Insight

When a Settlement Is Not a Settlement

Published on: June 1, 2017

Louisiana law favors the settlement of disputes. With a settlement, both sides agree to avoid costly litigation and obtain a certain, negotiated result. While neither side is completely happy with the result in a typical settlement, the case is at least closed and the financial and emotional drain of litigation is ended. But the recent decision in The Marietta Trust and The Warren Trust v. J.R. Logging, Inc., Fair Hills Farm, LLC, Jerry Avants, Jr., Thomas Keaty, Jr. and XYZ Insurance Company, 2016 CA 1136 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/17) shows what can happen when one of the parties change their mind. This case is important because it calls into question whether an exchange of emails is sufficient to reach a final settlement.

The Marietta Trust case involved a dispute regarding the wrongful cutting of timber and the parties seemingly came to a resolution. Via email, the case was negotiated and the terms were agreed upon. Formal settlement documents were drawn up and money was exchanged. However, when the time came to execute the final documents, one set of defendants refused to sign the paperwork. This refusal to sign came after the attorney for these defendants directly stated in an email that his "clients have agreed to the settlement." Id. at *4. In response to the refusal to sign, the other parties filed a Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement which was denied by the Trial Court.

Settlement agreements are governed by the Louisiana Civil Code art. 3071 which provides that litigation can be resolved via settlement or compromise. A settlement agreement can take two forms: 1) recitation in open court; or 2) a writing. “The purpose of the writing requirement is to serve as proof of the agreement and the acquiescence therein.” Marietta Trust, 2016 CA 11336, Id. at *3. The writing must be signed by the parties or their agents. “Until the parties sign a written document or documents evincing their consent to the terms of the proposed agreement, a party is free to change his or her mind.” Id. at *3. Prior courts have found that emails meet the "writing" requirements. See, Geer v. BP America Production Co., 2014-450 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So. 3d 621; Dozier v. Rhodus, 2008-1813 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/09), 17 So. 3d 402.

The appellate court in Marietta Trust refused to enforce the "settlement." The court found that the exchange of emails was insufficient to meet the "writing" requirement of Civil Code article 3071 because neither the emails nor any other evidence showed that the attorney possessed "the express consent necessary to accept the terms of the settlement." Id. at *3.

When is a settlement not a settlement? Maybe when it came to you through your inbox. So, if an email from the attorney is not sufficient to perfect a settlement, what can we do? The answer offered by the 1st Circuit is to either: 1. Recite in open court; or 2. Obtain a writing that includes the client’s express consent given to the attorney to settle the case (presumably for the amount in the writing).

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Insight

What Mrs. O'Leary's Cow Has to Do With Spoliation

For more than a century, the debate has raged over whether Mrs. O'Leary and her famous cow truly started The Great Chicago Fire of 1871. Were the tragic events of that conflagration to happen today, someone would ask Mrs. O'Leary to produce the "RFID" chip in her bovine. (You know they would). They would contend that this key evidence could show the whereabouts and movement of the cow at the time the fire began. When she could not produce it, they would claim not only that she started the fire that destroyed a swath of Chicago, but that she also destroyed the evidence of her guilt. They would cry "spoliation."

"Spoliation" is the legal term for the improper destruction or alteration of evidence to prevent its use in litigation. It is also an ugly word and its presence in litigation can lead to ugly results. While this doctrine has existed in some form or the other for hundreds of years, understanding the concept may prove to be even more important now in a time when reams of documents can be stored on a "zip drive" smaller than a stick of gum and information can be maintained in a multiplicity of ways previously unthinkable.

To prove spoliation, a litigant must demonstrate that their adversary in litigation: (1) knew of a lawsuit or had a reasonable expectation that a lawsuit would follow; (2) failed to produce relevant evidence without an explanation; and, (3) participated in intentional conduct to alter, secret, or destroy the evidence. It is important to note that a defendant is not responsible under the doctrine of spoliation when the defendant’s failure to produce evidence is adequately explained.

A party who discovers that evidence has been spoliated has options. They may ask the court to enter an adverse presumption. If allowed, a court may instruct the jury that the missing or altered evidence would have been unfavorable to the party who destroyed it. Depending upon the nature and relevancy of the evidence, the court may have grounds to strike claims or defenses relevant to the evidence.

Another option is to file a formal claim against the party who spoliated the evidence. This type of claim alleges that the alleged “spoliator” impaired a party's ability to win or defend a law suit. In Louisiana, all five appellate circuit courts have recognized the tort of spoliation.

