Insurance: “ACV,” Depreciation, or Both

For decades, Louisiana law provided a claimant or injured person an uncommon opportunity (1) to directly name an insurer in a lawsuit, and (2) to make the jury aware of the presence of insurance. This was known nationally as the “Louisiana Direct Action Statute.” This statute, embodied in LSA—R.S. 22:1269, has long been a topic of debate.

The Louisiana Legislature recently amended the “direct action statute” in Act 275 and declared that the injured person “shall have no right of direct action against the insurer” unless at least one of the exceptions applies: the insured files for bankruptcy, the insured is insolvent, service cannot be made on the insured, a tort cause of action exists against a family member, uninsured motorist claims, the insured is deceased, or when the insurer issues a reservation of rights or coverage denial (but only for the purpose of establishing coverage). The Act further provides that the insurer shall not be included in the caption of the case. And, the existence of insurance is not to be disclosed unless the Louisiana Code of Evidence requires it. This new legislation is effective August 1, 2024.

But, the Act also provides for new provisions that allow for the joinder of an insurer after settlement or in connection with a final judgment. The Act further includes specific provisions enacted to provide notice to an insurer of an action and outlines the procedures and timelines for how insurers assert reservation of rights or a denial of coverage.

The revisions to LSA—R.S. 1269 represent a significant change in how lawsuits involving insurance companies will proceed.

Hurricanes Laura and Delta caused substantial damage in Louisiana, resulting in extensive litigation that continues to develop. In a July 8, 2024 blog post, we reported that the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., affirmed that equitable estoppel applied to allow domestic insurers to compel arbitration under the New York Convention even where the insured dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice. Click here to read more.

New case law from the LA Supreme Court warrants supplementation of our prior blog post. The Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish (“Calcasieu”) filed suit in federal court to recover alleged underpaid and untimely insurance claim payments. Various domestic insurers moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses found in two foreign insurers’ policies. The foreign policies required all claims be submitted to arbitration in New York under New York law. The insurers relied upon Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., and Calcasieu moved to certify questions to the LA Supreme Court.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of LA certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court to address this issue. In Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held:

1. Arbitration is prohibited by statute. The case involved the interpretation of La. R.S. 22:868, as amended in 2020. Generally, La. R.S. 22:868(A) prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in insurance policies. The Court held this prohibition is rooted in public policy because compulsory arbitration clauses deprive courts of jurisdiction over actions against insurers. The Court noted it historically has held arbitration clauses within insurance policies are unenforceable, and it did not deviate from its historical position.

2. As a matter of first impression, an insurance policy with a political subdivision is a “public contract” within meaning of the statute banning any provision in public contracts which requires a suit or arbitration proceeding to be brought in a forum or jurisdiction outside of the state. It was undisputed that Calcasieu is a political subdivision of this state. Also, it was undisputed the Defendants contracted with Calcasieu to provide insurance coverage for approximately 300 properties that Calcasieu owned for the benefit of the public. No private actors involved. Thus, the Court found, “The Defendants’ insurance policies clearly covered public properties owned by Calcasieu, purchased with public funds––taxpayer dollars. As such, we easily find insurance contracts with political subdivisions, like the policies at issue, are public contracts within the meaning of La. R.S. 9:2778.” Thus, the statute precludes arbitration or venue outside of LA, or the application of foreign law, in claims involving the State and its political subdivisions.

3. A domestic insurer may not use equitable estoppel to enforce arbitration via a foreign insurer's policy. Citing its disagreement with the Federal Court’s ruling in Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins., the Court held “[E]quitable estoppel is not available under these circumstances because it conflicts with the positive law of La. R.S. 22:868, which prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies. As such, domestic insurers may not employ this common law doctrine to compel arbitration through the clause of another insurer's policies, as it clearly contravenes La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2). A contrary finding would (1) violate Louisiana's positive law prohibiting arbitration in Louisiana-issued insurance policies; and (2) invite domestic insurers’ misuse a doctrine of ‘last resort’ to ceaselessly rely on insurance policies of foreign insurers to compel arbitration.”

References:

Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., 2024 WL 4579035 (La.), 9, 2024-00449 (La. 10/25/24).

Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. 96 F.4th 726 (5th Cir. 2024).

All claims against professional designers are perempted (extinguished) under La. R.S. 9:5607 five years after the project is completed with an exception for fraud. In cases of fraud, an otherwise untimely lawsuit can go forward. For this reason, plaintiffs often allege fraud when the claim may be perempted. This scenario was present in the recent First Circuit decision in Markiewicz v. Sun Constr., L.L.C, 2019-1590 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/18/20), 2020 WL 5587265. The decision helps to explain when a designer’s alleged conduct falls outside of ordinary negligence based upon the standard of care and becomes fraudulent.

Broadly, fraud is designed as “a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other.” La. C.C. art. 1953. Fraudulent intent or intent to deceive is a necessary element of a fraudulent misrepresentation. Therefore, fraud cannot be predicated on a mere mistake or negligence, however gross.

In Markiewicz, the plaintiff homeowners filed a class action lawsuit in 2006 arising from flooding of their neighborhood. Ten years later, plaintiffs added as defendants the engineers involved in the design of the drainage system, including the engineers who prepared the surveys for the development. Absent fraud, the newly added claims would be untimely. Plaintiffs alleged that the engineers fraudulently provided incorrect or misleading survey certificates, despite their knowledge that the certificates were incorrect.

The engineers filed a motion for summary judgment on peremption because more than five years had passed from the completion of their services. The engineers argued that plaintiffs could not prove fraud under facts of the case such that the fraud exception would not apply.

The Markiewicz court ruled for defendants. Although there was a dispute as to whether the engineers’ measurements were erroneous, the court found that plaintiffs failed to prove that the services were fraudulent. The plaintiffs provided no evidence that the engineers were aware of any discrepancy in preparing the surveys or that they knowingly misrepresented the surveys. As such, the court found that the fraud exception did not apply, and plaintiffs’ claims against the engineers were perempted. Through its analysis, the Markiewicz court made clear that labelling allegedly negligent conduct as fraudulent is insufficient to defeat a supported motion. While fraud may be established by circumstantial evidence, including highly suspicious facts and circumstances, the court found the record devoid of such facts.