Impact of Supreme Court's Recent "Open and Obvious" Ruling not Obvious

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that a district court must reconsider a case involving a seventeen year old who was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for second degree murder under a mandated penalty provision of a statute. See State of Louisiana v. Darrius R. Williams, 12-1723 (La. 03/08/13), --So.3d---. The defendant's application for review to the Louisiana Supreme Court was pending when, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), was decided by the United States Supreme Court.

In Miller, the United States Supreme Court found that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." The Miller Court additionally stated that "[a]lthough we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Miller, 567 U.S. at ____, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.

The Williams Court found that "the Miller court did not establish a categorical prohibition against life without parole for juveniles" in homicide cases but did establish the requirement "that a sentencing court consider an offender's youth, and attendant characteristics as mitigating circumstances before deciding to impose" a life sentence without the possibility of parole on a juvenile." The requirement to consider the age and attendant characteristics of juveniles as mitigating circumstances before sentencing is the Williams Court's interpretation of Miller's mandate that the sentencer "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id.

On remand, the district court is to reconsider the sentence of a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole "after conducting a new sentencing hearing in accordance with the principles enunciated in Miller v. Alabama." State v. Williams, (La. 03/08/13), -- So.3d at ---.

Legal malpractice claims in Louisiana are governed by a peremption period that cannot be interrupted or suspended. La. R.S. 9:5605(A) provides that a legal malpractice claim must be brought one year from the date of the alleged malpractice, or within one year from the date the alleged malpractice should have been discovered. However, even when a claim is filed within one year of discovery, it must be filed within three years of the date of the alleged malpractice. If a party fails to assert a legal malpractice claim before the peremption period expires, the right to bring the claim is lost.

The Louisiana Supreme Court holds that “peremption commences to run in a legal malpractice case when a claimant knew or should have known of the existence of facts that would have enabled him to state a cause of action for legal malpractice.” In Crosby v. Waits, Emmett, Popp & Teich, LLC, the court recently examined the types of circumstances that should inform a plaintiff that an act of alleged malpractice occurred, which would trigger the peremptive period in which the plaintiff’s claim must be filed.

The plaintiff in Crosby owned 75% of a company and was in the process of buying out the minority stakeholder. The company was involved in litigation at the time. Initially, the minority stakeholder maintained all of the recovery and risk related to the suit. In April 2016, an attorney advised the plaintiff to accept an offer to split the recovery and risk in the suit 50/50 as part of the sale. The plaintiff then accepted the 50/50 offer. The litigation concluded after the sale, in February 2018, and resulted in an adverse judgment for which the plaintiff was responsible pursuant to the 50/50 agreement.

The plaintiff filed suit on February 12, 2019, within one year of the verdict in the underlying litigation, and claimed that its attorney committed malpractice when he advised that plaintiff accept the offer to split the recovery and risk in the suit. Specifically, it was alleged the attorney failed to examine the nature of the litigation or discover that the seller’s employees were aware the suit bore serious risk. The plaintiff’s representative testified that he did not keep track of the litigation and therefore could not have known the attorney engaged in the alleged malpractice until the jury rendered its verdict in the underlying suit.

However, the minority stakeholder testified that he knew the 50/50 offer was a bad deal for the plaintiff. Another employee testified he thought the risk of loss in the underlying suit was apparent to everyone involved. The court agreed. Based upon the evidence presented, “it should have been obvious to all concerned that the 50/50 option was favorable” to the minority stakeholder, who was adverse to the plaintiff’s interest.

The court held that the plaintiff should have known its attorney may have committed an act of malpractice when he advised it to accept the 50/50 split before the underlying litigation concluded. Accordingly, suit was not filed within one year of when the plaintiff should have known the alleged act of malpractice occurred. The plaintiff’s claims that it lacked such knowledge could not stand up to conflicting evidence. Thus, the claim was peremepted, and the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.

Case References:

Crosby v. Waits, Emmett, Popp & Teich, LLC, 2022-0395 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/22), 352 So. 3d 145.

Jenkins v. Starns, 2011-1170, p. 15 (La. 1/24/12), 85 So.3d 612, 621.

A federal court for the Middle District of Louisiana recently ruled that a 1½ inch elevation change in a Walmart parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff patron in Lacaze v. Walmart Stores, Inc. The case involved a slip and fall/trip and fall accident in the parking lot of Walmart’s Burbank Drive store in Baton Rouge. The defendant moved to dismiss the suit where the plaintiff claimed she tripped and fell as she crossed the area where the black asphalt parking lot adjoined the concrete crosswalk as pictured below.

In the area where the asphalt meets the crosswalk, the surface presented a ¼ inch to 1½ inch change in elevation. Plaintiff admitted the black pavement was distinct in appearance and color from the concrete crosswalk. Surveillance showed that plaintiff looked down at her cell phone at the time she tripped and fell. Though in a high pedestrian traffic area, Wal-Mart maintained this was the first reported incident.

The Court found the condition was open and obvious and did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. To reach this decision, the Court made the following observations:

1. Parking lots have clear and apparent utility. Crosswalks do as well. Crosswalks give patrons a designated area to traverse the lot safely.
2. The likelihood and magnitude of the risk posed by the condition was low. The Court noted it is common for surfaces of parking lots and sidewalks to be irregular, and no other patrons reported problems or accidents.
3. The cost of preventing the harm was high. The Court would not consider only the cost of fixing the specific injury-causing defect. Rather, it considered the cost of eliminating all defects in the Walmart parking lot.
4. Plaintiff conducted an ordinary commercial activity that was not dangerous in nature.

The Court concluded that all but factor four pointed to a single conclusion: the 1½ inch elevation difference did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. The Court reached this conclusion even though the plaintiff retained an expert who gave opinions regarding possible violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and OSHA regulations. The expert’s opinions were insufficient to defeat summary judgment when the condition was open and obvious. In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court joined with several other courts, including the following:

• Chambers v. Vill. of Moreauville, where a one-and-one half inch deviation did not present an unreasonable risk of harm;
• Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, where a height variance of one-fourth to one-half inch between concrete blocks in parking lot did not present an unreasonable risk of harm; and
• Boyle v. Board of Sup'rs, Louisiana State University, where a depression of up to one inch in a sidewalk did not pose unreasonable risk of harm.

Case References: Lacaze v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. CV 20-696-JWD-EWD, 2022 WL 4227240 (M.D. La. Sept. 13, 2022); Chambers v. Vill. of Moreauville, 2011-0898 (La. 01/24/12), 85 So.3d 593; Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, 97-1174 (La. 03/04/98), 708 So.2d 362; and Boyle v. Board of Sup'rs, Louisiana State University, 96-1158 (La. 01/14/97), 685 So.2d 1080.