Cajun Conti as well as in the other COVID-19 business interruption coverage litigation will be whether the existence of the novel coronavirus constitutes a “direct physical loss or damage” under the intendment of an all risks property policy. The Cajun Conti plaintiffs cite to Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2011-0196 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/10/11), 82 So.3d 294, writ denied, 2011-2336 (La. 12/2/11) for the premise that the existence of a hazardous condition that renders the insured property unusable or uninhabitable is sufficient to constitute a “physical loss or damage” sufficient to trigger coverage.  Notably,  in Widder, the actual presence of inorganic lead in the insured property was confirmed to exist and coverage was therefore available. Because policyholders have the burden to establish the existence of “physical loss or damage,” reliance on Widder may require the Cajun Conti plaintiffs to establish coronavirus was actually present in their property or that its presence otherwise caused their property to be unusable or uninhabitable.  Presence in the community may not be sufficient to prove the coronavirus made the insured property uninhabitable or unusable.

One of the items of proof required for the triggering of coverage under the civil authority provisions of a commercial property policy is that the alleged business loss was caused by an action by the civil authority that prohibited access to the insured premises. Relying on out-of-state jurisprudence, one Louisiana federal court has determined this factor requires proof that access to the insured premises be “actually and completely prohibited,” which is not satisfied if the access is merely “limited or hampered.” Kean, Miller v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, C.A. No. 06-770 (M.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007), 2007 WL 2489711, *4-*6. The state orders expressly referenced in the Cajun Conti suit would appear not to satisfy this standard as they served only to limit occupancy and required earlier closures. Even the subsequent stay-at-home orders [Proclamation Number 33 JBE 2020 and 41 JBE 2020, issued respectively on March 22, 2020 and April 2, 2020], may likely be insufficient to satisfy this requirement as they do not expressly mandate closure of restaurants, but simply require restaurants to  “reduce operations to continue minimum contact with members of the public,” expressly allow for curbside delivery, drive-thru, and delivery services, and only prohibit the consumption of food and beverages on site. 

The specific facts of each business interruption claim and the terms of the relevant policy should be considered in every occasion. Yet, these suits may face problems of proof generally. For now, we expect the novel suits to continue.


John has been practicing over 30 years and is a Senior Partner with firm where he serves on the Management Committee. He has devoted attention to non-profit boards dedicated to assisting at risk children. He enjoys time with his three children and grandchildren. He also enjoys tennis and hiking.

Nancy B. Gilbert is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  She is a puzzle-solver by nature, and specializes in providing clear and in-depth analysis of complex litigation issues. 

Treating Physician Testimony – Pitfalls for Plaintiffs & Opportunities for Defendants

A party that wants to rely upon the testimony of a treating physician to support a personal injury case in federal court should be sure to consult the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Different rules will apply depending on the scope of the treating physician’s testimony.

Rule 26 sets two standards for expert disclosures. 26(a)(2)(C) sets a “lower standard” that typically applies to treating physicians. Under this standard, the treating physician may provide testimony beyond his personal knowledge, but he must base his opinions on “facts or data obtained or observed in the course of the sequence of events giving rise to the litigation.”  LaShip, LLC v. Hayward Baker, Inc., 296 F.R.D. 475 (E.D.La. Nov. 13, 2013).  Further, the physician may be permitted to testify regarding causation and future medical treatment if these opinions come from the doctor’s actual treatment of the party.

Under this “lower standard,” the party seeking to offer the physician’s testimony, usually the plaintiff, must timely disclose: (1) the subject matter on which the treating physician is expected to present evidence; and (2) a summary of the facts and opinions to which he is expected to testify.  Importantly, production of a plaintiff’s medical records alone is not sufficient – the plaintiff must actually provide a summary of the physician’s opinions.  See e.g. Williams v. State, 2015 WL 5438596, at *4 (M.D. La. Sept. 14, 2015).  If the party fails to timely disclose this information, he runs a substantial risk of having his testimony excluded from trial.

Where the physician’s testimony goes beyond the medical records or his treatment of the plaintiff, a “higher standard” can apply to the physician’s testimony. Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The physician may be required to produce a complete expert report to disclose: (1) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (2) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; (3) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; (4) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of publications authored in the last 4 years; (5) a list of all cases the expert has been used as an expert at trial or in depositions; and (6) a statement of the compensation the witness is to be paid for his work and testimony.

Application of this “higher standard” often turns on the frequency and recency of the physician’s treatment. Courts are also more likely to apply the higher standard when the physician’s opinions are based general scientific knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition rather than his actual treatment of the plaintiff.

 

John Grinton, a Keogh Cox associate whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When he is not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

Creating Obstacles to Frivolous Claims

The costs of litigation can be substantial, but a seldom used statute arms defendants with a tool to minimize these costs.  If a defendant has not filed another pleading, La. R.S. 13:4522 allows the defendant to request that a court order the plaintiff to post a bond as security to cover certain costs. If the plaintiff fails to post this security in the time fixed, his case will be dismissed without prejudice.

