Author: John Grinton

The New Home Warranty Act: Protections and Pitfalls

11.18.2020

Louisiana’s New Home Warranty Act (“NHWA”) provides remedies to homeowners forcertain construction defects once the new home construction is complete. La. R.S. 9:3141 et seq. These protections can prove crucial to a homeowner’s ability to remedy defects that appear in their home, but the statutes providing these remedies establish strict guidelines that must be followed for the protections to apply. This generally post sets forth some of the key protections and obstacles/defenses that often arise. However, each specific claim should be considered under its own facts.

PROTECTIONS

The NHWA provides specific protections to homeowners. Each protection expires if not advanced within a set time-period.

Noncompliance/Defects– The NHWA protects against “any defect due to noncompliance with the building standards or other defects in materials or workmanship not regulated by building standards.” La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(1). This category includes defective construction or materials used in the construction. Even seemingly minor issues such as cracked plaster, yellowing paint, and “rubbing off” of new paint can give rise to a valid claim for recovery under this portion of the NHWA. See Bynog v. MRL, LLC, 05-122 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1197. Deviations from the “plans and specifications” for a home may also be recoverable. See Thorn v. Caskey, 32-310 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/99), 745 So.2d 653.

Because this first protection is so broad, it also provides the shortest time-period to assert a claim: one year from the “warranty commencement date,” which is either the date legal title to the home is conveyed to its initial purchaser or the date the home is first occupied, whichever occurs first. La. R.S. 9:3142(7).

Plumbing/Electrical/HVAC– The NHWA also protects the homeowner from defects in the plumbing, electrical, heating, cooling, and ventilating systems. These protections exclude equipment or appliances. A homeowner must bring a claim under this second category within two years of the warranty commencement date. La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(2).

Major Structural Problems– the NHWA allows recovery for major structural defects up to five years following the warranty commencement date. La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(3). For instance, recovery was allowed for a failing foundation under this provision in Campo v. Sternberger, 15-53 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/15),179 So.3d 908.

PITFALLS

The most obvious – and probably most prevalent – pitfall is the timeliness of the claim. Courts do not hesitate to dismiss a claim if it is not timely filed.

The NHWA also requires that the homeowner give the builder written notice (via certified mail) of the defect before the homeowner attempts a repair, or before filing suit under the NHWA. La. R.S. 9:3145(A). This notice must be sent to the builder within one year after the homeowner has knowledge of the defect. Therefore, the one-year “clock” may begin to run when the homeowner gains knowledge of the problem even if the NHWA provides a longer time-period to advance the claim.

A failure by the homeowner to give timely notice can also diminish the claim even if it is brought within the deadlines. Under La. R.S. 9:3144(B)(4)(c), any damages caused by the homeowner’s failure to give the builder notice of the defect are not recoverable. In that circumstance, builders often contend that the severity of the problem could have been lessened had they been made aware.

RECOVERABLE DAMAGES

With some exceptions, damages under the NHWA are limited to the actual damages incurred by the homeowner, including attorney fees and court costs arising out of the builder’s violation. La. R.S. 9:3149. The actual damages cannot exceed the reasonable cost of repair or replacement necessary to cure the defect. If there are multiple defects across the home, damages are limited to the original purchase price of the home.

Consequential damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, or loss of use are generally not recoverable. See La. R.S. 9:3144(B); Iteld v. Four Corners Const., L.P., 12-1504 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 157 So.3d 702. However, there may be exceptions to this general rule under certain factual circumstances beyond the scope of this post.

CONCLUSION

The NHWA provides important remedies to homeowners. But, the New Home Warranty Act is complex and balances the competing interests of the homeowners and the builders. For this reason, a failure to follow the notice and timeliness requirements will often defeat the claim.

John Grinton, is a partner at Keogh Cox whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When he is not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

Minimal Force of an Impact Matters in Car Accident Litigation

09.23.2019

For years, Louisiana plaintiffs attorneys have argued that the force of impact in an auto accident is not determinative of their clients’ injuries and should be afforded little, if any, weight. A recent decision out of the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal does damage to that argument. In Jones v. Bravata, Jr. and The City of Baton Rouge, 2018 CA 0837 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/19), the First Circuit upheld the trial court’s jury instruction on “force of impact” where photographs showed only minor damage and the defendant described the accident as a “bump.”

