Category: Liability

Louisiana Second Circuit Applies Anti-Dram Shop Statute to Grant Summary Judgment

02.05.2024

Louisiana’s “anti-dram shop” statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.1, limits the ability of a claimant to hold a provider of alcohol liable for damages resulting from the acts of an intoxicated patron. Subsection A of the statute declares that the consumption of intoxicating beverages, rather than the sale, serving, or providing of those beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury or property damage that the consumer may cause. Under Subsection B, anyone who lawfully serves alcohol to a person of legal age is provided immunity for any injury caused by the consumer that occurs “off the premises.” This immunity extends to sellers of alcohol and social hosts.

The Louisiana Second Circuit recently examined these provisions of this statute in Rugg v. Horseshoe Entertainment, et. al. The plaintiff alleged she was injured when an intoxicated patron (John Doe) fell onto her at a hotel bar. She alleged that the defendant, which operated a casino bar, was liable because it ignored multiple complaints about John Doe’s drunken state prior to the incident and failed to escort him out.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Louisiana’s anti-dram shop statute prevented any finding of liability on its part. In opposing the summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the statute did not rule out liability because the injury occurred on the premises.

The Second Circuit determined that the immunity afforded in Subsection B of the statute was not available because, as the plaintiff argued, the injury occurred on the premises. However, Subsection A of the statute, which declares the consumption, not the serving, of alcohol is the proximate cause of injury inflicted by an intoxicated person, still applied.

Under these circumstances, the Court held it had to determine whether the bar owner violated general negligence principles. In conducting this analysis, the court was required to focus on two issues: 1) whether the alcohol provider acted reasonably under the circumstances, and 2) whether the alcohol provider took any “affirmative acts” that increased the chances of the incident.

The Court of Appeal granted summary judgment under the facts of the case. The court found no evidence in the record that Horseshoe acted unreasonably leading up to the incident. Testimony indicated that the complaints about John Doe’s behavior arose after the incident occurred, not before. Similarly, the court reasoned that the failure to escort John Doe out of the bar was not an “affirmative act” that increased the risk of the incident because the record did not indicate Horseshoe had any reason to do so prior to the injury.

In conclusion, the court noted “that in no case will the serving of alcohol be held as the proximate cause of a tort in which alcohol was involved.” Therefore, the plaintiff had to show Horseshoe did something more to cause her injury than just serve John Doe alcohol. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, summary judgment was granted. Under these facts, Louisiana’s dram shop statute still applied to protect the defendant provider of alcohol, even though the injury occurred on its premises and the statutory immunity was not available.

References:

La. R.S. 9:2800.1

Mechelle Rugg v. Horseshoe Entertainment, et al., 55,239 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 104143.

Summary Judgment Affirmed Because Alleged Defect was Open and Obvious

01.10.2024

The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed summary judgment in Rainey v. Knight, on grounds that the alleged defect was open and obvious. Its ruling shows that the open and obvious defense remains viable and supports summary judgment when reasonable minds can only agree that a condition is not unreasonably dangerous.

In Rainey, the plaintiff fell and was injured while leaving a veterinary hospital. Evidence showed the plaintiff frequented the premises for nearly twenty years before the incident. The plaintiff attempted to descend four steps from the hospital’s elevated porch but stepped off the porch and fell twenty-one inches to the ground. Rainey filed suit for his injuries, alleging the defendant failed to maintain its property. Specifically, he claimed that the elevated porch lacked a railing, which created a defect.

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and argued (1) the front porch ledge was an open and obvious defect and (2) the plaintiff could not show the defendant had knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition of the porch. The defendant also produced evidence to show it had no prior problems with anyone falling from the porch.

The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion, but his opposition was filed one day late. Because the opposition was not filed timely, the appellate court noted it was unable to consider the plaintiff’s opposition and exhibits under the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Auricchio v. Harriston.

On appeal, the court focused its analysis on whether the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff, applying Louisiana’s risk/utility balancing test to consider the utility of the condition, the likelihood and magnitude of harm, the cost of preventing the harm, and the nature of the plaintiff’s activities.

