Category: Torts

Louisiana Supreme Court Addresses Mental Anguish Awards When No Other Injury Is Claimed

08.21.2023

As a general rule of Louisiana law, a plaintiff cannot recover general damages for mental disturbance or distress unless the defendant’s act also causes physical injury, illness, or some other physical consequence. However, in Spencer v. Valero Refining Meraux, LLC, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently reexamined the circumstances under which a limited exception to this general rule may apply.

The Spencer case involved an explosion and fire that occurred shortly after midnight at the Valero refinery in Meraux, Louisiana. The plaintiffs claimed Valero should be liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged they heard loud sounds, experienced anxiety, and had difficulty sleeping after the event. None of the plaintiffs received any medical treatment or experienced physical injury/symptoms. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs could not recover damages under these circumstances.

The court held that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is not precluded under Louisiana law. However, the court also cautioned that not every act that causes some harm also yields liability and compensatory damages. It held that Louisiana courts must also consider the goal set forth under Louisiana law to prevent “spurious” or false claims when examining these types of actions.

In review of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court cited Moresi v. State Through Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, to show that the plaintiffs were required to establish “the especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.” The Spencer court held evidence of generalized fear or evidence of mere inconvenience is not enough to show that a plaintiff’s distress is “serious.” The court added that this rule must be “stringently applied,” because these types of cases, though fact intensive, are inherently speculative in nature.

In review of the facts presented in Spencer, the court found that Valero owed a duty to the plaintiffs and breached the “duty it owed, which was a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs’ generalized fear and anxiety.” However, the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to show that their complaints, which included anxiety and difficulty sleeping, were sufficiently “serious” to support an award for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and their claims were dismissed. Although the result in Spencer may be limited to its facts, the Court’s decision appears to align with the general rule that a plaintiff usually cannot recover general damages for emotional distress in Louisiana absent an accompanying injury.

References:

Spencer v. Valero Refining Meraux, LLC, 2022-00469 (La. 1/27/23), 356 So. 3d 936.

Moresi v. State Through Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1801 (La 1990).

Louisiana Supreme Court Rules on Admissibility of Expert Opinion on “Ultimate Issues”

08.14.2023

La Code Evid. Art. 704 addresses the use of expert testimony in Louisiana Courts and provides, “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Though the text of this article is simple, Louisiana trial courts often face questions about when an expert’s opinion crosses a line and invades the jury’s fact-finding function. These questions often arise in the context of Daubert hearings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1425.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Hulin v. Snow, where the Court was asked to review the extent to which an expert in a civil case could offer testimony that addressed the ultimate issues of law and fact in the case. The ultimate issue in the Hulin case, which involved parental care, was the alleged negligence of the defendants. The Court examined multiple tendered opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert, including expert testimony about the defendants’ negligence and credibility.

In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court ruled that it was improper for the expert to testify on the ultimate issues of whether the defendants were negligent or credible. It held that “(a)lthough experts may aid the trial court in the determinations of ultimate facts, the final conclusions drawn from those facts belong exclusively to the trier of fact.” The testimony of plaintiffs’ expert stated conclusions about these ultimate issues. Therefore, it was inadmissible.

However, the Court did allow the expert, a board-certified pediatrician, to opine on the parental care of the defendants. “Even though this testimony may embrace some of the ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, it is permissible.” It appears the Court found that this testimony did not state conclusions about ultimate issues, as the Court held that the trier of fact could accept or reject the expert’s opinions on parental care as they relate to ultimate facts.

Reference:

Hulin v. Snow, 2023-00530 (La. 6/26/23), — So.3d —, 2023 WL 4199310.

Louisiana Supreme Court Uses Reason to Decide Case Involving Tragic Facts

09.16.2022

Sometimes in law, the facts of a case may threaten to eclipse the legal issue. However, Louisiana law instructs the fact finder to see through the facts, and their sometimes tragic nature, and apply the law as written. As Aristotle once wisely said, “The Law is reason free from passion.”

In Kazan, et. al. v. Red Lion Hotels Corporation, et. al., 2021-CC-01820 (La. 6/29/22), the Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled on a case with tragic facts, and its ruling provides an example of Aristotle’s description of law in action. In Kazan, a female patron was in the parking lot of a motel when a male patron approached her and used Kazan’s vehicle to abduct her from the premises. The car was later found submerged in a lake, and Kazan’s body was recovered from the water. The family filed a tort suit against several parties, including the motel’s owner and its insurer, the Great Lakes Insurance Company SE.

