Employment Law Categorized Articles

In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Lacy v. Ibarra, et al, the Court provided further instruction and clarification on exceptions to the “going and coming” rule, which provides employers generally are not liable for acts or omissions of their employees as they travel to or from work.

The plaintiff in Lacy alleged that she and her daughter were injured after they were involved in a car accident with the defendant. The defendant was an employee of Exxon who recently relocated to Baton Rouge, Louisiana from Houston, Texas. The employee had not secured a permanent residence in Louisiana. His family remained in Houston. At the time of the accident, the defendant was driving to work in his personal vehicle.

Plaintiff claimed that Exxon should be liable under the “special mission” and/or the “interest in transportation” exceptions to the “going and coming” rule. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected both exceptions.

The Court noted the “special mission” exception applies in circumstances where the employee’s travel is a special or unusual, employment-related task outside the scope of the defendant’s normal job duties. The Lacy Court found that the defendant “was simply going to work” at the time of the accident. Therefore, the “special mission” exception did not apply. The Court also explained the employee’s recent relocation was not the type of “unusual” circumstance usually needed for the exception to apply.

The Court also found that the “interest in transportation” exception did not apply. This exception applies when an employer specifically pays the employee for the travel that is being done at the time of the accident. This can occur when an employer pays an employee for actual mileage for transportation from one point to another and, from both the employee and employer’s perspective, the purpose of the transportation is primarily for the employee’s benefit. In Lacy, the employer provides its employee with general transportation and relocation expenses. However, those general payments did not transform an ordinary commute into an employment-related activity or establish that the employer became interested in the employee’s transportation to trigger the exception.

The Lacy decision further solidifies Louisiana law that an employee’s travel to or from work, without any special circumstances, is not within the course and scope of an employee’s employment for purposes of vicarious liability.

Reference:

Lacy v. Ibarra, et al, 2025-01599 (La. 4/21/26), — So.3d —-, 2026 WL 1074083.

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, the U.S. Supreme Court recently clarified an important issue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court addressed whether employees who belong to “majority groups” must meet a higher burden by proving “background circumstances” when bringing discrimination claims. The Court unanimously held that they do not.

The case involved an employee of the Ohio Department of Youth Services, who alleged she was denied a promotion and was later demoted because of her sexual orientation. The plaintiff is heterosexual, and her supervisor is homosexual. When the plaintiff sought the promotion, the position ultimately was awarded to a homosexual woman. After her demotion, plaintiff’s position also was filled by a homosexual man.

The plaintiff filed suit under Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics, including sex. The district court dismissed her claims. It applied a rule requiring “majority-group” plaintiffs, i.e., plaintiffs who are not part of a minority group, to prove additional “background circumstances” suggesting the defendant is “the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” employees.

The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the lower court’s ruling. The Court focused on the statutory text of Title VII, which protects “any individual” from discrimination. The statute does not distinguish between majority and minority groups.

The Court held Title VII does not impose a higher evidentiary burden on plaintiffs who are part of a majority group. Therefore, the “background circumstances” rule applied by the lower courts imposed an additional evidentiary burden on majority group plaintiffs that was inconsistent with the statute.

This decision resolved a split among lower courts regarding this issue and confirmed that Title VII discrimination claims should be evaluated equally for all employees.

Reference:

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303, 145 S. Ct. 1540, 221 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2025).