In examination of the likelihood and the magnitude of the harm, the appellate court noted that summary judgment may be granted if a condition is open and obvious. If reasonable minds could only agree that the condition was not unreasonably dangerous, that condition would be open and obvious, and the plaintiff would be unable to establish the defendant breached any duty owed to the plaintiff.

Considering the evidence before the court, the First Circuit found a reasonable person would have found the lack of a railing on the porch open and obvious and would have avoided the area where plaintiff fell when exiting the building. Importantly, the court found the lack of a railing was apparent to all who encountered it such that it was open and obvious.

The Rainey court also noted that the lack of reported complaints about the alleged condition indicated a low risk of harm. The height of the porch also showed the likelihood and magnitude of the plaintiff’s harm was minimal. In light of this evidence, the lack of railing around the entire porch was not an unreasonably dangerous condition. No reasonable factfinder could find that the defendant breached any duty owed to the plaintiff, and summary judgment was appropriately granted.

References:

Rainey v. Knight, 2023-0133 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23) (La. App. 1st Cir. Nov. 3, 2023)

Auricchio v. Harriston, 2020-01167 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So.3d 660

Louisiana Supreme Court Clarifies Analysis for Open & Obvious Conditions

05.03.2023

It seems intuitive that people have an obligation to avoid potentially harmful conditions that are open and obvious. Nevertheless, treatment of open and obvious conditions in Louisiana law has proved tricky because many cases did not apply a uniform analytical framework. In Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently offered needed guidance on the appropriate analysis for open and obvious conditions.

The plaintiff stopped at a gas station and decided to walk her dog in a nearby grassy area. To get to the grassy area, Farrell had to cross a pool of water that was “approximately the length of a tractor-trailer.” Farrell attempted to jump across the narrowest part of the pool, but slipped and fell. She sued for damages arising from her injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the condition was open and obvious. The trial court and court of appeal denied the defendants’ motion. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the matter and reversed.

In finding that the condition was open and obvious, the court began its analysis by outlining the elements that a plaintiff must establish to recover for damage arising from a defect under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2316, 2317 and 2317.1:

That the defendant owed plaintiff a duty to conform its conduct to a specific standard;
That the defendant breached the duty owed;
That the defendant’s conduct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries;
That the defendant’s conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and,
That the plaintiff suffered damages.

The court also highlighted the requirement under La. R.S. 2317.1 that plaintiff show the defendant knew or should have known of the condition before the injury occurred.

The court noted that some courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, while other courts had assessed whether a condition was open and obvious in the context of whether the defendant had breached the duty that was owed. In Farrell, the court found a duty was owed under the code articles referenced above. It clarified that whether a condition was open and obvious should be considered during analysis of whether the duty was breached, pursuant to Louisiana’s “risk/utility” test. This test requires consideration of whether the condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm, which considers whether the condition had any social utility; the likelihood and magnitude of harm the condition presented; the cost of preventing the harm; and the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct, including whether plaintiff’s conduct was socially useful or inherently dangerous.

Specifically, whether a condition is open and obvious should be considered in determining the likelihood of harm and magnitude of harm to an objectively reasonable person. The court further advised that the specific nature of the condition should be considered, such as its location and size. In contrast, a plaintiff’s particular and subjective knowledge of the condition is not relevant in determining whether defendant has breached a duty.

The Farrell court applied this analysis to the facts. It found that the pool served no useful purpose. No evidence existed regarding the cost to eliminate the risk. With respect to Farrell’s conduct, the court found that walking a dog was not dangerous by nature and may have an important social function, but this did not weigh heavily in the analysis. However, with respect to whether the condition as open and obvious, the court considered the location of the pool at the edge of the parking lot, the size of the pool, and the fact that it was apparent to all who encountered it. Thus, the condition was open and obvious, and the likelihood of and magnitude of the harm was minimal.

The court concluded that these factors collectively showed the condition was not unreasonably dangerous. The defendants did not breach their duty to plaintiff, and summary judgment should have issued for the defendants. In so holding, the Supreme Court provided clarifying guidance on analysis of open and obvious conditions under Louisiana law.

