Author: Mary Anne Wolf

Compelling Arbitration of Commercial Property Insurance Claims under the New York Convention

In the wake of recent hurricanes, Louisiana courts were flooded with cases property owners filed against their insurers alleging improper denial or underpayment of hurricane claims. Many of those cases were stayed and the parties were compelled to arbitration, despite Louisiana law prohibiting arbitration provisions in insurance contracts, La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2).

In a typical case involving commercial property, a property owner filed suit against its insurers, often including both domestic and foreign companies. One or more insurance policies contained an arbitration agreement requiring all disputes to be resolved by arbitration in a specified U.S. city. Undeterred, the insured filed suit in Louisiana state court. The insurers removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration.

The foreign insurers sought to enforce the arbitration agreement under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (aka the New York Convention). The New York Convention is an international treaty that requires signatory countries to enforce an arbitration agreement where four requirements are met: (1) a written arbitration agreement exists, (2) that provides for arbitration in a signatory country, (3) which arises from a commercial legal relationship, and (4) at least one party is not a U.S. citizen. These conditions are met where a foreign insurer issues a commercial policy that contains an arbitration provision to a U.S. property owner. Under such circumstances, the courts were bound to compel the parties to arbitration.

The cases presented some interesting questions. For example, could domestic insurers also compel arbitration? Yes. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, where the claims against the insurers are interdependent, the domestic insurers, even if they were not signatories to the arbitration agreement, could compel arbitration.

Does the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a federal law that maintains the states’ power to regulate the insurance industry, cause Louisiana’s law prohibiting arbitration in insurance contracts to reverse-preempt the Convention? No, the Act does not apply to treaties.

What about the arguments that the contract was not freely negotiated, or that under conflict of laws principles Louisiana law should apply, or that the federal courts should abstain because the state has a vital interest in regulating insurance? The courts rejected these arguments as well.^

Recently, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., affirmed that equitable estoppel applied to allow domestic insurers to compel arbitration under the New York Convention even where the insured dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice.* However, the U.S. Second Circuit has held the opposite in two recent cases involving insurance contracts between foreign insurers and Louisiana property owners – that Louisiana law applied to prohibit the enforcement of the arbitration provision in the insurance policy.^^

With the exception of the Second Circuit split, the numerous cases arising from recent hurricanes confirm a strong policy favoring arbitration under the New York Convention, which overrides potential state law obstacles to enforcing arbitration provisions in insurance policies.

Mary Anne Wolf is an arbitrator on the commercial, construction and large, complex cases panels of the American Arbitration Association and is a neutral at Perry Dampf Dispute Solutions.

References:

^ See for example, General Mill Supplies, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, et al, 23-6464, 2024 WL 216924 (E.D. La. 1/19/2024), – F.Supp.3d – (2024); Dryades YMCA v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, et al, 23-3411, 2024 WL 398429 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2024); Parish of Lafourche v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., et al, 23-3472, 2024 WL 397785 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2024).

* Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., et al, 96 F.4th 726 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2024).

^^ See Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. 3131 Veterans Blvd. LLC, 22-9849, 2023 WL 5237514 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2023); and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Mpire Properties, LLC, 22-9607, 2023 WL 6318034 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023) (appeal filed).

Making the Case for Arbitration of Commercial & Construction Disputes

Clients frequently ask their attorneys whether they should arbitrate their commercial and construction disputes instead of litigating in the court system. This question arises either when drafting the contract or, if the contract contains an arbitration clause, once a claim occurs. Claims that require analysis of complex contracts, government regulations, and technical issues, such as those that arise in the construction, environmental, and energy industries, are well-suited to arbitration.

Parties typically want the quickest and least expensive means to a fair result. This is true even for highly sophisticated businesses where the amount in dispute is high. Arbitration gives parties a high level of control in the dispute resolution process. It is specifically designed to provide an alternative to the onerous and expensive discovery and trial procedures required in litigation. Parties can tailor the discovery and schedule to the needs of the case, which drastically reduces the overall time and cost of reaching resolution.

