COVID-19 Case Presents Interesting Constitutional and Procedural Issues

Plaintiff Brady Hardisty and a coworker attempted to use chains attached to a tractor to pull a Caterpillar bulldozer from the mud. A chain snapped and struck plaintiff in the head and face. Hardisty sued Caterpillar under allegations that its product was unreasonably dangerous. Caterpillar filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing Hardisty was not engaged in a “reasonably anticipated use” of its product. Both the trial court and the appellate court identified “material issues of fact” in denying Caterpillar’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, and entered summary judgment for Caterpillar.^

Caterpillar cited its Operation Manual that warned against the use of chains and gave a safer alternative. Hardisty asserted that material issues of fact existed as to whether Caterpillar “knew or should have known” that users were not following product warnings. Hardisty offered opinions from its expert witness that: (1) Caterpillar knew of the danger because it warned against the use of chains and (2) experience showed that the use of chains was a common practice in the industry.

The Hardisty court reasoned that the expert’s own “experience” was insufficient to refute Caterpillar’s evidence that it received no report of prior similar accidents. However, the Court cited to earlier case law for the proposition that even actual knowledge would not defeat the motion, stating:

The jurisprudence has recognized that knowledge of the potential and actual intentional abuse of a product does not create a question of fact on the question of reasonably anticipated use when the manufacturer expressly warned against the danger of such misuse.

In a recent case handled by Keogh Cox, the federal Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants, citing Hardisty for the proposition that a manufacturer may reasonably expect that its users will follow “clear and direct” product warnings. See Friels v. Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al.

References:

^Hardisty v. Walker, 25-00239 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So,3d 774.

Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al., No. 24-30688, 8/15/25. Opinion not designated for publication. 5^th Cir. R. 47.5.

Witness For The Prosecution was a 1957 film about the testimony of a German-born wife whose husband was on trial for murdering a rich woman. Based upon an Agatha Christie novel, the film gave a quote which has been parroted by attorneys ever since.

Sir Wilfrid: And when you said that he had accidentally cut his wrist, again, you lied?　

Helm: Yes!

Sir Wilfrid: And now today you've told us a new story entirely! The question is, Frau Helm, were you lying then, [or] are you lying now?　

Whether in court, deposition or on the big screen, the impeachment of witness creates drama-the kind of drama opposing attorneys try to avoid.

In O'Dwyer v. Our Lady of the Lake, -- So. 3d ---, 2013 WL 2131763 (La. 5/17/13), the Louisiana Supreme Court was asked to decide whether audio recordings of a defense witness must be disclosed before the deposition of the witness. The O'Dwyer plaintiff was a nursing student who alleged that she had been targeted for termination from the nursing program through "harassment, bullying, stalking, and intimidation."

O'Dwyer's attorney sought to depose the nursing program director. The defendant sought production of audiotaped conversations between the program director and another student before the deposition was allowed, and successfully obtained a written order that the audiotapes be produced. The First Circuit denied the plaintiffs' writ, but writs were granted by the Louisiana Supreme Court.

The O'Dwyer Court looked to prior jurisprudence. In Wolford v. JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital, 96-2460 (La. 5/20/97), 693 So. 2d 1164), the Supreme Court held that a defendant was not required to produce surveillance of the plaintiff until after the plaintiff's deposition. The Court highlighted the "important function in the search for truth" served by surveillance. After all, the value of the surveillance could be minimized were a plaintiff able to view the evidence and tailor his or her testimony to match. Therefore, the evidence was viewed as potential impeachment evidence and could be withheld prior to deposition.

In Bell v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 06-1538 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So. 2d 654, the Court refused to extend Wolford to the production of video which captured the accident itself. Video of the accident upon which the plaintiff sued was direct evidence and not primarily impeachment evidence. Therefore, it had to be produced prior to the plaintiff's deposition.

In O'Dwyer, the Court concluded that the audiotapes were made for impeachment and therefore need not be produced until after the nursing director's deposition. Justice Weimer, in dissent, challenged the characterization of the audiotapes as exclusively impeachment evidence. He cited to the language of the writ application which described the tapes as "unique evidence that may be used for direct or impeachment evidence at trial."

O'Dwyer indicates that a court may look to the primary function of the evidence in deciding its discoverability. The fact that the audiotapes may serve as direct evidence did not require their production when their primary function was impeachment.

Winning or losing in court often comes down to who possesses the burden of proof. Like a driver at a four-way stop, a litigant has to know when it is their turn.

Civil Procedure Article 966, the "Summary Judgment Article," provides that the mover bears the burden of proof. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this burden in Dan Veuleman & Jody Veuleman v. Mustang Homes, LLC, 2013-C-190 (La. 4/5/13), - So. 3d - in the context of insurance coverage.

The general rule in Louisiana is that an insurer bears the burden of proving that a loss falls within a policy exclusion. In Veuleman, the insurer argued that the loss was excluded through a "work product" exclusion. However, the "work product" exclusion contained a "subcontractor" exception. The plaintiffs argued that the work was performed by a subcontractor and should for that reason be covered under the policy.

At the hearing, the insurer introduced its policy as evidence of the exclusion. However, it offered no evidence to show who performed the work at issue. The plaintiffs attempted to introduce an affidavit to establish that the work was performed by a subcontractor. The court of appeal rejected the affidavit as insufficient and concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish that their claims were spared from the work product exclusion.

The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed. It stressed that the insurer, not the plaintiff, possessed the burden of proving that the policy exclusion applied. The Court stated that "[t]he insurer offered no proof to accomplish its burden." Id. at 1.　

The Veuleman Court held that the appellate court "erroneously shifted the burden of proof on the motion for summary judgment" to the plaintiffs and that the insurer had the burden to show that "the exception [to the exclusion] is not met." In keeping, the Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The Veuleman decision reminds that a litigant should be aware when it is their turn to go.