Author: Chelsea A. Payne

What is a Design Professional’s Tort Duty?

05.24.2024

A design professional’s duties and responsibilities on a construction project generally are outlined in its contract with the owner. Does a design professional’s duty extend to third parties? The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue and held that the design professional’s duty to third parties is limited to the terms of the contract documents.

In Bonilla, a construction worker was injured while performing demolition work on a construction project. The worker, who was a subcontractor on the project, filed suit against the architect and the engineer on the project alleging that these design professionals failed to monitor and supervise the execution of the plans to ensure safety on the job site.

The engineer and the architect filed summary judgment motions arguing that they owed no duty to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site. The trial court granted their motions. However, the appellate court found the contract between the architect and the owner may have inferred a duty was owed to the worker.

The appellate court referenced contract provisions that required the architect to make weekly site visits and to report to the owner any deviations from the plans. The court noted that the architect was on site the day of the accident and photographed potential unsafe conditions, which would have deviated from the plans. The appeal court reversed the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment.

The architect filed a writ with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which reversed the appellate court’s ruling and reinstated summary judgment in favor of the design professionals. The Supreme Court emphasized “the duty owed to an employee of a contractor by an engineer or architect is determined by the express provisions of the contract between the parties.”

While the contract documents required the architect to make weekly visits to the jobsite, the purpose of this duty was to ensure that the owner received the building it paid for and that the progress and quality of the work met the plans. More importantly, the contract also provided that these site visits did not create a duty to supervise construction. In contrast, under the terms of the contract, the contractor had control over construction means and methods and responsibility for site safety, specifically including site safety for all employees.

The clear and unambiguous language of the contract dictated that the design professions owed the worker no duty. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the architect could not be held liable for failing to perform a duty that it had no responsibility to undertake.

Reference:

Bonilla v. Verges Rome Architects, 2023-00928 (La. 3/22/24), 382 So. 3d 62.

A Matter of Control: Vicarious Liability in Construction Projects

05.16.2023

Under Louisiana’s comparative fault system, each party in a lawsuit generally is only liable for their own percentage of fault. However, in some instances, a party may be “vicariously” liable for the fault of another party. One example of vicarious liability is an employment relationship, where an employer can be liable for the fault of its employees. On the other hand, vicarious liability generally does not apply when the alleged “employee” is found to be an independent contractor. Whether a worker qualifies as an employee or an independent contractor often becomes an important issue in suits related to construction projects.

The test for determining whether a party is an employee or an independent contractor involves analysis of who has the right to control his or her work. In the construction context, courts distinguish between “operational control” (which suggests an employment relationship) and control as it relates to the results of the work (which suggests an independent contractor relationship). Two recent cases examine this issue and provide examples of how courts analyze the type of control necessary to establish vicarious liability in the construction projects.

In Stonetrust Com. Ins. Co. v. TBT Contracting, Inc. of LA, homeowners hired a general contractor to renovate their home. During the project, an electrical subcontractor was injured after falling through an attic space. It was alleged that the general contractor created a hazard by cutting a hole in the attic and concealing it. The plaintiff sued the general contractor and the homeowner. The court had to determine whether the homeowner could be liable for the subcontractor’s injuries, which would require a finding that the homeowner was vicariously liable for the general contractor’s fault.

The plaintiff argued that the homeowners were particularly involved in the project. It presented evidence to show the homeowners would give suggestions regarding the work to be performed and also directed alterations or additions to the work. The plaintiff argued that this demonstrated control over the general contractor’s work. However, the court disagreed. Despite the homeowners’ level of involvement, the court held that their control was limited to the results of the work, and was not “operational control.” The general contractor therefore was an independent contractor, and the homeowners were not vicariously liable for its acts.

In Baham v. Fisk Elec. Co., a city worker brought suit against a general contractor after suffering injuries from an electrical shock. The worker alleged that the general contractor was vicariously liable for the fault of its subcontractor. While evidence showed the subcontractor relied on the general contractor for the location of its work, the court found that this was not “operational control.” The court observed that general contractors are entitled to exercise supervisory control over its independent contractors to ensure compliance with the contract. It further found that suggestions or instructions given to an independent contractor do not equate to control over the methods or details of the work. Absent such “operational control” vicarious liability could not be imposed.

