Insight

Walking Drivers: A “Sudden” Defense to Rear-end Liability

Published on: August 2, 2016

A rear-end collision is a unique animal in the law. Plaintiff’s attorneys seek them out, and insurance companies fear them­­--sometimes for good reason. The "rear-end" accident is unique because proof of the mere fact that one vehicle strikes the rear of another creates a strong legal presumption of fault under La. R.S. 32:81. While this presumption is formidable, it may be overcome.

The rear-end presumption is premised upon the duty to not follow too closely and the law will assume that the following driver breached this duty when there is impact. However, the following driver can escape liability if he shows that his vehicle was under control, that he followed at a safe distance, and that the lead driver negligently created a hazard which could not have reasonably been avoided. For instance, if it is shown that the reckless or unpredictable driving of the lead motorist created a sudden emergency, the following driver will not be at fault. Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 35 So.3d 230 (La. 2010). Once established, the sudden emergency defense trumps the “rear-end presumption.”A "sudden emergency" is created when a driver is placed in a position of imminent peril that he or she did not create through their own conduct. Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Company, 262 So.2d 385 (La. 1972). When a driver can demonstrate the existence of a sudden emergency, they are not negligent for failing to do what a reasonable person might have done to avoid the accident had they been given enough time to assess and react to the situation.In Jewitt v. Alvarez, 179 So.3d 645 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), a following driver who rear-ended the vehicle of the lead driver was free from fault as a result of the sudden emergency defense where the facts revealed that the accident was solely caused by the slow speed of the lead driver (who almost came to a complete stop on the interstate) and the presence of surrounding traffic prevented the following vehicle from taking evasive action.In Carias v. Loren, 2015 WL 1019481 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/9/15), an eighteen-wheeler was traveling in the middle lane of the interstate when a "phantom driver" moved without warning from the left lane to the middle lane and slammed on its brakes in front of the eighteen-wheeler. In attempt to avoid the collision, the driver of the eighteen-wheeler swerved to his right and impacted a vehicle which then struck the plaintiff's vehicle. The driver of the eighteen-wheeler invoked the sudden emergency defense; the court agreed and found the defendant-driver free from fault.Rear-end collisions are hard to defend, but a defendant may want to gather a clear understanding of all of the facts before accepting liability. If these facts support the sudden emergency defense, the driver may "walk."

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Insight

Legislature Responds to Louisiana Supreme Court Decision and Sets New Public Policy Regarding Insurance Coverage for Permissive Use of Non-Owned Vehicles

Imagine you are visiting family during the holidays. As a favor, you take a family member’s vehicle to the gas station for a fill-up. While in transit, you get into an accident where you are at fault. Does your insurance policy provide coverage for the accident?

According to La. R.S. 22:1296.1, a new statute that went into effect on August 1, 2022, the answer to this question is “yes,” your insurance may afford coverage under these facts.

La. R.S. 22:1296.1 now requires insurance policies issued in Louisiana to provide coverage when the driver insured under the policy operates a non-owned vehicle with the express or implied permission of the vehicle’s owner. The statue was enacted to declare a new public policy regarding this issue and was passed in response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Landry v. Progressive Security Insurance Company, 2021-00621 (La. 1/28/22), reh'g denied, 2021-00621 (La. 3/25/22); 338 So.3d 1162.

The Landry case involved a motor vehicle accident that occurred as the defendant-driver, as a favor to the vehicle’s owner, drove the vehicle to a tire shop to repair a tire. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant-driver, the driver’s insurer, and the insurer of the vehicle that he drove at the time of the collision.

The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a provision in the driver’s policy that stated coverage under such circumstances was only available when the driver’s own vehicle was out of service. Because the driver’s vehicle was not out of service, no coverage was found under the driver’s policy. In so holding, the Landry court found that public policy did not require automobile insurance liability coverage for a driver’s negligent operation of a non-owned vehicle.

The Louisiana legislature enacted La. R.S. 22:1296.1 in response to the Landry decision. The statute provides that an insurer writing automobile liability, uninsured, underinsured, or medical payments coverage shall not exclude the benefits of such coverage under its policy to an insured operating a non-owned vehicle if all of the following requirements are satisfied:

  • The coverage is in full force and effect.
  • The insured is operating a vehicle owned by another with the express or implied permission of the vehicle’s owner.
  • The non-owned vehicle that is being operated by the insured is not provided, furnished, or available to the insured on a regular basis.

