Author: Chad A. Sullivan

Louisiana Legislature Sets New Prescription Period for Tort Claims

The Louisiana legislature recently enacted laws that set new prescription periods for most delictual/tort actions and claims for damage caused to immovable property. Civil Code articles 3492 and 3493 previously established a prescription period of one year for these types of claims. The legislature repealed these articles and enacted Louisiana Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 in their place.

Louisiana Code Article 3493.1 now establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years for delictual actions/tort claims that runs from the day injury occurred or damage is sustained. It contains language previously included in Louisiana Civil Code Article 3492, which states that prescriptive period does not run against minors or interdicts in actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3493.2 also establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years when damage is caused to immovable property. This prescriptive period runs from the day the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage.

These changes went into effect of July 1, 2024. Louisiana Civil Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 apply prospectively only and apply to delictual actions arising after July 1, 2024.

Supreme Court Establishes Shifting Burden of Proof for Additional Medical Opinions (“AMO”)

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464 allows a defendant to select a physician to perform a physical and/or mental examination of a plaintiff to challenge the plaintiff’s claimed physical and mental injuries. This is called an Additional Medical Opinion (AMO); this was previously referenced as an Independent Medical Examination (IME). Earlier this year, the Louisiana Supreme Court, outlined the “good cause” requirement of the statute—an essential element required to proceed with an AMO. But, what remained as a question was the scope of an AMO and which party had the burden to deal with requested restrictions on the physician’s medical exam. This question was answered: In Augustine v. Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that after “good cause” has been shown for the examination, the party seeking to limit the scope of the AMO bears the burden to justify the restrictions.  

In Augustine, a sequel to Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Company, Et al,  the Court held that if the party to be examined for the AMO, usually the plaintiff, wants to place limits upon the examination, that party then has the burden of proof to justify the need for any restrictions or limitations with competent evidence. This ruling appears to show a trend in which the Court is confirming a defendant’s ability to obtain an AMO to support its defenses to a personal injury claim.  Augustine follows another Supreme Court decision from March of 2022, in which the Court held that a party establishes “good cause” for an AMO if that party shows a “reasonable nexus” between the requested examination and the condition in controversy. See Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Company, Et al. The Hicks decision eased the hurdles that defendants faced when seeking to compel AMOs pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464. For more information on the Hicks decision, see our prior blog here. Supreme Court Clarifies “Good Cause” for Additional Medical Opinion (“AMO”) (keoghcox.com)

In Augustine, the defendants requested an AMO. The plaintiff agreed to the examination, but the parties were unable to agree on “certain restrictions” the plaintiff sought to impose on the scope of the examination. The defendants ultimately filed a Motion to Compel regarding this issue. The District Court limited the examination to only those tests that the plaintiff’s treating physicians had performed. The District Court also noted that it did not want the AMO to turn into a “fishing expedition.” The Court of Appeal denied the defendant’s request for review of the Trial Court’s decision. The defendants then sought relief from the Supreme Court, which vacated the Trial Court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

In its opinion, the Supreme Court set forth the burden of proof each party has in the context of a Motion to Compel an AMO. As outlined in Hicks, the party requesting the AMO initially has the burden to establish “good cause” for the AMO. Importantly, the Augustine court found that once “good cause” has been found, “the court should presume that the examination will be conducted in a reasonable manner.” Because it is presumed the examination will be conducted reasonably, if a party opposing the AMO wants to place restrictions on the examination, the burden now shifts to that party to establish “special circumstances” that justify the restrictions they request. To meet this burden, the opposing party must produce “competent evidence” to establish (1) the need for the restriction and (2) that harm that will result if the restrictions are not imposed.  The type of evidence that may support AMO restrictions under Augustine likely will vary depending on the unique facts of each case. However, Hicks and its “sequel,” Augustine, provide clarification and guidance to parties seeking to compel or limit an AMO under article 1464.

Case References:

Augustine v. Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon, 2021-01753 (La. 10/1/22), __ So.3d __.  

Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Company, Et al., 2021-00840 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d 1106.