Though they may be limited to their facts, these cases show courts usually require a showing of more than suggestions or instructions regarding the work to establish the “operational control” necessary to trigger vicarious liability. Absent such a showing, independent contractors usually remain independent.

Case References:

Stonetrust Com. Ins. Co. v. TBT Contracting, Inc. of LA, 2022-0971 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 2023 WL 2947826

Baham v. Fisk Elec. Co., 2022-0551 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/23), 2023 WL 2595253

Personal Liability of an LLC Member – Can an Informal Contract Create Liability?

06.27.2022

Limited liability companies (“LLCs”) are usually formed with the goal of protecting its members from personal liability for the actions of the LLC. Under Louisiana law, there is a “presumption” that the members of an LLC are not personally responsible for the liabilities of the LLC. However, a recent Third Circuit decision highlights how an LLC member may be exposed to personal liability for performance of a contract when the LLC’s name is not displayed on the contract.

In Bourque v. Bergeron, 2021-108 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/1/21), 331 So. 3d 1089, the plaintiff filed suit against his contractor seeking damages from allegedly defective work. The contractor filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him individually, arguing that he was acting on behalf of his LLC and therefore had no personal liability. In support of his motion, the contractor introduced evidence that: (1) the contractor was the sole member of the LLC; (2) the required contracting license was in the name of the LLC; and (3) plaintiff’s checks were deposited into the LLC’s financial accounts.

The plaintiff argued that he contracted with the contractor individually, and the contractor did not represent that he was acting on behalf of an LLC. The proposal and invoices listed a business name, but did not indicate the business was an LLC. The trial court granted the contractor’s motion, finding the evidence showed the plaintiff was dealing with the LLC, and not the contractor individually.

On appeal, the Third Circuit recognized the general rule that an LLC member is not personally liable for acts committed by the LLC. However, it found an LLC member can be personally liable when they fail to disclose that the member is contracting on behalf of the LLC. The court noted that the proposal/invoice did not reflect the LLC’s involvement – it only included a business name along with the contractor’s individual name and address. Simply including a business name was not sufficient to alert plaintiff he was contracting with an LLC as opposed to an individual with a tradename. The Third Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the personal liability claims, finding issues of fact as to whether the contractor disclosed that he was acting on behalf of the LLC, which opened the door for potential personal liability for the LLC member.

This case shows that LLC members can create personal liability if they do not express that the LLC is the true party to the contract.

Fraud or Mistake? And How It Can Effect a Claim Against a Professional Designer.

04.06.2021

All claims against professional designers are perempted (extinguished) under La. R.S. 9:5607 five years after the project is completed with an exception for fraud. In cases of fraud, an otherwise untimely lawsuit can go forward. For this reason, plaintiffs often allege fraud when the claim may be perempted. This scenario was present in the recent First Circuit decision in Markiewicz v. Sun Constr., L.L.C, 2019-1590 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/18/20), 2020 WL 5587265. The decision helps to explain when a designer’s alleged conduct falls outside of ordinary negligence based upon the standard of care and becomes fraudulent.

Broadly, fraud is designed as “a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other.” La. C.C. art. 1953. Fraudulent intent or intent to deceive is a necessary element of a fraudulent misrepresentation. Therefore, fraud cannot be predicated on a mere mistake or negligence, however gross.

In Markiewicz, the plaintiff homeowners filed a class action lawsuit in 2006 arising from flooding of their neighborhood. Ten years later, plaintiffs added as defendants the engineers involved in the design of the drainage system, including the engineers who prepared the surveys for the development. Absent fraud, the newly added claims would be untimely. Plaintiffs alleged that the engineers fraudulently provided incorrect or misleading survey certificates, despite their knowledge that the certificates were incorrect.

The engineers filed a motion for summary judgment on peremption because more than five years had passed from the completion of their services. The engineers argued that plaintiffs could not prove fraud under facts of the case such that the fraud exception would not apply.

The Markiewicz court ruled for defendants. Although there was a dispute as to whether the engineers’ measurements were erroneous, the court found that plaintiffs failed to prove that the services were fraudulent. The plaintiffs provided no evidence that the engineers were aware of any discrepancy in preparing the surveys or that they knowingly misrepresented the surveys. As such, the court found that the fraud exception did not apply, and plaintiffs’ claims against the engineers were perempted. Through its analysis, the Markiewicz court made clear that labelling allegedly negligent conduct as fraudulent is insufficient to defeat a supported motion. While fraud may be established by circumstantial evidence, including highly suspicious facts and circumstances, the court found the record devoid of such facts.