Case Reference:

Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. and the City of Pineville, 2022-000849 (La. 3/17/23), — So.3d —-, 2023 WL 2550503.

Court Finds Legal Malpractice Claim Perempted Because the Client Knew It Received “Bad Advice” More than One Year Before Suit Was Filed

02.28.2023

Legal malpractice claims in Louisiana are governed by a peremption period that cannot be interrupted or suspended. La. R.S. 9:5605(A) provides that a legal malpractice claim must be brought one year from the date of the alleged malpractice, or within one year from the date the alleged malpractice should have been discovered. However, even when a claim is filed within one year of discovery, it must be filed within three years of the date of the alleged malpractice. If a party fails to assert a legal malpractice claim before the peremption period expires, the right to bring the claim is lost.

The Louisiana Supreme Court holds that “peremption commences to run in a legal malpractice case when a claimant knew or should have known of the existence of facts that would have enabled him to state a cause of action for legal malpractice.” In Crosby v. Waits, Emmett, Popp & Teich, LLC, the court recently examined the types of circumstances that should inform a plaintiff that an act of alleged malpractice occurred, which would trigger the peremptive period in which the plaintiff’s claim must be filed.

The plaintiff in Crosby owned 75% of a company and was in the process of buying out the minority stakeholder. The company was involved in litigation at the time. Initially, the minority stakeholder maintained all of the recovery and risk related to the suit. In April 2016, an attorney advised the plaintiff to accept an offer to split the recovery and risk in the suit 50/50 as part of the sale. The plaintiff then accepted the 50/50 offer. The litigation concluded after the sale, in February 2018, and resulted in an adverse judgment for which the plaintiff was responsible pursuant to the 50/50 agreement.

The plaintiff filed suit on February 12, 2019, within one year of the verdict in the underlying litigation, and claimed that its attorney committed malpractice when he advised that plaintiff accept the offer to split the recovery and risk in the suit. Specifically, it was alleged the attorney failed to examine the nature of the litigation or discover that the seller’s employees were aware the suit bore serious risk. The plaintiff’s representative testified that he did not keep track of the litigation and therefore could not have known the attorney engaged in the alleged malpractice until the jury rendered its verdict in the underlying suit.

However, the minority stakeholder testified that he knew the 50/50 offer was a bad deal for the plaintiff. Another employee testified he thought the risk of loss in the underlying suit was apparent to everyone involved. The court agreed. Based upon the evidence presented, “it should have been obvious to all concerned that the 50/50 option was favorable” to the minority stakeholder, who was adverse to the plaintiff’s interest.

The court held that the plaintiff should have known its attorney may have committed an act of malpractice when he advised it to accept the 50/50 split before the underlying litigation concluded. Accordingly, suit was not filed within one year of when the plaintiff should have known the alleged act of malpractice occurred. The plaintiff’s claims that it lacked such knowledge could not stand up to conflicting evidence. Thus, the claim was peremepted, and the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.

Case References:

Crosby v. Waits, Emmett, Popp & Teich, LLC, 2022-0395 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/22), 352 So. 3d 145.

Jenkins v. Starns, 2011-1170, p. 15 (La. 1/24/12), 85 So.3d 612, 621.

UM Waiver Completed by Insured’s Assistant Found Invalid

08.01.2022

Uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM coverage”) is included in all automobile liability policies by Louisiana law unless the insured “rejects [UM] coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic only coverage.” What constitutes an adequate rejection of UM coverage has been the crux of countless lawsuits across the state. Recently, in Havard v. Jeanlouis, et al, 2021-C-00810 (La. 6/29/22), the Louisiana Supreme Court examined the validity of a corporate representative’s signature in the context of execution of a UM waiver form. Louisiana courts have found that without a valid signature, UM coverage generally may not be waived.

The Havard court recognized that a corporation cannot “sign” its own name, and that an authorized representative must act on its behalf. Under the facts of this case, an administrative assistant attempted to execute a UM waiver form at the corporate representative’s direction with a stamp of the representative’s signature. The plaintiff argued that the use of the stamp did not meet the requirements for proper execution of the UM waiver form at issue.