Great Lakes filed a motion for summary judgment and asked to be dismissed on grounds that coverage for the event was excluded from its policy. Specifically, the insurer argued that bodily injury caused by an “assault,” “battery,” or “physical altercation” was excluded under the policy’s terms. Great Lakes further argued that the kidnapping and ultimate death of the patron was excluded under the policy as bodily injury caused by an assault, battery, or physical altercation. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed and reversed the decision of the trial and appellate courts.

Under Louisiana law, “[a]n insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules for the interpretation of contracts.” Id. at p. 3. “When the words of an insurance policy are clear and explicit and do not lead to absurd consequences, courts must enforce the language as written.” Id. at p. 3. “Courts lack authority to alter the terms of an insurance policy under the guise of interpretation and should not create an ambiguity where none exists.” Id. at p. 3.

With these basic rules in mind, the Court carefully reviewed the wording of the exclusion in the Great Lakes policy which stated as follows: “This insurance does not apply to ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage,’ or ‘personal advertising injury’ arising out of an ‘assault,’ ‘battery,’ or ‘physical altercation.’” “Physical altercation” was defined in the policy as “a dispute between individual [sic] in which one or more persons sustain bodily injury arising out of the dispute.” Citing Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, the Court defined the term “dispute” as “verbal controversy” or “quarrel.”

Based upon the evidence in the case, the Court found the female patron was involved in a “dispute” with her male attacker, and ultimately sustained bodily injury as a result of the dispute. Therefore, the patron was injured in a physical altercation, as defined under the specific terms of the Policy, and coverage for the event was excluded under the policy’s terms.

The Court noted as follows: “The facts of this case are undoubtedly tragic. Nonetheless, absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers are entitled to limit their liability by imposing reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations they contractually assume. That is what Great Lakes did in the insurance policy at issue here.” Despite the tragic facts presented in the case, in so holding, it appears the court agreed with Aristotle’s belief that the Law is Reason Free from Passion.

Louisiana Legislature Passes the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2020

07.09.2020

On June 30, 2020, the last day of the 2020 First Extraordinary Session, the Louisiana legislature passed HB 57 legislation designed to revise tort law legislation. Although not yet signed by Governor Edwards, it appears he is likely to sign this legislation into law. The highlights of this new legislation include the following:

The jury trial threshold has been lowered from $50,000 to $10,000;

If the tort demand is between $10,000 and $50,000, the party demanding a jury must post a cash deposit of $5,000 within sixty (60) days of the jury demand;

The existence of insurance coverage will not be communicated to the jury unless (a) the jury will decide a coverage issue; (b) “the existence of insurance would be admissible to attack the credibility of the witness under Article 607;” or (c) bad faith is claimed under La. R.S. 22:1973 or against the insurer alone under the Direct Action statute;

The identity of the insurer will not be communicated to the jury “unless the identity of the insurer would be admissible to attack the credibility of a witness under Article 607.” The Judge will instruct the jury at the opening and closing of trial that there is insurance coverage for the damages claimed by the plaintiff;

If Medicaid or workers’ compensation pays medical bills, the amount recoverable is limited to the amount actually paid. If health insurance or Medicare pays medical bills, the amount recoverable is limited to the amount actually paid (plus any co-pays, deductibles, etc.). Additionally, the Court shall award 40% of the difference between the amount of the bill and the amount paid. If anyone other than health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or workers’ compensation pays the medical bills, the amount recoverable is the amount actually paid and amounts remaining owed;

Except for Medicaid and workers’ compensation the jury will only know the amount of medical treatment billed. After trial, the Judge will take evidence relevant to any discounts;

Failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt is now admissible evidence of comparative fault or failure to mitigate.

Importantly, if signed by the Governor, HB 57 will become effective on January 1, 2021. It will have prospective application only and will not apply to a cause of action arising or action pending prior to January 1, 2021.