Keogh Cox Secures Dismissal Of Alleged Chemical / Environmental Exposure Case: Worker’s Compensation Immunity

12.18.2020

In Million v. Exxon Mobil, et al., plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer and pulmonary embolisms in 2016. Plaintiff had worked in the chemical industry for 40 years. In his suit, filed in the United States Middle District Court, plaintiff alleged that long-term exposure to toxic chemicals during his employment caused his cancer. While the suit alleged that Million’s former employers created an unsafe work environment, he admitted in deposition that he was provided both safety equipment and safety training during his employment.

Andrew Blanchfield, managing partner at Keogh Cox, represented one of the former employers and filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to enforce the protections of Louisiana worker’s compensation law. Under the law, worker’s compensation benefits are generally an employee’s exclusive remedy against an employer for work-related injuries or illnesses. An employer is therefore entitled to immunity from tort claims unless the employee can prove that employer committed an “intentional act.”

To prevail under an intentional act theory, a plaintiff is required to show that the employer’s act was “intentional” and “substantially certain” to result in injury to the plaintiff. In support of the motion to enforce immunity, the former employers cited to plaintiff’s admissions in deposition as to the efforts made for his safety and to the absence of evidence sufficient to show intentional conduct substantially certain to cause injury. The district court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims. This month, the dismissal was upheld by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Million v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Exxon Chem. Co./ Exxon Ref., No. 20-30002, 2020 WL 7054051 (5th Cir. Dec. 1, 2020).

This case illustrates the interplay between general Louisiana tort law and the Louisiana worker’s compensation law and shows that courts will require substantive evidence of an intentional act to maintain a tort suit against an otherwise immune employer.

Chelsea Payne is an associate at Keogh Cox and has been practicing for three years. Her practice mainly relates to construction law and complex litigation. Chelsea enjoys playing tennis and spending time with her family.

An Update on Prescription – The Most Important Issue

11.26.2019

“Prescription” is the time period in which a litigant must file suit, or the action is barred. One of the first lessons a Louisiana law student learns is the importance of determining the prescriptive period of a cause of action. Filing a cause of action too late is fatal. A recent decision from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reads like a law school exam and illustrates that determining which prescriptive period applies is sometimes the key to the case.

In DeFelice v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 18-374 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/19), mold was discovered in plaintiff’s home on June 10, 2016. Plaintiffs notified their insurance company, who hired a mold remediation company to inspect the home. When the home was inspected on June 22, 2016, the inspector verbally informed plaintiffs that the home was safe. On the same day, a separate mold inspector collected samples. The second mold inspector issued a report on June 23, 2016 advising that mold remediation may be necessary. This report specifically stated that “certain mold and mold spores in buildings and housing can result in mild to severe health effects in humans and can deteriorate the structure of the dwelling resulting in content or structure damage.” The second report was provided to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs continued to live in the home. In August of 2016, plaintiffs’ infant son was born. Shortly thereafter, the infant began to experience breathing issues and was diagnosed with a lung condition by December of 2016. Plaintiffs vacated the premises in January of 2017.

More than one year after receipt of the second mold report, plaintiffs filed suit on July 24, 2017 against their insurer and the inspector who advised that the home had no mold problems. Plaintiffs raised claims for property damage, damage to the health of the parents, damage to the health of the minor child, and consortium claims on behalf of the parents for the damage to the minor child.

The DeFelice court found that prescription began to run on June 23, 2016 with regard to the parents’ individual and property damage claims. Because suit was not filed within a year of the second mold report advising of possible health and property damages, the parents’ individual health claims and the claims for property damage were prescribed under the one-year period set by Civil Code article 3492.

The minor child was not born when the report was issued on June 23, 2016. Plaintiffs argued that those claims were brought within a year of the child’s birth, and were therefore timely. The DeFelice court agreed and held that prescription could not began to run until the child was born. While Louisiana law provides that a child is a “person” upon conception, this “legal fiction” applies only to protect the interests of the child. The court reasoned that a finding that prescription commenced prior to birth would not “protect the interests” of the child. While the parent’s claims were prescribed, the claim filed on behalf of the infant, and any claims that the parents had related to their infant’s health condition, were timely.