The issues surrounding spoliation have been magnified by technology. Meaningful information can now be found on almost anything: "smart refrigerators"; product sensors; a car's "black box" that may reveal the speed at the time of impact; SMS information on a phone, computer, or tablet; and on and on. Consider further the increasing scope of surveillance video recorded at businesses, schools, hospitals, and even homes, which is complicated by the fact that many systems automatically "write over" prior video in a matter of days, weeks, or months.

In short, it’s a good time for everyone to understand the doctrine of spoliation. The chance that some party will loudly proclaim that your spoliation of evidence adversely affected their case continues to increase. Being aware of the potential spoliation issues that may arise when a suit has been filed, or is expected to be filed, may save your case. It may also save you the time, money, and distraction involved in defending a claim that you have spoliated key evidence.

Insight

CORPORATE DEPOSITIONS: Recent Amendment to Federal Rules Mark a Positive Change

Litigation is increasingly a “part of doing business.” In federal court, corporate depositions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) (frequently referred to as a “30(b)(6) deposition”). When a corporate representative is appointed to testify on behalf of a company, they are typically provided a deposition notice which identifies the subjects he or she will be asked to address in their testimony. However, the process is not always smooth when the parties disagree about what is fairly covered in the notice. A recent amendment to Rule 30 aims to improve the process.

Preparing for a 30(b)(6) deposition can be overwhelming and time-consuming. Often, the imprecise identification of subjects in the notice leaves the corporation wondering what the noticing party really seeks to explore or even who is the best individual to testify to the topics identified. The federal judiciary has observed that corporate representative(s) under the current practice are often unprepared to provide the necessary testimony and/or that the entity’s interpretation of the deposition topics does not match the intent of the noticing party. The result is aborted or suspended depositions, extended litigation, increased costs, and the birth of theories that the deponent intentionally obstructed the deposition, which is usually not the case.

To address these issues, effective December 1, 2020, Rule 30(b)(6) now reads as follows (changes in bold):

Notice or Subpoena Directed to an Organization. In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify. Before or promptly after the notice or subpoena is served, the serving party and the organization must confer in good faith about the matters for examination. A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to confer with the serving party and to designate each person who will testify. …

The recent amendment directs the serving party and the named organization to confer before or promptly after the notice or subpoena is served about the matters for examination. The intent is to “facilitate collaborative efforts” and to encourage “candid exchanges about the purposes of the deposition and the organization’s information structure [which] may clarify and focus the matters for examination and enable the organization to designate and to prepare an appropriate witness or witnesses, thereby avoiding later disagreements.” (Committee Notes; Rule 30). The Committee Notes even suggest that the notice of the deposition may be “refined as the parties confer.” The Committee Notes further provide that the obligation is to “confer in good faith,” not to reach agreement, and remind that “it may be desirable to seek guidance from the court.”

The recent changes to Rule 30 are subtle but may prove impactful. Because the new procedure is now in effect, we should know soon.

Insight

The Louisiana Legislature Overhauls the “Direct Action” Statute

For decades, Louisiana law provided a claimant or injured person an uncommon opportunity (1) to directly name an insurer in a lawsuit, and (2) to make the jury aware of the presence of insurance. This was known nationally as the “Louisiana Direct Action Statute.” This statute, embodied in LSA—R.S. 22:1269, has long been a topic of debate.

The Louisiana Legislature recently amended the “direct action statute” in Act 275 and declared that the injured person “shall have no right of direct action against the insurer” unless at least one of the exceptions applies: the insured files for bankruptcy, the insured is insolvent, service cannot be made on the insured, a tort cause of action exists against a family member, uninsured motorist claims, the insured is deceased, or when the insurer issues a reservation of rights or coverage denial (but only for the purpose of establishing coverage). The Act further provides that the insurer shall not be included in the caption of the case. And, the existence of insurance is not to be disclosed unless the Louisiana Code of Evidence requires it. This new legislation is effective August 1, 2024.

But, the Act also provides for new provisions that allow for the joinder of an insurer after settlement or in connection with a final judgment. The Act further includes specific provisions enacted to provide notice to an insurer of an action and outlines the procedures and timelines for how insurers assert reservation of rights or a denial of coverage.

The revisions to LSA—R.S. 1269 represent a significant change in how lawsuits involving insurance companies will proceed.

Virginia J. ‘Jenny’ McLin

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