Chris Jones is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, LA. He focuses his practice on class actions and mass torts, and handles these matters in courts throughout the country. He is a life-long resident of Baton Rouge, where he lives with his wife and four children

Torts: “Loss of Chance”: Claim Limited to Medical Malpractice

12.31.2019

In Niang v. Dryades YMCA School of Commerce, Inc., 19-0425 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/19), – – – So.3d – – -, the Fourth Circuit declined to expand the “loss of chance of survival” cause of action to non-medical defendants. Despite a statute which arguably supported such a cause of action under case facts, the Fourth Circuit felt constrained to reject the claim.

On March 7, 2017, Mouhamadou Niang collapsed while playing basketball at a YMCA. Mrs. Niang was certified in cardiac life support, and requested an automated external defibrillator (“AED”) to attempt to resuscitation. Mrs. Niang was advised that an AED machine was not available. Thereafter, Mr. Niang was transported to University Medical Center where he died on March 11, 2017 secondary to cardiac arrest.

Mrs. Niang sued the YMCA for failing to have an AED machine on premises and asserted multiple claims including a loss of chance of survival claim. She contended that the lack of the defibrillator contributed to her husband’s death. Under La. R. S. 40:1137.3, all “physical fitness facilities” such as the YMCA are required to have an AED available.

The YMCA filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which was granted. In its reasons, the trial court held that the “loss of chance” cause of action was limited to claims raised in a medical malpractice context. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

The Fourth Circuit found that, although styled as a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the YMCA had actually raised an Exception of No Cause of Action and therefore analyzed the issue as a pure question of law. The Fourth Circuit reviewed prior Louisiana Supreme Court decisions providing a right to recover damages for a loss of chance of survival in the medical malpractice context including the decision in Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So.2d 713 (La. 1986). In Hastings, the Louisiana Supreme Court identified a cause of action where a stab wound victim with weak vital signs was transferred from the hospital after the patient lacked insurance. The Hastings court commented on the reduced burden of proof in such cases:

“The law does not require the plaintiff to prove to a certainty that the patient would have lived had he received more prompt diagnosis and treatment for the condition causing the death.”

The Fourth Circuit identified no cases directly “on point” when the defendant was not a medical practitioner. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit gave consideration to a noted Oklahoma decision in Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1996) which addressed the issue. The court in Hardy considered the public policy implications associated with expanding the loss of chance of survival claim to non-medical cases and reasoned that the policy concerns which justify a reduced burden of causation in medical malpractice claims do not transfer to ordinary negligence cases. The cause of action against medical providers is supported by the “special relationship” of the physician and the patient. No such relationship exists in a non-medical setting.

Citing to Hardy, the Niang court determined that allowing a loss of chance of survival claim with general negligence would allow for improper speculation as to a person’s chance of survival. Identifying no controlling cases and the lack of any statute creating a cause of action in non-medical malpractice cases, the Niang court concluded that loss of chance of survival claims are not supported outside of the medical context.

Collin is a Keogh Cox partner who litigates injury, commercial, and legal malpractice disputes. He lives in nearby Zachary, Louisiana with his wife Melissa and three all too active children. He is an outdoorsman, a league tennis player, a cook, and a hobbyist writer.

The Louisiana Supreme Court rules that amount billed by healthcare providers beyond what has been paid by a Workers Compensation insurer is NOT a collateral source that is recoverable against tort defendants

05.08.2019

In a very important ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court, a tort defendant is no longer liable for any “actual charges” by medical providers above the amount paid by a Workers Compensation insurer pursuant to promulgated Workers Compensation fee schedule . In Simmons v. Cornerstone Investments, LLC, 2018-cc-0735 (La. 5/18/19), the court concluded:

“…the amount of medical expenses charged above the amount actually incurred is not a collateral source and its exclusion from the purview of the jury was proper.” See http://www.lasc.org/opinions/2019/18-0735.CC.OPN.pdf

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the development of the collateral source rule under applicable jurisprudence noting that the genesis of the collateral source rule:

“Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution. Under this well-established doctrine, the payments received from the independent source are not deducted from the award the aggrieved party would otherwise receive from the wrongdoer.” See Louisiana Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 02-2349, p. 6 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 734, 739.

Essentially, the court asks two questions when assessing whether the collateral source rule should apply. First, does the claimed benefit arise from some payment, wage deduction or other contribution by the Plaintiff that would diminish the plaintiff’s patrimony? Second, will the goal of tort deterrence be promoted by allowing the windfall? In a series of cases culminating in the case at bar, the court has been limiting the application of the collateral source rule in a number of contexts.

