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Biomechanical Testimony: Reliability Sinks Expert Testimony

Published on: August 20, 2020

Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected biomechanical testimony due to a lack of sufficient facts or data. In Louisiana, as elsewhere, the trial court is to serve as the “gatekeeper” in deciding the admissibility of expert testimony.

In Blair v. Coney 20-00795 (La. 4/3/20),the plaintiff sought damages for injuries caused by a rear-end collision. The defendant offered testimony from Dr. Charles E. Bain, partial owner of Biodynamics Research Corporation. Dr. Bain testified that the plaintiff was not subjected to acceleration and forces sufficient to cause lasting injuries. Dr. Bain’s testimony was based on previously conducted collision tests, photographs of the accident, and inspection of two vehicles of the same make and model.

The plaintiff moved to have Dr. Bain’s testimony excluded, claiming the testimony was irrelevant, unreliable, unduly prejudicial, and failed to satisfy the requirements of the “Daubert standard” as applied through Code of Evidence art. 702. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion and the defendant appealed. After ordering reasons from the trial court, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s rejection of Dr. Bain. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.

According to the Blair Court, Dr. Bain’s testimony was properly excluded where he did not review prior medicals, inspect the vehicles involved, and made assumptions regarding the plaintiff’s body position which contradicted sworn testimony. As such, the testimony did not satisfy the reliability required for expert testimony.

The Blair Court declined to address whether Dr. Bain’s testimony satisfied any of the other requirements of Code of Evidence art. 702. The Court expressed no opinion as to Dr. Bain’s qualifications or methodology.

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Appellate Court Rules a Waiver of UM Coverage Can Only Be Changed at the Insured’s Written Request

Under Louisiana law, all automobile liability policies include uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM coverage”) unless the insured affirmatively rejects such coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic only coverage in writing. The question of what qualifies as a valid rejection of UM coverage has been debated in numerous lawsuits across the state. In Barbera v. Andrade, examination of this issue continued, and the court ruled that an initial rejection of UM coverage remains effective until changed by the insured’s written request.

In Barbera, the court examined whether UM coverage was triggered under a policy when the insured, who previously waived coverage, failed to respond to the insurer’s request to complete a new UM waiver form. It was undisputed that the insured executed a valid waiver of UM coverage in 2001. In 2014, the insurer sent the insured a letter that asked the insured to complete an updated coverage selection form and return it to the insurer’s office. The insured did not execute the updated form. A driver insured under the policy was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2017 and filed a claim for UM benefits.

The insured argued the letter sent with the waiver form in 2014 was ambiguous and could be read to mean that failure to respond would mean that UM coverage would be read into the policy by default. Evidence also showed that some of the insurer’s employees also thought the failure to respond with the updated form would result in UM coverage.

However, La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) provides, “An insured may change the original uninsured motorist selection or rejection on a policy at any time during the life of the policy by submitting a new uninsured motorist selection form to the insurer on the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance.” Thus, the Court ruled that the insured’s initial rejection of UM coverage could only be changed via written request by submitting a waiver form to the insurer. The intent of the parties was inconsequential.

Because the insured executed a valid UM waiver in 2001, it remained part of the existing policy. No event, such as a change in the policy’s liability limits, occurred that required the execution of a new UM selection waiver form, and the insured did not submit a new form to the insurer to obtain UM coverage. Therefore, UM coverage was not afforded under the policy, and summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the insurer.

Case Reference: Barbera v. Andrade, 22-147 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/30/22), 2022 WL 1733087, --- So.3d ---.

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Throw Me Something Mister? Liability for Mardi Gras Krewes

As part of the unique aura that surrounds Mardi Gras inSouth Louisiana, the expression “Laissez les bons temps rouler” is foreverlinked to the spirit of the season. The Cajun French phrase meaning “Let thegood times roll” captures the eccentric soul of Carnival. However, it might bedifficult to let the good times roll after being struck by a bag of beadshurled from the second deck of float. If the spectator suffers a severe injuryas a result, who is liable? Does the injured party have any recourse againstthe person who threw the beads? Against the Mardi Gras krewe organizers?