The court’s analysis in DeFelice reminds that determining which prescriptive period applies to which claim is often the most important issue.

Who’s Left Holding the Bag? Indemnity in Construction Contracts

01.12.2018

The period of time before the contract is signed in one of optimism. After all, few sign a contract expecting problems. But if you do not consider the many “what ifs,” you may be left holding the bag. And this “bag” may include indemnity provisions which could force you respond for the actions of other parties.

Many contracts include “indemnity” or “hold harmless” provisions. Black’s Law Dictionary defines indemnity as “a duty to make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another.” Like many states, Louisiana allows one party to agree to pay for the damages caused by the fault of the other, if this intention is sufficiently expressed. However, there are broad statutory exceptions that can nullify the indemnity requirement.

Parties to construction contracts should be careful not to blindly rely upon indemnity provisions because the Louisiana legislature in La. R.S. 9:2780.1 declared invalid any indemnity provision where a party seeks indemnity from another for its own fault.

Despite the broad nullification of certain types of indemnity provisions in construction contracts, current Louisiana law allows a party to be indemnified for its own fault when the other party obtains insurance to cover the risk, and recovered the cost of insurance in the contract price. For example, a general contractor can require a subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for the general contractor’s fault, as long as the subcontractor obtains insurance for this obligation, and was paid that amount under the contract.

Indemnity obligations are not always as they seem. Even in the pre-contract period of optimism, you may want to contact an attorney so you won’t be left holding the bag.

Is Your Neighbor a Nuisance?

12.18.2017

The poet Robert Frost famously wrote that: “Good fences make good neighbors.” But what if there is a problem even fences won’t solve? Louisiana law offers some answers.

Under Louisiana law, a landowner cannot use their property in a manner that interferes with their neighbor’s enjoyable use. While a neighbor may have to put up with some inconveniences, excessive inconveniences that cause damage may be actionable. If a landowner’s activity is considered a nuisance, he may be liable for damages, and the court may require the landowner to stop the activity.

To determine whether a particular activity is considered a nuisance, courts look to the following factors: (1) the character of the neighborhood; (2) the degree of the intrusion; and, (3) its effect on the use and enjoyment of neighboring properties. For example, a person living in a heavy industrial area may have to put up with more noise than someone living in the suburbs. Whether activity is considered a nuisance is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Further, the nature of the noise and its persistence and duration can be a factor in determining whether the activity is a nuisance. For example, in Parish of E. Feliciana ex rel. E. Feliciana Parish Police Jury v. Guidry 2004-1197 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/10/05), 923 So. 2d 45, writ denied, 05-2288 (La. 3/10/06), 925 So. 2d 515, the court looked not only at the level of the noise, but also at the “nature” of the noise. The court held that noise from a motor cross track was a nuisance, likening the noise to a chainsaw, a buzzing bee, or a dentist drill.

Even when a landowner has a right to conduct a business on his property, he cannot create a nuisance in running the business. Louisiana courts have held that noxious smells, dust, debris, rats, flies, and noise may all constitute a nuisance, even if the business was otherwise lawful.

The duty owed to neighbors applies not only to the landowner, but may also apply to tenants or contractors performing “work” on the property. To prove a nuisance, the offended neighbor must show that the landowner/tenant/contractor either “knew or should have known” that the activity was a nuisance.

When mending fences is not possible, you may have other options.

The New Home Warranty Act: How Does It Work?

12.29.2016

Whether you are building a new home, buying a new home, or a residential construction contractor, there is one Louisiana law that you should know: The New Home Warranty Act (“NHWA”).

The NHWA provides the exclusive remedies, warranties, and peremptive periods between a builder and owner relative to home construction. The NHWA provides a warranty for new home purchases and defines the responsibilities of the builder during the warranty periods.

What warranties are provided?

1 year: For one year following the warranty commencement date, the builder warrants that the home will be free from defects due to noncompliance with the building standards or other defects not regulated by building standards;

2 years: For two years after the warranty commences, the builder warrants the plumbing, electrical, heating, cooling, and ventilation systems or other defects not regulated by building standards; and,

5 years: For five years following the warranty commencement, the builder warrants that the home will be free from major structural defects, including foundation systems, or other defects not regulated by building standards.