The accident occurred when a City employee rear-ended the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Liability was stipulated and the only question at trial was damages. Mrs. Jones alleged severe neck and back injuries. She began treatment with an orthopedist within a week of the accident and thereafter received five “relatively non-invasive surgical procedures” in lieu of a lumbar fusion surgery. The jury returned a verdict of $200,000, which included $150,000 in past medical expenses and $35,000 in future medical expenses, but awarded little for general damages. Mrs. Jones appealed the verdict, asserting that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on force of impact.

The “force of impact” jury instruction in dispute provided:

While the force of a collision may be considered in determining whether a person was injured by an accident and the extent of the injuries sustained, it should not be the only factor to consider in making such a determination. Even though the force of impact may be slight, it does not preclude an award of damages. However, in determining causation, you may consider the minimal nature of the accident.

In considering the plaintiff’s assignment of error, the First Circuit noted that Mrs. Jones was correct that no witness specifically testified that the accident was too minor to have caused her injuries. However, there was evidence in the record upon which the jury could have reached the conclusion that this was a minimal impact.

Common sense would appear to support a connection between the force of an impact and the injury one could be expected to suffer. The recent Jones decision allows defendants to promote this common sense argument. Where the claimed injuries are disproportionate to the forces involved, this argument can make the difference at trial.

John Grinton is a partner of the firm admitted in state, federal and appellate courts throughout Louisiana. His practice focuses on commercial and construction litigation, representing insurance companies, architects, engineers, contractors and other businesses in all aspects of litigation. His workers’ compensation practice includes representing clients in medical billing disputes, healthcare provider disputes, statutory/borrowing/special employer disputes, and court approved settlements. John has been involved in complex cases involving construction defect claims, breach of contract and negligence actions, insurance coverage issues, lender liability, securities litigation and personal injury matters. He has firsthand experience in jury trials and arbitration’s, as well as mediation, appellate briefing and oral argument.

Treating Physician Testimony – Pitfalls for Plaintiffs & Opportunities for Defendants

10.24.2018

A party that wants to rely upon the testimony of a treating physician to support a personal injury case in federal court should be sure to consult the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Different rules will apply depending on the scope of the treating physician’s testimony.

Rule 26 sets two standards for expert disclosures. 26(a)(2)(C) sets a “lower standard” that typically applies to treating physicians. Under this standard, the treating physician may provide testimony beyond his personal knowledge, but he must base his opinions on “facts or data obtained or observed in the course of the sequence of events giving rise to the litigation.” LaShip, LLC v. Hayward Baker, Inc., 296 F.R.D. 475 (E.D.La. Nov. 13, 2013). Further, the physician may be permitted to testify regarding causation and future medical treatment if these opinions come from the doctor’s actual treatment of the party.

Under this “lower standard,” the party seeking to offer the physician’s testimony, usually the plaintiff, must timely disclose: (1) the subject matter on which the treating physician is expected to present evidence; and (2) a summary of the facts and opinions to which he is expected to testify. Importantly, production of a plaintiff’s medical records alone is not sufficient – the plaintiff must actually provide a summary of the physician’s opinions. See e.g. Williams v. State, 2015 WL 5438596, at *4 (M.D. La. Sept. 14, 2015). If the party fails to timely disclose this information, he runs a substantial risk of having his testimony excluded from trial.

Where the physician’s testimony goes beyond the medical records or his treatment of the plaintiff, a “higher standard” can apply to the physician’s testimony. Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The physician may be required to produce a complete expert report to disclose: (1) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (2) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; (3) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; (4) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of publications authored in the last 4 years; (5) a list of all cases the expert has been used as an expert at trial or in depositions; and (6) a statement of the compensation the witness is to be paid for his work and testimony.

Application of this “higher standard” often turns on the frequency and recency of the physician’s treatment. Courts are also more likely to apply the higher standard when the physician’s opinions are based general scientific knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition rather than his actual treatment of the plaintiff.

