Edward F. Stauss III

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In Ralser v. Harrah’s New Orleans, the claimant tripped over the extended arm of a forklift while walking toward the employee entrance for the defendant’s casino. A third-party construction contractor had parked the forklift adjacent to the employee entrance while doing work on the premises. Surveillance footage showed that no warning signs, barricades, or other safety devices had been placed around the forklift. Evidence also showed that another employee tripped over the same forklift on the same day.

Generally, an employee's injuries sustained while traveling to or from a place of employment are not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law. This is known as the “going-and-coming rule.” However, at trial, the workers’ compensation judge applied the Threshold Doctrine, an exception to this general rule, and found the accident occurred in the course and scope of the claimant’s employment. Under Louisiana law, the Threshold Doctrine applies when:

1. A distinctive or unusual travel risk exists; and
2. The risk is immediately  adjacent to the employer’s premises.

On appeal, the employer argued that the trial judge was manifestly erroneous in applying the Threshold Doctrine. However, in affirming the trial court’s determination, the appellate court emphasized several factual findings that supported application of the doctrine:

• The forklift created a  distinctive travel hazard.
• The hazard was  immediately adjacent to the employee entrance.
• Employees regularly traversed the route where the forklift was located.
• The risk arose from construction activities associated with Harrah’s premises.
• No warnings, barricades,  or protective measures were in place to protect employees from the hazard.

Under the facts of this case, the court found the Threshold Doctrine applied. Even though the employer did not own the forklift, evidence showed the forklift was within the defendant-employer’s control and presented a distinct travel risk immediately adjacent to the casino.  

While it may be limited to its facts, this decision is significant because it appears to extend application of the Threshold Doctrine and suggest employers may be held responsible for dangers created by conditions near workplace access points, even when those conditions arise from the activities of third parties. Because Ralser presented very unique circumstances, it remains to be seen whether the decision will impact the well-established Threshold Doctrine beyond its facts.

References:

 Ralser v. Harrah’s New Orleans, ___ So. 3d ___, 2026WL 1090787 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/22/26).

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Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

"An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration."

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

• After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
• The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
• The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
• After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
• The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
• Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
• The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont'l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.