Arbitration also allows parties to select an arbitrator with specialized knowledge necessary to decide the case, which is especially beneficial in complex cases. Because parties agree to arbitration in their contract, they have control over the process in a way that is not available in litigation. For example, the parties may designate the administrative body and applicable rules, require a three-arbitrator panel for a complex case, name a particular arbitrator, require confidentiality, or dictate the timeframe for the hearing.

The following four factors are key considerations in assessing arbitration:

Expertise of decision-maker – One of the most important benefits of arbitration is the parties’ ability to select the arbitrator. This affords parties an opportunity to designate a decision-maker with specific qualifications and expertise needed to understand the contracts, legal issues, engineering and technical facts, and expert evidence to be presented. The parties can also select someone with strong management skills to handle complex matters or difficult decisions. The benefit is two-fold: Fewer resources are needed to educate the decision-maker in the critical industry background information, and the risk of an unreasonable ruling is reduced. 

Timeframe for resolution – The median time to resolution in commercial arbitrations is less than one year, whereas the time to trial in federal court is two to three years.* Because appeal rights in arbitration are limited, the award typically terminates the dispute and the expense. However, after a trial, the case could linger through the appeal process for several more years, thus increasing the expense. 

In addition to direct cost saving, decreasing the resolution time creates an indirect cost benefit to industry. Because “time is money,” shaving years off the process results in significant savings that likely can be better used advancing the business than litigating a case. Businesses lose billions of dollars every year because of the inherent delays in the litigation process.^ These losses stem from uncertainty in the outcome, capital set aside as reserves for potential losses, open claims reported to insurers, investors, potential clients and auditors, and loss of employee hours and administrative costs expended in litigation. Arbitration offers an alternative to mitigate and control these costs.

Expense – Arbitration typically costs more upfront than litigation. The parties must pay the administrative costs and arbitrator fees, which vary depending on the time and complexity involved, but generally range from $20,000 for a $100,000 claim to $60,000 for a $1 million claim. The costs are shared among the parties, which decreases the per-party cost in multiparty claims.

However, parties can control the cost of arbitration. Discovery, depositions, and document production in complex cases can come with staggering costs. In arbitration, the rules governing discovery and evidence are less formal. Additionally, discovery is more limited, which encourages a streamlined process and reduces costs and time significantly.

Risks – An often-cited risk of arbitration is the lack of appeal right. An arbitration award can only be vacated on limited grounds of fraud, corruption, misconduct, or where an arbitrator exceeds their power.~ However, if the initial decision-maker has expertise in the industry and law involved, the expectation is that the decision will be a well-reasoned one that the parties can accept.

In contrast, a major risk of litigating a complex commercial dispute is the fact-finder’s lack of understanding of the issues, the escalating potential for nuclear verdicts, and the appellate court’s limited power to correct factual findings.

In sum, arbitration is a good choice for dispute resolution where parties want to control the risk of an unreasonable outcome, reduce the time and expense of the process, and select a decision-maker with special expertise in their industry.

About the author: Mary Anne Wolf is an engineer and attorney. She is on the panel of commercial and construction arbitrators for the American Arbitration Association. Her goal as an arbitrator is to assist parties in managing their case for efficient resolution, give a high level of attention to each party’s position, and achieve a fair result.

References:

* AAA, Measuring the Costs of Delays in Dispute Resolution [online]; Micronomics, (March 2017), Efficiency and Economic Benefits of Dispute Resolution through Arbitration Compared with U.S. District Court Proceedings.

^ Efficiency and Economic Benefits, pp. 4-5, 16-23.

~ La. R.S. 9:4210 (LA Binding Arbitration Act); 9 USCA §10 (FAA).