The court in Bozeman v. State, 03-1016 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So.2d 692, found that the collateral source rule did not apply when Medicaid was the payor such that the defendant could not be responsible for any amounts above what Medicaid paid to the provider. The court reasoned that it would be “unconscionable” to require taxpayers to pay the bills and then let a plaintiff recover the full undiscounted medical expenses and “pocket the windfall.” The court continued by noting in “Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607 (La. 5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945, this court found the collateral source rule did not apply to prevent the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier from receiving a credit for workers’ compensation benefits paid by her employer, even though the plaintiff paid for the UM coverage herself.” In Hoffman v. 21st Century North American Ins. Co., 14-2279 (La. 10/2/15), 209 So.3d 702, the court held that the collateral source rule does not apply to attorney-negotiated medical discounts. The court also looked at the US 5^th Circuit in Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2016), that the collateral source rule does not apply above any amounts actually paid by the employer in the context of the LHWCA.

In each of the instances outlined, the court noted that the patrimony of the plaintiff was not impacted by limiting recovery to the amount of medical bills actually paid. Moreover, the court noted that the goal of tort deterrence is not negatively impacted, and that allowing a plaintiff to recover a windfall in this context is tantamount to an award of punitive damages that are not recoverable absent statutory authority which is not present in this context. The Simmons decision now extends that same logic to cases where a Workers Compensation insurer has paid the medical benefits pursuant to the Louisiana Workers Compensation Law.

This ruling will have significant impact on the evaluation, settlement and trial of tort cases that have corresponding Workers Compensation claims.

Submitted by John P. Wolff, III (Partner)

The “Collateral Source Rule” & How it Can Cost (or Make) You Thousands – Part I

07.14.2017

Imagine you are a defendant sued because you negligently injured someone in Louisiana. In the accident, the plaintiff received extensive medical treatment. The health insurer paid $50,000 for medical costs even though the doctors billed $150,000 for the plaintiff’s care. The plaintiff was only out-of-pocket $500 for his health insurance deductible. What amount should you have to pay: $150,000, $50,000, or only $500?

The answer to this question is not so simple. You will certainly have to pay more than the plaintiff’s deductible, that much is clear. But whether you are required to pay the medical providers’ full rate of $150,000, the insurer’s discounted rate of $50,000, or some other amount for the medical services provided is a more complicated issue.

This blog is broken down in a two-part series. This installment will address the background of the collateral source rule and the public policy behind the rule.

What is the Collateral Source Rule?

The collateral source rule provides that a tortfeasor is generally not entitled to a credit for payments made to a plaintiff through “collateral sources,” i.e., sources not provided by the defendant. Under this rule, a tortfeasor’s exposure for damages should be the same regardless of whether or not the plaintiff purchased health insurance.

The collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover medical expenses in excess of the amounts actually paid by the plaintiff or their insurer. Critics therefore assert that the rule provides a “windfall” to the plaintiff that violates the goal of Louisiana tort law, namely to make the victim “whole.” As applied, the rule can make the victim more than whole.

Origins of the Collateral Source Rule

To understand the collateral source rule, it helps to look at its origins. The rule in the United States at least dates back to the 1854 case The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 15 L.Ed. 68 (1854). In Propeller Monticello, two ships wrecked and one sank. The insurer of the ship that sank paid for the loss. The owner of the at fault ship asserted that the plaintiff had been fully compensated by the insurer’s payment and that it was therefore not obligated to pay for the damage. In rejecting this argument, the Propeller Monticello Court held the defendant was not a party to the insurance contract and could not reduce exposure by citing to the insurance available to the plaintiff.

Policies Behind the Collateral Source Rule

In Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 846 So. 2d 734 (La. 5/20/03), the Louisiana Supreme Court detailed the public policy concerns that support the collateral source rule. According to the court, the policies in favor of the rule include:

i. Fairness– a defendant should not gain an advantage from benefits provided to the plaintiff independent of any act of the defendant;

ii. Deterrence– the rule provides a deterrence to negligent conduct; and,

iii. Promotion of Insurance– victims could be dissuaded from purchasing insurance if that act could affect tort recovery.