The security identified in this statute can include expert witness fees, deposition costs, exhibit costs, and other related expenses.  The defendant bears the burden of showing the amount needed for proper security. If a plaintiff’s damages are questionable, or preliminary investigation shows that the plaintiff might be apportioned most of the liability for the incident, the attorney filing the suit may think twice before pursuing the claim further, especially if a substantial amount of security is ordered.

By its terms, the statute does not apply to cases brought in forma pauperis. It also does not apply to claims filed in the Parish of Orleans. Everywhere else, the provisions of La. R.S. 13:4522 can add a layer of protection in the defense of frivolous claims.

 

John Grinton is a Keogh Cox associate whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

Too Much Money and No One to Give it to- The Cy Pres Doctrine

What happens when someone leaves money in a will to a charity that has closed its doors by the time the will is probated? In this strange circumstance, a court may apply the “cy pres doctrine” to answer this question. Cy pres is a French term which loosely translates to mean “as near as possible.” In modern litigation, cy pres is not only used to distribute charitable donations, but also to distribute millions of dollars left over in class action settlements.

In the example above, a court may use cy pres to transfer the donated money to a charity similar to the one that had shut down. In class actions, there are often funds left over when not enough people register to receive money under a settlement. In this situation, the court will use cy pres to decide where this money goes; but that decision is a tricky one. Courts will sometimes direct these funds to a governmental entity loosely related to what the lawsuit was about. Other times these funds will go to a charity. Whatever the choice, there are usually complaints.

In one case, a nationwide class of AOL customers agreed to a settlement in a class action filed in California. Even though class members lived all over the country, the cy pres funds went to a legal aid office in Los Angeles, where the judge’s husband served as a director. This raised some eyebrows.

In another case, Kellogg’s settled a class action filed because its advertisements claimed that frosted mini-wheats improved kids’ brain power, which -sadly- turned out not to be true. Those cy pres funds initially went to a charity designed to feed the poor. However, the court later ruled that the funds should have gone to a group that protected the public from false advertising.

As more and more cases like these garnered attention, rules were passed as to how to distribute these funds. Generally, these rules require some connection between the issues in the lawsuit and the mission of the group that gets the funds. While the United States Supreme Court has yet to address these issues, Chief Justice Roberts recently indicated that the Court may be ready to put its stamp on cy pres.

We may be “as near as possible” to some clarity in the murky law of cy pres.

When the Stakes are High: Class Actions in Louisiana

They make movies about “class actions” exactly because they can involve high stakes, with millions, even billions of dollars on the line. The class action procedure can create exposure at this level because of the large numbers of potential claims involved. Class actions are used to address losses experienced from unfair or fraudulent business practices, natural disasters, industrial explosions, or any event or action which is alleged to have damaged a large group in a similar way.

As a procedural device, the class action combines several claims (often hundreds or thousands) into a single action. A key battle in most Louisiana class actions is whether the proposed claim can properly be “certified” as a class action under Louisiana procedure. The recent Fourth Circuit decision in Duhon v. Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n., Inc., 2016 WL 3551620 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/30/16) addressed whether the lower court’s class “certification” was proper under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 591.

Duhon involved damages experienced following hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  In particular, the class representatives sought damages against the Harbor View Condominium Association and its insurers claiming that the association was guilty of faulty repairs following these two hurricanes. In deciding whether certification was proper, the Duhon court considered the following elements, all of which must be present to certify a proper class action:

Numerosity- the class must be so numerous that joinder of all involved persons would prove impractical;

Commonality- the case must present questions of law and fact that are common to the class;

Typicality- the claims and defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and,

Adequacy of representation- the representative parties must be positioned to fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.

After analyzing each of these “elements,” the Duhon court upheld the Trial Court’s certification of the claim as a class action. Further, the court concluded that the questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominated over any questions affecting only individual members such that a class action was superior to other available methods to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the controversy.

While the class action procedure has its detractors, it is sometimes the only real option to address a harm to a large group. Now that the class in Duhon has been certified, the case will proceed through discovery and towards trial on the merits. Who knows, they may make a movie about it someday.

What Mrs. O’Leary’s Cow Has to Do With Spoliation

For more than a century, the debate has raged over whether Mrs. O’Leary and her famous cow truly started The Great Chicago Fire of 1871. Were the tragic events of that conflagration to happen today, someone would ask Mrs. O’Leary to produce the “RFID” chip in her bovine. (You know they would). They would contend that this key evidence could show the whereabouts and movement of the cow at the time the fire began.  When she could not produce it, they would claim not only that she started the fire that destroyed a swath of Chicago, but that she also destroyed the evidence of her guilt. They would cry “spoliation.”

Discovery in a Digital World

The image of a law firm stuffed with banker boxes floor-to-ceiling is shifting to the view of a computer server filled with gigabytes of information. This is increasingly a digital world and the documents, photographs, charts, memos, and emails that are the “stuff” cases are built upon now often come in digital form. As a result, great emphasis is placed upon “electronic discovery.”