Considering these facts, the court noted that Louisiana law of mandate provides that “when the law prescribes a certain form for an act, a mandate authorizing the act must be in that form.” The court continued: “Accordingly, where one individual signs a UM form on behalf of another individual and authority is not conferred by law, our Civil Code requires this authority be in writing.”

While the corporate representative in Havard verbally instructed his administrative assistant to complete the waiver with his signature stamp, no written mandate existed between the representative and the assistant to confirm this authority. Absent the written mandate, the court disregarded the express intention of the corporate representative and held the form invalid.

The court recognized the impracticality of its holding. However, it also commented “Concerns over the practical impact within the insurance industry in scrutinizing stamped signed UM forms are unavailing. Inconvenience is not absurdity. The insurer has the authority, opportunity, and responsibility to assure the UM form is completed properly. … Practical considerations regarding increased due diligence requirements are matters of policy best directed to the legislature.”

Cases involving UM waiver forms are fact-sensitive. Havard involved unique facts where the company’s authorized agent did not sign the UM waiver form personally. While Havard may be limited to its facts, it reminds that proper execution of a UM waiver form is necessary for UM coverage to be properly waived.

Louisiana Supreme Court Provides Updated Guidance on Execution of UM Waiver Forms

Personal Liability of an LLC Member – Can an Informal Contract Create Liability?

06.27.2022

Limited liability companies (“LLCs”) are usually formed with the goal of protecting its members from personal liability for the actions of the LLC. Under Louisiana law, there is a “presumption” that the members of an LLC are not personally responsible for the liabilities of the LLC. However, a recent Third Circuit decision highlights how an LLC member may be exposed to personal liability for performance of a contract when the LLC’s name is not displayed on the contract.

In Bourque v. Bergeron, 2021-108 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/1/21), 331 So. 3d 1089, the plaintiff filed suit against his contractor seeking damages from allegedly defective work. The contractor filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him individually, arguing that he was acting on behalf of his LLC and therefore had no personal liability. In support of his motion, the contractor introduced evidence that: (1) the contractor was the sole member of the LLC; (2) the required contracting license was in the name of the LLC; and (3) plaintiff’s checks were deposited into the LLC’s financial accounts.

The plaintiff argued that he contracted with the contractor individually, and the contractor did not represent that he was acting on behalf of an LLC. The proposal and invoices listed a business name, but did not indicate the business was an LLC. The trial court granted the contractor’s motion, finding the evidence showed the plaintiff was dealing with the LLC, and not the contractor individually.

On appeal, the Third Circuit recognized the general rule that an LLC member is not personally liable for acts committed by the LLC. However, it found an LLC member can be personally liable when they fail to disclose that the member is contracting on behalf of the LLC. The court noted that the proposal/invoice did not reflect the LLC’s involvement – it only included a business name along with the contractor’s individual name and address. Simply including a business name was not sufficient to alert plaintiff he was contracting with an LLC as opposed to an individual with a tradename. The Third Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the personal liability claims, finding issues of fact as to whether the contractor disclosed that he was acting on behalf of the LLC, which opened the door for potential personal liability for the LLC member.

This case shows that LLC members can create personal liability if they do not express that the LLC is the true party to the contract.

Supreme Court Abrogates Louisiana’s “Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine”

05.11.2022

Historically, Louisiana law provided that a professional rescuer injured in the performance of his or her duties “assumes the risk” of an injury and is not entitled to damages. See Worley v. Winston, 550 So.2d 694, 696 (La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 551 So.2d 1342 (La. 1989). This is known as the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine and applied as a defense to claims raised by firefighters, policeman, and others. The doctrine prevented recovery because the professional rescuer “assumed the risk” of injury. Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. McKesson, 2021-00929 (La. 3/25/22) rejected the doctrine as a bar to suit by the professional rescuer.

In Doe, the Supreme Court of Louisiana accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals as to the viability of the doctrine. In response, the Supreme Court held that the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine has been abrogated in Louisiana both legislatively under La. C.C. art. 2323 and jurisprudentially in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988).

