Tag: appellate courts

UM Claim in Amended Petition Prescribed When Original Petition Did Not Give Sufficient Notice of Claim

02.11.2025

In Madden v. Fairburn, the plaintiff amended her petition to assert a UM claim against an insurer based upon the alleged negligence of a new defendant not named in the original petition. The amended petition asserted a new theory of liability but sought the same recovery under the same UM policy.

The issue presented to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit was whether the original petition interrupted prescription for the claim brought against the UM insurer. Because the insurer did not receive notice in the original petition that it could be liable for damages based upon the new defendant’s fault, the court found prescription could not be interrupted.

Madden was a passenger in a vehicle driven by John Seibert that collided with Steven Ray Fairburn. Madden timely filed suit against Fairburn and Capitol Specialty Insurance Corporation (Capitol Specialty), claiming uninsured motorist (UM) coverage under its policy. The Trial Court later dismissed Madden’s claims against Fairburn. While the appeal of that ruling was pending, and over five years after the accident, Madden amended her petition to allege Seibert was at fault and sought the same UM coverage any damages he caused. Capitol Specialty argued the claim brought against it in the amended petition had prescribed.

At the time of the accident, claims for torts/delictual actions had a one-year prescriptive period that commenced from the date of the injury or damage sustained* Claims to recover damages under a UM policy are subject to a prescription period of two years.^ Madden argued her original claim against Capitol Specialty interrupted prescription because her amended claim arose from the same accident and sought to recover damages under the same UM policy.

La. C.C. art. 3462 states that prescription is interrupted when an obligee (Madden) commences an action against an obligor (Capitol Specialty) in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. However, in Kling v. Hebert, the Louisiana Supreme Court has clarified that the “essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved.” The Kling judges emphasized that prescription serves to protect defendants from unexpected liability years after an event, particularly when a new legal theory or a different alleged tortfeasor is introduced.

The court also considered Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which held that a claim against an insurer based on one party’s negligence does not interrupt prescription for a later claim against the same insurer based on another party’s negligence. Because Madden’s original suit was based on Fairburn’s negligence, Capitol Specialty did not receive timely notice that she would later seek UM coverage based on Seibert’s alleged fault. Thus, the appellate court ruled in favor of the insurer, affirming the prescription of the plaintiff’s claims.

References:

Madden v. Fairburn, 2024-0513 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), — So.3d —, 2024 WL 5232995.

Kling v. Hebert, 23- 00257, p. 4 (La. 1/ 26/24), 378 So. 3d 54.

Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975).

*La. C.C. art. 3492. See As of July 1, 2024, delictual actions are subject to a two-year liberative prescriptive period, applying to delictual actions that arose or after the effective date.

^ La. R.S. 9:5629.

Supreme Court Settles Circuit Split on Right to Appeal Summary Judgment

12.12.2022

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled that a co-defendant who pleads comparative fault as an affirmative defense may appeal a summary judgment that dismisses a co-defendant, even when the plaintiff did not file an appeal. The Court’s decision in Amedee v. Aimbridge Hospitality resolved a circuit split among the Louisiana Courts of Appeal regarding this issue.

The Amedee plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against multiple defendants including the City of New Orleans and Premium Parking of South Texas, LLC. After discovery, the City of New Orleans filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal from the suit. The plaintiff did not oppose the city’s motion. Premium Parking was the only party to file an opposition. The trial court granted the city’s motion and dismissed it from the suit. Premium Parking appealed the court’s judgment.

The Fourth Circuit did not address the merits of Premium Parking’s appeal. Instead, the court dismissed the appeal because it found Premium Parking did not have a legal right to appeal the city’s dismissal when the plaintiff did not appeal the judgment.

The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court’s ruling. The Court noted that “to prohibit appellate review of a summary judgment by a co-defendant, even where a plaintiff did not appeal, diminishes the search for truth—the object of a lawsuit—and denies a defendant the ability to fully defend itself.” To reach this conclusion, the Court first asked, who may appeal a judgment?

To answer this question, the Court looked to La. C.C.P. art. 2082 and observed the article makes no restriction regarding what party may appeal a final judgment. Further, the Court noted that the right to an appeal is even extended third parties, not involved in the suit, when that third party is allegedly aggrieved by the judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 2086.

The Court also considered a defendant’s right to appeal in the context of Louisiana’s pure comparative fault system and summary judgments. Under La. C.C. art. 2323, Louisiana’s comparative fault statute, the fault of all parties is to be quantified. La. C.C.P. art. 966(G), provides that when summary judgment is granted in favor of a party or non-party to a suit, the fault of the dismissed party may not be considered in any subsequent allocation of fault in the matter.

The Court noted that while art. 966(G) precludes an allocation of the fault of a party dismissed under the statute, it does not limit the right of a defendant to appeal the dismissal of a co-defendant. No statute limited a defendant’s right to appeal a summary judgment only to those situations where a plaintiff also filed an appeal. Therefore, a defendant who hopes to keep a co-defendant in the case so that fault still may be allocated to the dismissed party at trial now may appeal the co-defendant’s dismissal, even when the plaintiff fails to do so.

Case Reference: Amedee v. Aimbridge Hosp. LLC, 2021-01906 (La. 10/1/22), — So.3d —, 2022 WL 12338929.

Summary Judgment Affirmed in Premises Liability Case Upon Court’s De Novo Review

05.17.2021

In Marrero v. I. Manheim Auctions, Inc., the plaintiff fell after he exited a building during a rainstorm and stepped off a curb into a parking lot. He claimed he stepped into a divot where asphalt had washed away. The defendant moved for summary judgment.

In opposition, the plaintiff offered an expert affidavit that cited a lack of handrails, code violations, and loose pebbles as contributing to the plaintiff’s fall. To recover in the case, the plaintiff possessed the burden under La. R.S. 9:2800.6 to establish three elements: 1) the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm, 2) this risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable, and 3) the defendant possessed actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect.

The defense argued the plaintiff could not show the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable and produced an expert affidavit to show the divot was only 3/16” deep. Evidence also showed the plaintiff was familiar with the area where he fell. The defendant also had received no prior complaints about the area. The trial court found that the parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm because the divot was only 3/16” deep and granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in light of the competing expert affidavits regarding whether the parking lot presented an unreasonable risk of harm. However, when a motion for summary judgment is appealed, the court uses a de novo standard of review. Under this standard, the appellate court reviews all issues and considers all evidence submitted to the trial court in its ruling.

The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment but did so for different reasons than the trial court. The Marrero court found the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of the third element, i.e., whether the defendant knew or should have known of the defect. Because the plaintiff failed to establish a material issue of fact as to all three required elements, summary judgment was granted. Marrero reminds that appellate courts may consider facts and legal issues the trial court did not address in its ruling.

Supreme Court Emphasizes “Error-Correcting” as Proper Role of Appellate Courts

01.21.2016

In a 68 page decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hayes Fund for the First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC, et al. v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain LLC, et al. forcefully explained the role of an appellate court. It is axiomatic that Louisiana appellate courts are courts of review.  Louisiana law specifically sets the standard of review an appellate court must apply when reviewing a trial court’s factual decisions (manifest error) or its legal decisions (de novo). According to Hayes Fund, a failure to faithfully apply the “manifest error” standard of review where applicable causes an appellate court to function as a “choice-making court” when its proper role is to serve as an “errors-correcting court.”