Written by Chad A. Sullivan and George A. Wright

Supreme Court Clarifies “Good Cause” for Additional Medical Opinion (“AMO”)

In cases that involve physical injury, defendants often request an “Additional Medical Opinion [AMO]” from a physician of their choice as part of the defense of the case. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464 allows a defendant to select a physician to perform a physical and/or mental examination of a plaintiff to challenge the plaintiff’s claimed physical and mental injuries. At times, a plaintiff may voluntarily agree to the examination. However, if an objection is lodged to the requested examination, a defendant must proceed with a Motion to Compel the Additional Medical Opinion. In the context of the motion, the defendant must establish the following for the AMO to be ordered pursuant to article 1464:

  1. The mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy; and
  2. “Good cause” exists for the AMO.

Because Louisiana courts routinely hold that a plaintiff puts his or her physical and mental condition in “controversy” by filing suit and requesting damages for physical and mental pain and suffering, the focus of a motion for an AMO is often on the “good cause” requirement. “Good cause” is not defined in La. CCP article 1464, and its meaning is not clear. Recently, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided guidance on the issue in the case of Hicks v USAA General Indemnity Company, et al., holding that a showing of “good cause” requires that a moving party establish a reasonable nexus between the requested examination and the condition in controversy.

In Hicks, the defendant moved for an AMO with an orthopedic surgeon after plaintiff filed suit, alleging personal injuries to his neck, back, and arm as a result of an accident. In the context of the Motion to Compel, it was argued the plaintiff put his physical condition in controversy by alleging injury. The defendant noted plaintiff treated with two physicians, one of whom did not believe plaintiff was a surgical candidate. The defendant also maintained “good cause” existed because a plaintiff “who asserts mental or physical injury… places that mental or physical injury clearly in controversy and provides the defendant with good cause for an examination to determine the existence and extent of such asserted injury.” In support of this argument, the defendant also highlighted inconsistent medical testimony concerning plaintiff’s physical conditions and treatment in support of “good cause.”

In opposing the motion, the plaintiff argued “good cause” was absent because two physicians already had offered opinions on plaintiff’s condition and treatment.

The trial court denied defendant’s Motion to Compel AMO on grounds that “good cause” did not exist. The trial court noted that two physicians already had been deposed and that a physician selected by the defendant could review plaintiff’s medical records and the depositions of the other doctors to offer an additional medical opinion at trial. The case proceeded to trial, where the defendant introduced testimony from a physician who relied upon the materials referenced in the court’s ruling to support his medical opinion. Not surprisingly, the plaintiff argued the opinion of the defendant-selected physician should be discredited because he never examined plaintiff.

After a trial judgment in favor of plaintiff, the defendant appealed. The appeal court also concluded “good cause” did not exist for the AMO, noting the absence of “definitive guidelines as to what constitutes good cause.”  The appeal court also noted the fact that defendant had the ability to obtain the desired information by other means was relevant in deciding whether good cause was shown.

The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It started its analysis by noting the basic premise of our system of justice: that both sides to a dispute stand on equal footing in gathering evidence and preparing for trial. It noted the AMO allowed under La. CCP article 1464 actually limits the extensive discovery permitted under Louisiana law, as it balances considerations of “sanctity of the body and the right to privacy with considerations of fairness in the judicial quest for truth.” Article 1464 seeks to achieve balance by requiring more than “relevance” for an AMO, granting the right to courts to order an AMO only when a plaintiff’s condition is “in controversy” and “good cause” supports allowing the examination. The Supreme Court also noted that an AMO may be one party’s only opportunity to independently ascertain the existence and extent of the other party’s claimed injuries.

After balancing these competing interests, the Louisiana Supreme Court found “good cause” under article 1464 requires the moving party to establish a reasonable nexus between the requested examination and the condition in controversy. The decision as to whether the moving party has demonstrated both the “in controversy” and “good cause” requirements lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. At times, the pleadings alone may contain sufficient information to establish a reasonable nexus.

As part of its decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that although meeting the statute’s requirements may entitle a defendant to an examination, a defendant is not entitled to any AMO it request; reasonable limitations may still be applied. It remains the trial court’s role to balance the competing interests and rights of the parties, considering both “sanctity of the body” and the implication of one party’s privacy rights against considerations of fairness for the moving party.