The Court cited La. C.C. art. 2323(A), which provides that the fault of “all persons […] shall be determined” in a civil action. Subsection (B) of the article provides this rule applies “to any claim for recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability.”

In Murray, the Supreme Court previously held that the doctrine of assumption of risk no longer had a place in Louisiana tort law following the adoption of comparative fault. Nevertheless, the Murray Court identified two exceptions:

Cases “where the plaintiff, by oral or written agreement, expressly waives or releases a future right to recover damages from the defendant,” if “no public policy concerns would invalidate such a waiver, the plaintiff’s right to recover damages may be barred on a release theory;” and

“[I]n the sports spectator or amusement park cases (common law’s “implied primary” assumption of risk cases).”

Murray, 521 So.2d at 1134. (internal citations omitted).

The Doe court observed that Murray provided no exception relative to professional rescuers. The Court further observed that, while the legislature had enacted statutes that bar plaintiff recovery in other settings, no such statute had been passed to codify the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine.

Although professional rescuers injured in the performance of their duties may still be found at fault, the is no longer an automatic bar to suit.

Summary Judgment Affirmed in Premises Liability Case Upon Court’s De Novo Review

05.17.2021

In Marrero v. I. Manheim Auctions, Inc., the plaintiff fell after he exited a building during a rainstorm and stepped off a curb into a parking lot. He claimed he stepped into a divot where asphalt had washed away. The defendant moved for summary judgment.

In opposition, the plaintiff offered an expert affidavit that cited a lack of handrails, code violations, and loose pebbles as contributing to the plaintiff’s fall. To recover in the case, the plaintiff possessed the burden under La. R.S. 9:2800.6 to establish three elements: 1) the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm, 2) this risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, and 3) the defendant possessed actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect.

The defense argued the plaintiff could not show the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable and produced an expert affidavit to show the divot was only 3/16” deep. Evidence also showed the plaintiff was familiar with the area where he fell. The defendant also had received no prior complaints about the area. The trial court found that the parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm because the divot was only 3/16” deep and granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in light of the competing expert affidavits regarding whether the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm. However, when a motion for summary judgment is appealed, the court uses a de novo standard of review. Under this standard, the appellate court reviews all issues and considers all evidence submitted to the trial court in its ruling.

The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment but did so for different reasons than the trial court. The Marrero court found the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of the third element, i.e., whether the defendant knew or should have known of the defect. Because the plaintiff failed to establish a material issue of fact as to all three required elements, summary judgment was granted. Marrero reminds that appellate courts may consider facts and legal issues the trial court did not address in its ruling.

Louisiana COVID-19 Immunity Laws

11.02.2020

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Louisiana legislature enacted and modified several statutes to limit the liability of individuals, businesses, and government agencies for exposure claims. However, the immunity is not absolute. While the immunity applies to “ordinary” negligence claims, it does not apply where acts are grossly negligent, wanton, or involve reckless misconduct. Further, as a condition to the protection afforded, the entity must show substantial compliance with the applicable COVID-19 procedures established by government authorities.

La. R.S. 9:2800.25, entitled “Limitation of liability for COVID-19” (the general immunity statute) provides that no person, business, or government entity shall be liable for injury or death resulting from exposure to COVID-19 through the performance of its business operations unless the entity failed to substantially comply with at least one set of procedures established by the federal, state, or local agency that governs the business operations, or the injury was caused by gross negligence or wanton, reckless misconduct. With respect to employer immunity, the statute provides that, regardless of whether an employee’s COVID-19 illness is covered under workers’ compensation law, the employee shall have no tort-based remedy against his employer unless the exposure was caused by an intentional act.

The exception to immunity in the general immunity statute calls into question the type of conduct that would rise to a level of gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined in Louisiana case law as “willful, wanton, reckless conduct that falls between intent to do wrong and ordinary negligence,” “lack of even slight care and diligence,” and “utter, complete or extreme lack of care.” While the definition does not provide a bright line rule, it reflects that the conduct must move well beyond simple negligence to defeat immunity.

