Supreme Court Abrogates Louisiana’s “Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine”

Louisiana’s New Home Warranty Act (“NHWA”) provides remedies to homeowners forcertain construction defects once the new home construction is complete. La. R.S. 9:3141 et seq. These protections can prove crucial to a homeowner’s ability to remedy defects that appear in their home, but the statutes providing these remedies establish strict guidelines that must be followed for the protections to apply. This generally post sets forth some of the key protections and obstacles/defenses that often arise. However, each specific claim should be considered under its own facts.

PROTECTIONS

The NHWA provides specific protections to homeowners. Each protection expires if not advanced within a set time-period.

Noncompliance/Defects- The NHWA protects against “any defect due to noncompliance with the building standards or other defects in materials or workmanship not regulated by building standards.” La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(1). This category includes defective construction or materials used in the construction. Even seemingly minor issues such as cracked plaster, yellowing paint, and “rubbing off” of new paint can give rise to a valid claim for recovery under this portion of the NHWA. See Bynog v. MRL, LLC, 05-122 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1197. Deviations from the “plans and specifications” for a home may also be recoverable. See Thorn v. Caskey, 32-310 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/99), 745 So.2d 653.

Because this first protection is so broad, it also provides the shortest time-period to assert a claim: one year from the “warranty commencement date,” which is either the date legal title to the home is conveyed to its initial purchaser or the date the home is first occupied, whichever occurs first. La. R.S. 9:3142(7).

Plumbing/Electrical/HVAC- The NHWA also protects the homeowner from defects in the plumbing, electrical, heating, cooling, and ventilating systems. These protections exclude equipment or appliances. A homeowner must bring a claim under this second category within two years of the warranty commencement date. La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(2).

Major Structural Problems- the NHWA allows recovery for major structural defects up to five years following the warranty commencement date. La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(3). For instance, recovery was allowed for a failing foundation under this provision in Campo v. Sternberger, 15-53 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/15),179 So.3d 908.

PITFALLS

The most obvious – and probably most prevalent – pitfall is the timeliness of the claim. Courts do not hesitate to dismiss a claim if it is not timely filed.

The NHWA also requires that the homeowner give the builder written notice (via certified mail) of the defect before the homeowner attempts a repair, or before filing suit under the NHWA. La. R.S. 9:3145(A). This notice must be sent to the builder within one year after the homeowner has knowledge of the defect. Therefore, the one-year “clock” may begin to run when the homeowner gains knowledge of the problem even if the NHWA provides a longer time-period to advance the claim.

A failure by the homeowner to give timely notice can also diminish the claim even if it is brought within the deadlines. Under La. R.S. 9:3144(B)(4)(c), any damages caused by the homeowner’s failure to give the builder notice of the defect are not recoverable. In that circumstance, builders often contend that the severity of the problem could have been lessened had they been made aware.

RECOVERABLE DAMAGES

With some exceptions, damages under the NHWA are limited to the actual damages incurred by the homeowner, including attorney fees and court costs arising out of the builder’s violation. La. R.S. 9:3149. The actual damages cannot exceed the reasonable cost of repair or replacement necessary to cure the defect. If there are multiple defects across the home, damages are limited to the original purchase price of the home.

Consequential damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, or loss of use are generally not recoverable. See La. R.S. 9:3144(B); Iteld v. Four Corners Const., L.P., 12-1504 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 157 So.3d 702. However, there may be exceptions to this general rule under certain factual circumstances beyond the scope of this post.

CONCLUSION

The NHWA provides important remedies to homeowners. But, the New Home Warranty Act is complex and balances the competing interests of the homeowners and the builders. For this reason, a failure to follow the notice and timeliness requirements will often defeat the claim.

John Grinton, is a partner at Keogh Cox whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When he is not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464 allows a defendant to select a physician to perform a physical and/or mental examination of a plaintiff to challenge the plaintiff’s claimed physical and mental injuries. This is called an Additional Medical Opinion (AMO); this was previously referenced as an Independent Medical Examination (IME). Earlier this year, the Louisiana Supreme Court, outlined the “good cause” requirement of the statute—an essential element required to proceed with an AMO. But, what remained as a question was the scope of an AMO and which party had the burden to deal with requested restrictions on the physician’s medical exam. This question was answered: In Augustine v. Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that after “good cause” has been shown for the examination, the party seeking to limit the scope of the AMO bears the burden to justify the restrictions.