The statute also provides this coverage is secondary to the vehicle owner's insurance policy. Furthermore, if the coverage provided under the statute is included within the coverage provided pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1296, which addresses coverage for temporary, substitute, and rental vehicles, the provisions of La. R.S. 22:1296 determine which coverage is primary. (For additional information regarding La. R.S. 22:1296 click here.) [Sophia, please include link to blog from 5/25/22].

Let’s return to real life scenarios like those we addressed above. Perhaps you are blocked in at a party, so a friend tosses you the keys to move their car, or, like the situation in Landry, maybe you are trying to do a good deed by driving your parents’ car to a gas station for a fill-up when an accident occurs. While it remains to be seen how courts will interpret this statute in these circumstances, under the new legislation, these actions may now implicate coverage under your insurance policy.

Case Reference: Landry v. Progressive Security Insurance Company, 2021-00621 (La. 1/28/22), reh'g denied, 2021-00621 (La. 3/25/22); 338 So.3d 1162.

Insight

Claims for Negligent Spoliation of Evidence Not Supported by Louisiana Law, Reynolds v. Bordelon

In Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2362 (La. 6/30/15), — So.3d—, 2015 WL 3972370, the Louisiana Supreme Court definitively ruled that Louisiana law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. This resolved a disputed issue of Louisiana law.

The Reynolds plaintiff was involved in a multi-car accident in which his airbag failed to deploy. His insurance company paid what was owed for the totaled vehicle under its policy and, in the normal course of business, disposed of the vehicle by auctioning it to a salvage yard. Plaintiff’s petition included a claim against the auto manufacturer for the airbag failure. It also included a claim against his insurance company and the salvage yard for failure to preserve the vehicle as evidence likely to be used in litigation.

The Supreme Court classified the insurer and salvage yard as "third parties" to the lawsuit and categorized the plaintiff's claims against them as a negligent spoliation theory. In rejecting these third-party claims, the Court declared a claim for negligent spoliation to be against Louisiana public policy.

First, the tort would not deter future conduct, but would instead penalize a party unaware of potential wrongdoing. Second, liability for such a tort would be based upon great speculation regarding the value of the evidence at issue. Lastly, it would create unnecessary litigation and place a substantial burden upon society as a whole because third parties not even aware of litigation would be required to adopt cumbersome retention policies to reduce exposure to liability.

To prevent spoliation of evidence by third parties, a plaintiff who anticipates litigation should instead enter into an agreement with the third party or obtain a court order to preserve the evidence. By doing so, the plaintiff preserves a potential breach of contract claim regarding the evidence or can seek remedies for violation of the court order in the event the evidence is lost or destroyed.

Under Reynolds, the plaintiff cannot assert a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence. However, the Court confirmed that discovery sanctions and criminal sanctions remain viable against “first parties” who intentionally destroy evidence, Further, third parties may still be liable if a plaintiff can demonstrate a breach of a contract to preserve the evidence.

Insight

Governor Issues 2025 Insurance Reforms

During week seven of the 2025 Regular Session, Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry signed the following bills into law:

HB450 legislatively overrules Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d 973 (La. 1991) (which provided a presumption of medical causation where plaintiff had no pre-existing history) and became effective upon signature by the governor. The Act has prospective application only and shall not apply to causes of action arising prior to the effective date.

HB434 modifies “No Pay/No Play” and bars uninsured motorists from recovering for the first $100,000.00 of bodily injury and the first $100,000.00 of property damage based on any cause or right of action arising out of an automobile accident. The Act allows for an uninsured motorist, who institutes an action to recover damages, regardless of fault, and is awarded an amount equal to or less than $100,000.00, to be held liable for all court costs incurred by all parties to the action. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

HB436 bars unauthorized aliens from recovering general damages and past and future wages for damages arising from an automobile accident. The Act does not apply to a claim made against an uninsured or underinsured motorist policy which names the unauthorized alien as an insured. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

HB431 provides for modified comparative fault and bars claimants, who are found greater than or equal to 51% at fault, from recovering for damages. If fault attributable to the claimant is less than 51%, the amount recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the fault attributable to the claimant. The bill does not say whether this applies only to auto claims. We expect this will be clarified. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.

HB549 requires a premium discount for policyholders of commercial motor vehicles with installed dashboard cameras and telematic systems and who meet the other requirements enumerated in the Act. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.

HB148 requires insurance companies to display prior premium amounts in close proximity to the renewal premium. The Act also provides for rate filing standards and methods and changes the process by which the insurance commissioner can disapprove a rate if he determines it is excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

Richard W. Wolff

Partner
Attorney
Collision
Insurance