Louisiana COVID-19 Immunity Laws

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Louisiana legislature enacted and modified several statutes to limit the liability of individuals, businesses, and government agencies for exposure claims. However, the immunity is not absolute. While the immunity applies to “ordinary” negligence claims, it does not apply where acts are grossly negligent, wanton, or involve reckless misconduct. Further, as a condition to the protection afforded, the entity must show substantial compliance with the applicable COVID-19 procedures established by government authorities.

La. R.S. 9:2800.25, entitled “Limitation of liability for COVID-19” (the general immunity statute) provides that no person, business, or government entity shall be liable for injury or death resulting from exposure to COVID-19 through the performance of its business operations unless the entity failed to substantially comply with at least one set of procedures established by the federal, state, or local agency that governs the business operations, or the injury was caused by gross negligence or wanton, reckless misconduct. With respect to employer immunity, the statute provides that, regardless of whether an employee’s COVID-19 illness is covered under workers’ compensation law, the employee shall have no tort-based remedy against his employer unless the exposure was caused by an intentional act.

The exception to immunity in the general immunity statute calls into question the type of conduct that would rise to a level of gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined in Louisiana case law as “willful, wanton, reckless conduct that falls between intent to do wrong and ordinary negligence,” “lack of even slight care and diligence,” and “utter, complete or extreme lack of care.” While the definition does not provide a bright line rule, it reflects that the conduct must move well beyond simple negligence to defeat immunity.

For a business seeking to manage the risks arising from COVID-19, some best practices emerge: (1) monitor the COVID-19 procedures of government authorities to keep informed of the latest recommended or mandated procedures, (2) institute compliance protocols, (3) document and administer those procedures to show compliance, and (4) most obviously, avoid actions or omissions that may be construed as grossly negligent, wanton, or reckless.


Mary Anne Wolf is an engineer/attorney with a construction background who represents design professionals, contractors and others in construction litigation. She also gives seminars on the subject. She enjoys travel, yoga and encouraging her husband in his gardening and cooking endeavors.

Supreme Court Rules Against Broad Application of Indemnity Provision in Engineer’s Contract

The Supreme Court ruling in Couvillion Group, LLC v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 2020 -00074 (La. 4/27/20) is a reminder that an indemnity claim must be sufficiently related to the principal demand and that contract indemnity provisions are to be strictly construed.

In Couvillion, the general contractor sued the owner of a public works port project for contract delay damages resulting from a cease work order issued to allow redesign of a fuel tank platform. When the contractor submitted its delay claim, the owner requested that its project engineer review it and make recommendations. The engineer recommended payment of a little over $1 million dollars. When the owner refused to pay, the contractor sued. In response, the owner filed a third-party demand against the engineer alleging that its recommendation was erroneous and excessive and that, if it was bound by the engineer’s recommendation, then the engineer must indemnify the owner.

On behalf of the engineer, Keogh Cox attorneys argued that the engineer should not be required to reimburse the owner for any delay costs and asked for dismissal through an exception of no cause of action. Code of Procedure Article 1111 provides that a defendant in a principal action may bring in any person who may be liable to him for all or part of the principal demand. Here, that was not the situation. The engineer was not liable to the owner for any part of the contractor’s delay claim because the engineer did not cause the delay. The delay damages were incurred before the engineer made a recommendation for payment. The events giving rise to the two claims were separate and distinct: the main demand arose from the project delay and the third- party demand arose from the engineer’s recommendation of the claim amount. The Court commented that the principal claim against the owner for delay damages was too attenuated from the owner’s claim against the engineer, thus the third-party demand was improper.

The owner also relied on the indemnity provision in the engineer’s contract that required the engineer to indemnify the owner against any and all claims for personal injury or “damages to property” that may arise from its services. The Court held that the plain meaning of the term did not include the economic-only losses related to the subject delay claim. The Court further reasoned that indemnity agreements are to be strictly construed, rejecting the owner’s broader interpretation.