However, the builder’s warranty will exclude certain items, including, but not limited to: fencing, landscaping, insect damage, bodily injury, and mold damage.

The homeowner is also required under the NHWA to give written notice to the builder by registered or certified mail within one year of knowledge of the defect. Failure to give this required notice may forfeit any claims the homeowner may possess against the builder.

Once notice is given to the builder, if the builder fails to perform as required by the warranties, the owner may bring a claim against the builder for damages, including a claim for attorney fees. This cause of action must be brought within 30 days of the expiration of the applicable warranty period. The damages available to a homeowner cannot exceed the reasonable cost of the repair of the defect, and cannot exceed the original purchase price of the home.

While the NHWA provides certain “bright-line” rules and clarifies the rights and remedies available when a problem arises with new construction, litigation of these claims and the defenses provided to builders can present difficult issues. When an issue arises, you should consult an attorney experienced in this area of practice.

Arbitration: Losing Your Day in Court with a Click of the Mouse?

12.22.2016

Almost everyone has signed a phone contract, home-repair agreement, or other contract filled with terms and provisions they might not fully understand, or navigated a website only to receive a prompt to “accept these terms and conditions” before continuing. Most, and hopefully all attorneys, have that moment of hesitation- right before they click “yes.”

If you clicked “yes” or signed the contract, and the contract included an “arbitration clause,” you may have just signed away your right to access the court system; and you didn’t even know it. But are such arbitration agreements enforceable? Generally, these clauses are enforceable and found to be consistent with a strong public policy in favor of arbitration. However, a recent decision from the Louisiana Supreme Court places arbitration clauses in consumer transactions under scrutiny and may render arbitration provisions unenforceable in some cases.

In Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC, 2016-0818 (La. 10/19/16), the plaintiff brought a negligence suit against an indoor trampoline park. In an effort to prevent a formal trial, the defendants attempted to enforce the arbitration clause found in the Participant Agreement, Release, and Assumption of Risk document that was electronically signed by plaintiff to gain entry into the trampoline park. In this setting, the Court applied a “contract of adhesion” analysis to test the validity of the arbitration clause.

The Court set forth the following factors to gauge the enforceability of the arbitration clause: (1) the physical characteristics of the arbitration clause; (2) the distinguishing features of the arbitration clause; (3) the mutuality of the arbitration clause; and (4) the relative bargaining strength of the parties.

Under the facts in Duhon, the Court found that the lack of distinguishing features and the specific placement of the text served to conceal the arbitration clause from the plaintiff. While the arbitration language was consistent in size and font with the other contractual provisions, the clause was located in the eleventh line of a paragraph that covered multiple topics. The arbitration agreement also required only the plaintiff to arbitrate any dispute. Further, it required the plaintiff to pay $5,000 if he ignored the arbitration clause and instead filed a lawsuit. According to the Court, this “lack of mutuality” supported its conclusion that the arbitration clause was adhesionary.

Ultimately, the Duhon Court struck down the arbitration clause. While courts generally uphold arbitration clauses, especially in a commercial setting, Duhon shows that arbitration clauses are not per se valid and that the consumer, in some cases, still may have their day in court.

Going Once, Going Twice … A New Alternative to Design-Bid-Build Contracts

11.13.2014

The 2014 Legislative Session brought new possibilities for large construction projects under the Public Contract Law. Generally, a public entity is required to separately hire a design professional to design the project, and let the project out for public bid for the construction work. “Design-build” contracts, in which the public owner contracts with one entity for the design and construction of the facility, are prohibited under Public Contract Law. However, the Legislature has now given public entities another option under the Public Bid Law: Construction Management at Risk Delivery Method (CMAR).

What’s the Delay? Contractor Delay Damages Under the Public Bid Law

11.03.2014

Generally, a provision in a construction contract for private work limiting the contractor’s right to recover additional costs arising from delays outside of the contractor’s control may be enforceable. However, under the Public Bid Law, such a provision has been found to be against public policy. La. R.S. 38:2216 prohibits any public contract provision that purports to waive, release or extinguish the rights of a contractor to recover delay damages if the delay was caused in whole or in part by the acts or omission of the public entity.