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that spectatorsassume the risk of injury when attending a parade. Citron v. Gentilly CarnivalClub, Inc., 14-1096 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So.3d 304. The foundation ofthe decision was based on the Mardi Gras Immunity Statute, La. R.S. 9:2796,which has two parts: (1) creates broad immunity for krewes which sponsorparades; and (2) states that anyone who attends such a parade “assumes the riskof being struck by any missile whatsoever which has been traditionally thrown,tosses or hurled by members,” which include, but are not limited to: beads,cups, doubloons, and many other things.

To impose liability on a krewe, there must be evidence ofthe krewe’s—as opposed to its member’s—gross negligence. Palmer v. Zulu Soc.Aid & Pleasure Club, Inc., 09–0751 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/1/10), 63 So.3d 131(emphasis added). Furthermore, a carnival krewe or organization may not bevicariously liable for its members' acts. To the contrary, Louisianajurisprudence has rejected the argument that a krewe is vicariously liable forits members' acts. Kibble v. B.P.O. Elks Lodge No. 30, 640 So.2d 267, 269 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993).

The Mardi Gras Immunity Statute imposes an extremely high burden of proving the “loss or damage was caused by the deliberate and wanton act or gross negligence” of the krewe or organization. Gross negligence has been defined as the “entire absence of care” and an “extreme departure from ordinary care or the want of even scant care.” Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Department Ambulance Service, 93–3099 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 216. In calculating whether an act was grossly negligent in the context of Mardi Gras Immunity Statute, the Citron court considered several factors: (1) the weight of the object thrown, (2) the distance the object was throw, and (3) the manner in which the object was thrown. Citron, 165 So.3d at 317.

Ultimately, the statute absolves krewes from liability for injuries caused by objects thrown to parade spectators, except in extreme and unusual circumstances. Therefore, be alert during parades this Mardi Gras season and Laissez les bons temps rouler.

Cole Frazier joined Keogh Cox as an associate in 2019 after working at the firm as a law clerk during law school. He earned his J.D. and Diploma in Comparative Law from Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. During his time at LSU Law, he also studied comparative law at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University in Lyon, France. Cole received his Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration with a concentration in Pre-law from Nicholls State University in 2015. He was elected to the Southland Conference all-academic team twice as a member of the Nicholls State football program.

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Louisiana Supreme Court Provides Updated Guidance on Execution of UM Waiver Forms

Under Louisiana law, uninsured/underinsured insurance coverage is implied in any automobile policy of insurance, and UM coverage will be read into the policy unless it is validly rejected. This rejection of UM coverage must be “clear and unmistakable.” The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of what qualifies as a valid rejection of UM coverage in Baack v. McIntosh, 2021-01054 (La. 6/30/21), --- So.3d ---.

The Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance provides a form which must be completed to reject UM coverage. This form allows the insured to initial one of four selections regarding UM coverage: (1) UM coverage at lower limits than liability coverage; (2) economic-only coverage with same limits; (3) economic-only UM coverage at lower limits; or (4) no UM coverage. A representative of the insured must initial one of these options for that option to apply to the policy at issue. This list does not include an option to select UM coverage. Therefore, the Baack Court held that “the only way to ‘select’ UM coverage on the form is to not initial any of the provided choices.”

The insured in Baack properly rejected UM coverage through the UM form in 2002. A proper rejection of UM coverage remains valid for the life of the policy, and a new form is not required when a policy is renewed. However, the Court found that, under La. R.S. 22:1295, an insured may change its rejection of UM coverage at any time by submitting a new UM form to the insurer.

In 2011, the insured increased its liability limits under the policy, which required completion of a new form. UM coverage again was properly rejected. Even though not legally required, the insurer sent new UM waiver forms to the insured in 2012, 2013, and 2014 when the policy was renewed. However, the insured completed each of these forms without initialing any of the four selections related to UM coverage. The insurer later issued the insurance policies without objection. The court found that the insured changed its rejection of UM coverage when it submitted the new forms in 2012, 2013, and 2014.

Because the insurer did not initial these forms when they were resubmitted, the insured “selected” UM coverage under Baack’s analysis, and UM coverage was afforded under the policy. Importantly, the Court held that, if the insurer believed the failure to make a selection on the forms was a mistake, it was the insurer’s responsibility to follow-up with the insured to make any necessary corrections. Three justices dissented and argued that the majority opinion negates other law which provides that an insured must make a “written request” to add UM on a policy where UM is rejected. UM cases are often fact-intensive and each case should therefore be assessed under their own specific facts.

Chad A. Sullivan

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