After employing its analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the defendant in Hicks demonstrated “good cause” because plaintiff alleged severe injuries as a result of the accident, claimed damages, and inconsistent medical testimony concerning plaintiff’s physical condition existed. It remanded the case for a new trial.

Biomechanical Testimony: Reliability Sinks Expert Testimony

Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected biomechanical testimony due to a lack of sufficient facts or data.  In Louisiana, as elsewhere, the trial court is to serve as the “gatekeeper” in deciding the admissibility of expert testimony.

In Blair v. Coney 20-00795 (La. 4/3/20),the plaintiff sought damages for injuries caused by a rear-end collision.  The defendant offered testimony from Dr. Charles E. Bain, partial owner of Biodynamics Research Corporation.  Dr. Bain testified that the plaintiff was not subjected to acceleration and forces sufficient to cause lasting injuries.  Dr. Bain’s testimony was based on previously conducted collision tests, photographs of the accident, and inspection of two vehicles of the same make and model.

The plaintiff moved to have Dr. Bain’s testimony excluded, claiming the testimony was irrelevant, unreliable, unduly prejudicial, and failed to satisfy the requirements of the “Daubert standard” as applied through Code of Evidence art. 702.  The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion and the defendant appealed.  After ordering reasons from the trial court, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s rejection of Dr. Bain. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. 

According to the Blair Court, Dr. Bain’s testimony was properly excluded where he did not review prior medicals, inspect the vehicles involved, and made assumptions regarding the plaintiff’s body position which contradicted sworn testimony. As such, the testimony did not satisfy the reliability required for expert testimony.

The Blair Court declined to address whether Dr. Bain’s testimony satisfied any of the other requirements of Code of Evidence art. 702. The Court expressed no opinion as to Dr. Bain’s qualifications or methodology. 

La. Supreme Court Determines Impact of Failure to Pay Filing Fee in Medical Review Panel

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that failure to pay filing fees necessary to add a defendant does not invalidate the proceeding as to other defendants. Prior to the ruling, Louisiana courts held that a failure to pay for one defendant invalidated the entire proceeding. 

In Kirt v. Metzinger 2019-C-1162 (La. 04/03/20), plaintiffs requested a medical review panel after the death of their mother due to complications after surgery.  Plaintiffs named three defendants—two doctors and the hospital.  A letter from the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board (PCF) was mailed to the plaintiffs, confirming that the defendants were qualified under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, and informing the plaintiffs that they were required by La. R.S. 40:1231.8 to pay a filing fee of $100 per named defendant within forty-five days of the mailing of the letter.  Plaintiffs responded, requesting to add two additional defendants to the panel, one of whom was an unidentifiable nurse.  Plaintiffs also included payment of $500.

The PCF responded that it was unable to add the nurse without proper identification.  Three weeks later, plaintiffs notified the PCF they were also unable to identify the nurse. Upon request, Parish Anesthesia was added to the panel instead. Nearly five months later, plaintiffs provided the PCF with the identity of the nurse in question and requested she be added. The PCF sent confirmed the addition and requested another $100 filing fee which was never paid.  Nevertheless, the medical review panel thereafter determined that none of the defendants, including the nurse, breached their standard of care.  Suit followed against all defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the failure to pay the additional filing fee invalidated the proceeding as to all defendants. The trial court granted this motion, and the appellate court affirmed.   Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that the failure to pay the additional $100 filing fee did not invalidate the entire proceeding. The court observed that separate confirmation letters sent by the PCF provided a different forty-five day period during which to pay the filing fee tied to each individual defendant.

The Kirt court stated: “[t]he notion of ‘one filing fee’ for every panel proceeding cannot be reconciled with the different payment deadlines that arise when the PCF sends separate letters confirming defendants’ qualified status.  A single filing fee cannot be subject to different payment deadlines.”  The court dismissed only the nurse and remanded the remainder of case to the lower courts. 


Chad A. Sullivan is a partner with Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd.  Prior to becoming an attorney, he worked as a licensed Registered Nurse.  He utilizes his background in nursing on a daily basis in his law practice that primarily focuses on automobile liability, medical malpractice, nursing home litigation, healthcare professional licensure and discipline, and products liability.