For a business seeking to manage the risks arising from COVID-19, some best practices emerge: (1) monitor the COVID-19 procedures of government authorities to keep informed of the latest recommended or mandated procedures, (2) institute compliance protocols, (3) document and administer those procedures to show compliance, and (4) most obviously, avoid actions or omissions that may be construed as grossly negligent, wanton, or reckless.

Mary Anne Wolf is an engineer/attorney with a construction background who represents design professionals, contractors and others in construction litigation. She also gives seminars on the subject. She enjoys travel, yoga and encouraging her husband in his gardening and cooking endeavors.

No Pay, No Play: What is it and why does it matter?

04.06.2020

Louisiana’s automobile insurance premiums are some of the highest in the United States. With so many other demands on driver’s wallets, it may seem tempting to simply not purchase a liability automobile policy, even if it is required by Louisiana law. Louisiana’s “No Pay, No Play” statute, LA-R.S. 32:866, is intended to fight that temptation. See Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 1997-2985 (La. 4/23/98), 711 So.2d 675. Below are some key considerations for drivers and insurers on either side of a potential “No Pay, No Play” dispute.

For Drivers

The “No Pay, No Play” statute means just what it seems—if you do not pay for your own liability insurance, you cannot recover under someone else’s liability insurance even if the accident is not your fault … at least to a point.

Specifically, the “No Pay, No Play” statute precludes someone who does not have liability insurance from recovering from another driver’s policy (1) the first $15,000 of bodily injury damages and (2) the first $25,000 of property damage. Of course, if damages do not exceed these amounts, it means the uninsured driver cannot recover his or her damage at all.

Of course, some exceptions exist. For example, the statute does not apply (meaning, it does reduce the plaintiff driver’s recovery) if the other driver is cited for operating his or her vehicle while intoxicated and is convicted or pleads nolo contendere; if the other driver intentionally causes the accident; if the other driver flees the scene; or if the other driver is in furtherance of the commission of a felony. However, the off-chance that a driver falls into an exception should not outweigh the obligation to comply with Louisiana law.

For Insurers

Generally, liability insurers should assert the “No Pay, No Play” affirmative defense when it appears a plaintiff driver lacks liability insurance. However, insurers should also keep in mind that this defense also has limitations.

For instance, the “No Pay, No Play” statute is not necessarily a total bar to a plaintiff’s recovery. If damages exceed $15,000 for bodily injury and/or $25,000 for property damage, payment may still be owed for these excess damages.

Secondly, the party asserting the “No Pay, No Play” affirmative defense—usually a defendant insurer—bears the burden of establishing that the plaintiff driver lacked insurance coverage on the vehicle he or she was operating at the time of the incident.

This burden can sometimes present difficult issues. For instance, in Johnson v. Henderson, 2004-1723 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/16/05), 899 So.2d 626, the plaintiff was operating a vehicle he did not own. The defendant failed to yield and struck the plaintiff’s car. The defendant and his insurer asserted the affirmative defense under “No Pay, No Play.”

The facts of the case suggest the vehicle that the plaintiff was operating was not insured, but plaintiff paid his “premiums” to the owners of the vehicle, had an ostensibly valid insurance card, and believed he was insured. The court found that the defendants failed to carry their burden of establishing a lack of coverage. As a result, the insurer owed the plaintiff the full amount of his damages—a total of $5,855.00 that would otherwise have been precluded under the statute.

The “No Pay, No Play” issue is easily avoided: Louisiana drivers should get the insurance required by the statute. Failure to do so runs the risk of discounting (and potentially barring) recovery for accidents that are not the driver’s fault.

Is Timing Everything Where Workers Compensation Benefits are Forfeited Based on Fraud? It Depends…

02.28.2020

In Moran v. Rouse’s Enterprises, LLC, 19-2392019(La. App.5 Cir. 12/26/19)- – – So. 3d – – -, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit held that there is a forfeiture of all benefits when a worker’s compensation claimant commits fraud, regardless of when the fraudulent conduct occurs. The court declined to follow opinions from the First and Third Circuits concluding otherwise.