So, how much do you owe: $50,000, $150,000, or some other amount? We’ll tell you in Part II of this blog.

When “Drone” Used to be a Boring Word

03.13.2017

Webster’s top two definitions of the word “drone” are as follows:

1: A stingless male bee (as of the honeybee) that has the role of mating with the queen and does not gather nectar or pollen.

2: one that lives on the labors of others: parasite

While bees and parasites have their allure, Webster’s third definition of the word “drone” is the one with current intrigue.

According to Webster’s, a drone is also “an unmanned aircraft or ship guided by remote control or onboard computers.” Drones began as play things; but are now poised to revolutionize industry, retail, agriculture, journalism, art, and law at an ever-increasing pace.

Currently, drones are regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration which has for decades regulated flight by planes and helicopters; but not everyone can own an airplane or helicopter. Everyone can own a drone and many soon will.

The soon-to-be pervasive use of drones will stretch at the fabric of criminal and civil law and raises intriguing questions with hazy answers. For example,

1: Without probable case, can the government park a drone over a house or building, or even a crime-ridden city block, and monitor for criminal activity with sensors that easily peer through walls?

2: Does one have a reasonable expectation of privacy within a fenced-in back yard?

3: Is following a personal injury plaintiff via drone considered stalking?

4: Can a business fly a drone over a competitor’s work yard to observe it processes without recourse?

5: Is it legal to use technology (which is now available) to disrupt or even crash drones flying overhead? Would that be a tort?

In an upcoming Keogh Cox blog, we will advise of pending changes to the law that may begin to answer some of these questions. For now, we will observe that the word “drone” is no longer a boring word.

When the Stakes are High: Class Actions in Louisiana

09.09.2016

They make movies about “class actions” exactly because they can involve high stakes, with millions, even billions of dollars on the line. The class action procedure can create exposure at this level because of the large numbers of potential claims involved. Class actions are used to address losses experienced from unfair or fraudulent business practices, natural disasters, industrial explosions, or any event or action which is alleged to have damaged a large group in a similar way.

As a procedural device, the class action combines several claims (often hundreds or thousands) into a single action. A key battle in most Louisiana class actions is whether the proposed claim can properly be “certified” as a class action under Louisiana procedure. The recent Fourth Circuit decision in Duhon v. Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n., Inc., 2016 WL 3551620 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/30/16) addressed whether the lower court’s class “certification” was proper under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 591.

Duhon involved damages experienced following hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In particular, the class representatives sought damages against the Harbor View Condominium Association and its insurers claiming that the association was guilty of faulty repairs following these two hurricanes. In deciding whether certification was proper, the Duhon court considered the following elements, all of which must be present to certify a proper class action:

Numerosity- the class must be so numerous that joinder of all involved persons would prove impractical;

Commonality- the case must present questions of law and fact that are common to the class;

Typicality- the claims and defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and,

Adequacy of representation- the representative parties must be positioned to fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.

After analyzing each of these “elements,” the Duhon court upheld the Trial Court’s certification of the claim as a class action. Further, the court concluded that the questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominated over any questions affecting only individual members such that a class action was superior to other available methods to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the controversy.

While the class action procedure has its detractors, it is sometimes the only real option to address a harm to a large group. Now that the class in Duhon has been certified, the case will proceed through discovery and towards trial on the merits. Who knows, they may make a movie about it someday.

What Mrs. O’Leary’s Cow Has to Do With Spoliation

04.29.2016

For more than a century, the debate has raged over whether Mrs. O’Leary and her famous cow truly started The Great Chicago Fire of 1871. Were the tragic events of that conflagration to happen today, someone would ask Mrs. O’Leary to produce the “RFID” chip in her bovine. (You know they would). They would contend that this key evidence could show the whereabouts and movement of the cow at the time the fire began. When she could not produce it, they would claim not only that she started the fire that destroyed a swath of Chicago, but that she also destroyed the evidence of her guilt. They would cry “spoliation.”

Sudden Emergency Defense: Now More Dispositive

09.01.2015

On August 28, 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a Writ Application in Leandro Carias v. Vernon A. Loren, et al. This denial signifies that the “sudden emergency” defense may be properly applied at the summary judgment level. The defense in the Carias litigation was handled by Keogh Cox attorneys Gracella Gail Simmons and Collin J. LeBlanc.