In Augustine, a sequel to Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Company, Et al, the Court held that if the party to be examined for the AMO, usually the plaintiff, wants to place limits upon the examination, that party then has the burden of proof to justify the need for any restrictions or limitations with competent evidence. This ruling appears to show a trend in which the Court is confirming a defendant’s ability to obtain an AMO to support its defenses to a personal injury claim. Augustine follows another Supreme Court decision from March of 2022, in which the Court held that a party establishes “good cause” for an AMO if that party shows a “reasonable nexus” between the requested examination and the condition in controversy. See Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Company, Et al. The Hicks decision eased the hurdles that defendants faced when seeking to compel AMOs pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464. For more information on the Hicks decision, see our prior blog here. Supreme Court Clarifies “Good Cause” for Additional Medical Opinion (“AMO”) (keoghcox.com)

In Augustine, the defendants requested an AMO. The plaintiff agreed to the examination, but the parties were unable to agree on “certain restrictions” the plaintiff sought to impose on the scope of the examination. The defendants ultimately filed a Motion to Compel regarding this issue. The District Court limited the examination to only those tests that the plaintiff’s treating physicians had performed. The District Court also noted that it did not want the AMO to turn into a “fishing expedition.” The Court of Appeal denied the defendant’s request for review of the Trial Court’s decision. The defendants then sought relief from the Supreme Court, which vacated the Trial Court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

In its opinion, the Supreme Court set forth the burden of proof each party has in the context of a Motion to Compel an AMO. As outlined in Hicks, the party requesting the AMO initially has the burden to establish “good cause” for the AMO. Importantly, the Augustine court found that once “good cause” has been found, “the court should presume that the examination will be conducted in a reasonable manner.” Because it is presumed the examination will be conducted reasonably, if a party opposing the AMO wants to place restrictions on the examination, the burden now shifts to that party to establish “special circumstances” that justify the restrictions they request. To meet this burden, the opposing party must produce “competent evidence” to establish (1) the need for the restriction and (2) that harm that will result if the restrictions are not imposed. The type of evidence that may support AMO restrictions under Augustine likely will vary depending on the unique facts of each case. However, Hicks and its “sequel,” Augustine, provide clarification and guidance to parties seeking to compel or limit an AMO under article 1464.

Case References:

Augustine v. Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon, 2021-01753 (La. 10/1/22), __ So.3d __.

Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Company, Et al., 2021-00840 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d 1106.

Written by Chad A. Sullivan and George A. Wright

On August 28, 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a Writ Application in Leandro Carias v. Vernon A. Loren, et al. This denial signifies that the "sudden emergency" defense may be properly applied at the summary judgment level. The defense in the Carias litigation was handled by Keogh Cox attorneys Gracella Gail Simmons and Collin J. LeBlanc.

In Carias, the defendant operated his 18-wheeler traveling eastbound over the Mississippi River Bridge when, according to his testimony, a "phantom driver" abruptly entered into his lane of travel and forcefully applied their brakes. In the sliver of time allowed, the defendant sought to quickly determine if he could safely move from his lane of travel. Incorrectly, he believed that there was sufficient space in the lane to his right and impacted a truck in that lane. In turn, that vehicle rear-ended the plaintiff.

A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and won based upon the sudden emergency defense, which provides that one is not negligent when they fail to take reasonable measures to avoid an accident when they were presented with: 1) a sudden emergency; 2) which was not of their making; and, 3) which did not allow sufficient time for deliberation. In opposition to the Motion, the plaintiff cited testimony that the defendant was "following too closely," and contended that the defendant was therefore at fault and unable to seek the protections of the defense. In response, it was argued that whether the defendant driver allowed sufficient space between his vehicle and the vehicle to the front was non-material when it was the actions of the phantom driver which exclusively created the sudden emergency.

Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Louisiana First Circuit. Prior to Carias, the Louisiana First Circuit had questioned whether the sudden emergency defense could ever be used at the dispositive motion stage. On this subject, the Louisiana First Circuit stated as follows in Manno v. Gutierrez, 05-0476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06); 934 So. 2d 112, 117-118: "while we cannot say that it would never be possible to apply the doctrine on a motion for summary judgment, our research has disclosed no cases from this court that have so applied it, and by the nature of the sudden emergency doctrine, it would seem rarely appropriate on a motion for summary judgment." Nevertheless, the First Circuit upheld the Carias summary judgment finding that, unlike earlier cases, there was no conflicting testimony regarding the defendant's lack of opportunity to assess the situation or take other evasive actions.

In the Writ Application to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff cited to a "split in the Circuits" concerning whether the sudden emergency defense may be used at the summary judgment stage.　 In response, it was argued that the decades of jurisprudence following the Louisiana Supreme Court’s establishment of the sudden emergency defense in Hickman v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 262 La. 102, 113-114, 262 So.2d 385, 389 (1972) demonstrate that the lower courts have not struggled with this doctrine and that nothing in Hickman nor the Summary Judgment Article prevent a consideration of the sudden emergency defense through motion practice.

As a practical matter, summary judgment may still be difficult to obtain in the context of the sudden emergency defense because of the highly factual context into which the defense is often sought for application. Nevertheless, after Carias, it appears likely that there is no legal prohibition to the use of the doctrine in support of a dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment

Written by:

Gracella Gail Simmons and Collin J. LeBlanc