John Grinton, a Keogh Cox associate whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When he is not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

Creating Obstacles to Frivolous Claims

08.24.2018

The costs of litigation can be substantial, but a seldom used statute arms defendants with a tool to minimize these costs. If a defendant has not filed another pleading, La. R.S. 13:4522 allows the defendant to request that a court order the plaintiff to post a bond as security to cover certain costs. If the plaintiff fails to post this security in the time fixed, his case will be dismissed without prejudice.

The security identified in this statute can include expert witness fees, deposition costs, exhibit costs, and other related expenses. The defendant bears the burden of showing the amount needed for proper security. If a plaintiff’s damages are questionable, or preliminary investigation shows that the plaintiff might be apportioned most of the liability for the incident, the attorney filing the suit may think twice before pursuing the claim further, especially if a substantial amount of security is ordered.

By its terms, the statute does not apply to cases brought in forma pauperis. It also does not apply to claims filed in the Parish of Orleans. Everywhere else, the provisions of La. R.S. 13:4522 can add a layer of protection in the defense of frivolous claims.

John Grinton is a Keogh Cox associate whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

“IME” Killer Bill Put Down

05.19.2017

The Louisiana plaintiffs’ bar recently sought to tilt the scales of justice through Senate Bill 185, a bill seeking to complicate a defendant’s efforts to obtain an Independent Medical Examination (“IME”). An IME is an examination of the plaintiff by a physician or medical examiner hired by the defense. IMEs are important in the defense of a case and often act as a catalyst for settlement or to reduce the value of a claim.

Bill 185 was introduced by Senator Jay Luneau (D) and passed with a unanimous 35 – 0 vote in the Senate. The bill proposed amendments to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1464 to impose the following conditions upon IMEs:

All parties would be barred from referring to an IME as “independent” in the presence of a jury.
A plaintiff could not be ordered to submit to multiple examinations by multiple physicians within the same field of specialty, regardless of the number of defendants.
The party to be examined would have the right to have a person of his or her choosing present during the exam, including the plaintiff’s attorney.
The party to be examined would have the right not only to have the entire examination videotaped, but the ability to force the party requesting the examination to pay for all associated costs.

Were these conditions enforced, many physicians might have chosen not to provide IMEs at all when the process would involve: a potentially adversarial plaintiff’s attorney; a patient room packed with video equipment; and, the spectacle of it all captured on tape. Further, the bill would have stifled the ability to defend injury claims.

We may never know what effect these changes might have brought. On May 16, 2017, the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee, involuntarily deferred on a 4-4 vote. This action effectively killed the bill and saved the IME as currently understood.

By: John Grinton, a Keogh Cox associate whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When he is not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife, Kellye, and their two dogs.

One More Reason: Louisiana’s “Drunk Driving” Immunity

11.11.2016

A conviction for DWI brings the consequences you might expect, such as the loss of driving privileges, expensive attorneys’ fees, and public embarrassment. However, there is one additional, less-obvious consequence of which many are unaware; Louisiana provides immunity from claims brought by a drunk driver who was at least 25% at fault in the accident which caused his injuries, no matter how severe the injuries.

Generally stated, if you are driving drunk and are in an accident that is mostly someone else’s fault, you will not be able to recover for the injuries you sustain. Similarly, if your fault injures a drunk driver, the statute may shield you from liability. The “drunk driving” immunity is found in La. R.S. 9:2798.4. The statute provides immunity against the claims of a driver with a blood alcohol level of .08 or higher.

The immunity may even apply to defendants who were not directly involved in the accident. In Stewart v. Daiquiri Affair, Inc., 20 So.3d 1041 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 2009), writ denied, 19 So.3d 477 (La. 2009), the immunity was found to apply to claims brought by an 18-year-old employee who consumed alcohol on the premises and was subsequently injured in a motor vehicle accident. Rejecting the argument that immunity should not apply when the employer arguably contributed to the under-age plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol, the appellate court in Stewart concluded that the statute’s language required immunity because the employee was more than 25% at fault and her blood alcohol content was over the legal limit.

Because the “drunk driving” immunity statute is supported by the legislature’s strong and long-standing interest in protecting citizens against drunk driving, it has been upheld and applied in many instances. Although you should not need another reason to not drive drunk, you now have one.