In Moran, the claimant obtained treatment for injuries to her back, right knee, and right shoulder after a slip and fall at work for Rouses supermarket. In her deposition, the claimant Moran testified that she experienced knee pain only once before her fall; it was “years ago” and not “serious.” Moran also claimed that she experienced no prior shoulder or back pain. However, medical records established:

• Complaints of knee pain on at least 8 separate occasions between 2012 and the job injury;

• Complaints of right knee, right wrist, and back pain after a slip and fall in 2013; and

• A right shoulder impingement diagnosis 2 months before the on-the-job accident.

Rouses and its workers compensation carrier affirmatively alleged a violation of La. R.S. 23:1208, Louisiana’s workers compensation fraud statute, following the claimant’s deposition. Paragraphs “A” and “E” of section 1208 provide in pertinent part:

A. It shall be unlawful for any person… to willfully make a false statement or representation… for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment under…this Chapter.

***

E. Any employee violating this Section shall… forfeit any right to compensation benefits under this Chapter.

As part of their fraud defense, the defendants specifically denied responsibility for all worker’s compensation benefits, i.e. benefits that that might have otherwise been due both before and after the fraudulent deposition testimony.

Following trial, the workers compensation judge determined that Moran carried her burden of proving the occurrence of on-the-job injury and disability. Nevertheless, the trial court also ruled that the claimant made false statements for the purpose of obtaining workers compensation benefits in violation of section 1208, thereby forfeiting the right to both the pre and post-deposition benefits that she was claiming.

On appeal, Moran argued that the forfeiture requirement of section 1208 applies prospectively only. Moran cited opinions from the Louisiana First and Third Circuits. After addressing the statute and the case law, the Moran court affirmed the decision of the workers compensation judge finding that the forfeiture of benefits provided for in of Section 1208 is clear and unambiguous. The opinion states that “…if the legislature had intended to limit the application … it would have clearly expressed that in the statute.”

There are no Louisiana Supreme Court opinions which specifically address whether the Section 1208 forfeiture applies retroactively or prospectively only. Given the defined split in the Louisiana appellate courts, the issue is ripe for consideration by the state’s highest court.

Ed is a Keogh Cox partner who litigates Worker’s Compensation, automobile and premises liability as well as subrogation claims. He is an avid runner and enjoys traveling with his wife Jennifer and their three children.

Limitation of Liability under the LPLA: Can Internet Retailers be Manufacturers?

02.10.2020

The Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) contains the exclusive theories of recovery against a manufacturer for damages caused by its product. The term “manufacturer” within the LPLA includes “the seller of a product who exercises control over or influences a characteristic of the design, construction, or quality of the product that causes damage.” The rapid growth of e-commerce raises a unique question – how do we classify internet retailers?

Internet retailers generally act as a middleman for third party manufacturers and online consumers. In this respect, they are not technically “sellers” as defined by the LPLA because they typically do not have control over the design or construction of the products they sell. Nevertheless, the proper categorization of internet retailers may become important when someone is injured by a product, as was the case in State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 5616708 (Miss. N.D. 10/31/19) — F.Supp.3d —.

In State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Amazon.com, Inc., two hoverboards purchased through Amazon caught fire inside a Mississippi home and the home was destroyed. In considering Amazon’s possible liability, the Mississippi Court asked whether Amazon was a “service provider” or a “marketplace.” In Mississippi, a finding that Amazon was a “service provider” would insulate it from the claim. However, if Amazon acted as a “marketplace,” it could be exposed by the common law to a negligent failure-to-warn claim. The Mississippi Court held that, because Amazon operated as a marketplace, the claim against it could go forward.

If similar facts arose in Louisiana, could Amazon or similar retailers be exposed under the LPLA? If an internet retailer established policies that forced a “true” manufacturer to negatively alter product quality, would the LPLA provide a remedy? For example, if an internet retailer sets a price ceiling, this artificial figure, especially if unreasonably low, might pressure a manufacturer to lower product safety. Is setting a price range the exercise of enough control or influence over the “design, construction, or quality of a product” to render internet retailers subject to suit under the LPLA? That is a question likely to be answered in cases to come.