Statutory Employer Tagged Articles

In Saizon v. Dow Chem. Co., the plaintiff was injured while he was working for Turner Industrial Group at the Dow Chemical Plant in Plaquemine, Louisiana. The plaintiff named Dow and three of its employees as defendants. The Dow defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that the plaintiff was Dow’s statutory employee at the time of the accident and therefore the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (“LWCL”) provided plaintiff with his exclusive remedy for the claims he asserted against Dow and its employees.

The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment on appeal.

The Court found the contract executed between Dow and Turner Industries created a rebuttable presumption under La. R.S. 23:1061(A)(3) that Dow was the plaintiff’s statutory employer at the time of the accident. The plaintiff failed to produce evidence to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, the defendants argued plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was found in workers’ compensation, not in tort.

The LWCL generally holds that an employer is immune from tort actions brought against it by its employee. However, the LWCL includes an “intentional act exception,” where an employee can maintain a tort claim if he can show that his accident and injuries resulted from his employer’s intentional act. A plaintiff can establish the intentional act exception if he can show the employer “knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct.”

The plaintiff argued that the defendants were aware of the risk that a fire or explosion could occur before the accident. He also argued the defendants failed to follow Dow’s safety policies and OSHA guidelines at the time of the accident. Plaintiff argued this created an issue of fact regarding whether the accident was “substantially certain.”

The First Circuit disagreed, finding this evidence amounted to only “generalized knowledge of risk” that “falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character.” In short, the court agreed with the defendants’ position that “an employer’s generalized knowledge of risk does not meet the intentional act test without proof of specific knowledge of risk to this plaintiff and moving ahead with operations anyway.” Plaintiff had no such evidence, and his claims were dismissed.

Reference:

Saizon v. Dow Chem. Co., 2025-1139 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/26), 2026 WL 1122621

In Louisiana, a “statutory employer” is entitled to protection from tort suit. With limited exceptions, the defense must be supported by a contractual provision declaring the defendant to be a statutory employer in a manner consistent with La. RS 23:1061. In Spears v. Exxon Mobil Corporation & Turner Industries Group, LLC, 2019-0309, 291 So. 3d 1087 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 2019), the defendant-premises owner successfully asserted the defense, notwithstanding multiple issues with respect to the nature and terms of the agreement and an alleged lack of privity with the plaintiff’s immediate employer.

In Spears, the plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell on the production floor at the Exxon plastics plant. Spears filed suit against multiple parties, including Exxon, alleging it failed to provide a safe premises. The plaintiff worked for Poly Trucking who operated at Exxon under a contract with Polly-America. Poly-America, LP and Exxon, in turn, were signatories to an agreement entitled “STANDARD PURCHASE ORDER” which stated that Polly-America was to:

“… provide pickup/delivery service… For all containers of Polyethylene scrap as well as Polyethylene’s scrap recovery vacuum service for a quoted amount of one dollar.”

The “STANDARD PURCHASE ORDER” also contained a section expressly recognizing Exxon:

“… as the statutory employer of employees of Poly America and subcontractors while such employees are engaged in the contracted work.”

Exxon filed a motion for summary judgment based upon its status as Spears’ statutory employer. The Trial Court granted the motion and dismissed Exxon with prejudice. On appeal, Spears argued that the contract between Exxon and Poly-America presented multiple issues of fact and law which necessitated a reversal of the summary judgment. The issues identified by the plaintiff included the following:

The agreement upon which Exxon relied was a “Contract of Sale,” not a “Contract for Services;”
The agreement specified that the signatory contractor (Poly America) was an “Independent Contractor;”
The plaintiff’s immediate employer (Poly Trucking) was neither a signatory to, nor specifically identified anywhere in the agreement; and,
Although the agreement designated Exxon as the statutory employer of the “employees of Poly America,” Exxon is not specifically designated as the statutory employer of the employees of Poly Trucking, the plaintiff’s immediate employer.

The First Circuit Court of Appeal expressly rejected each of the plaintiff’s arguments.

First, the Court pointed out that the law does not mandate that the contract containing the statutory employment language be of any particular type. As such, whether the contract was considered a contract of sale or for services was irrelevant.

Secondly, the Court rejected the claim that contractual language describing Exxon as an “independent contractor” required a rejection of the statutory defense. The Spears Court reasoned that nothing in La. RS 23:1061 prevents an independent contractor from entering into a written agreement whereby the principal to that contract is recognized as the statutory employer of the employees of the contractor and its subcontractors.

Finally, the Court rejected the claim the defense should be rejected because the plaintiff’s immediate employer was not a party to the contract. As discussed in Spears, the law provides that the contract establishing statutory employment can be with either the plaintiff’s immediate employer or the plaintiff’s statutory employer, and Poly America qualified as the plaintiff’s statutory employer under the “two contract” theory because the work that Poly America subcontracted to the plaintiff’s immediate employer (Poly Trucking) was included within Poly America’s “STANDARD PURCHASE ORDER” contract with Exxon.

The Spears opinion highlights that the statutory defense should be maintained, even under unusual facts, when the requirements of La. RS 23:1061 are satisfied.