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In Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC v. Capitol City Produce Company, LLC, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-examined how Louisiana courts should review general damage awards. The Court noted its decision also was intended to clarify its prior ruling in in Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., which addressed the same issue. To review our prior analysis of the Court’s holding in Pete, click here.

Traditionally, Louisiana has required a two-step analysis for appellate review of a lower court’s damage awards. First, the appellate court must determine whether the trier of fact “abused its discretion” in assessing damages. Courts generally found a damage award abused discretion if it “shocked the conscience,” a standard critics argued was too subjective. Second, and only if the award “shocked the conscience,” courts could consider prior awards to establish the highest or lowest reasonable award.

In Pete, the Court held that courts of appeal should compare verdicts to general damage awards in similar cases during the first step of analysis to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion. This approach suggested general damage awards should not be solely based on the subjective findings of the jury but should be grounded in objective comparisons to other cases. It was thought this also served the purpose of maintaining consistency and reasonableness of damage awards. The Pete decision was seen by many as an attempt to address Louisiana’s trend of rising verdicts, which critics argued were contributing to higher insurance premiums in the state.

However, in Barber Bros., the Supreme Court revisited these issues, when it examined a jury verdict that awarded the plaintiff $10.75 million in general damages, $2.5 million to his wife for loss of consortium, and $1.5 million to each of their two children. The jury found the plaintiff sustained extensive physical injuries and a traumatic brain injury, which significantly impacted his personality, lifestyle, and self-image.

Citing Pete, the Louisiana Supreme Court initially reduced the awards to $5 million for the plaintiff, $400,000 for his wife, and $100,000 for each child. However, upon rehearing, the Court reinstated the original general damages award. Citing Pete again, the court clarified how damage awards should be reviewed on appeal as follows: (1) courts should determine whether abuse of discretion occurred by examining the particular facts and circumstances of the case, to include a “consideration of prior awards in similar cases,” and (2) if abuse of discretion is found, “the court is to then also consider those prior awards to determine ‘the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.’”

The Court clarified that the consideration of prior awards should be balanced with an examination of the unique facts and circumstances of each case. Considering the facts of Barber Bros., the Court held it did not adequately account for the effects of the plaintiff’s injuries upon initial hearing. While the jury award was “on the high end of the range of reasonable awards,” the court found it was not disproportionate to prior awards and “bore a reasonable relationship” to the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the award did not “shock the conscience” and should not have been adjusted following the initial hearing.

The Barber Bros. decision may be limited to the facts presented in that case. However, the ruling appears to suggest that prior verdicts are only a factor to be weighed against a case’s facts to assess whether a trial court abused its discretion with a general damage award that “shocks the conscience.” While the court did not overturn Pete, the Barber Bros. case appears to re-open the door for damage awards to be based upon more subjective assessments of the jury and not the more objective standards the Pete decision initially appeared to create. It remains to be seen how much weight prior decisions will carry when courts address these issues moving forward.

References:

Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC v. Capitol City Produce Company, LLC, 23-788 (La. 12/19/24), 397 So. 3d 404.

Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 23-170 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So. 3d 636, reh’g denied, 23-170 (La. 12/7/23), 374 So. 3d 135.

In recent years, the dollar amount of general damage awards to personal injury plaintiffs has been on the rise. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently issued an opinion that may signal greater scrutiny for heightened general damage awards going forward. In Pete, v. Boland Marine and Manufacturing Co., the state’s highest court changed the standard of review in quantum disputes to require courts of appeal to consider general damage awards in similar cases when determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in awarding a specific general damage award.

In Pete, a 74-year old mesothelioma patient was awarded $9.8 million in general damages after it was found he was exposed to asbestos. The jury awarded $2 million for past and future physical pain and suffering, $2.3 million for past and future mental pain and suffering, $3 million for past and future disability, and $2.5 million for past and future loss of enjoyment of life. The appellate court held the defendant failed to demonstrate the general damage award “shocks the conscience,” and found the jury did not abuse its discretion.

The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the decision. In so holding, it also changed the standard by which appellate courts evaluate whether a trial court abused its discretion in awarding general damages. The Louisiana Supreme Court now instructs appellate courts to compare general damage awards to those awarded in similar cases in their review of the reasonableness of the trial court’s award. Applying the new standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the trial court abused its discretion and reduced the Pete plaintiff’s general damage award from $9.8 million to $5 million.

Previously, Louisiana courts employed a two-step analysis in evaluating general damage awards. First, the court of appeal determined whether the trial court’s award constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Second, and only if the court first determined that there was an abuse of discretion, the appellate court would consider prior damage awards in similar cases to determine what an appropriate award should have been. This test had proven problematic because there were no clear objective standards for determining whether the trial court’s award was an abuse of discretion.

The appellate court’s decision in Pete v. Boland Marine serves as an excellent example of the problems this test presented. While the majority found that the $9.8 million awarded to Pete did not “shock the conscience,” a dissenting judge believed the award did shock the conscience, because it far exceeded general damage awards in similar cases. The “shocking the conscience” test has been long criticized because of its lack of objectivity, as the result ultimately depended on the thoughts and feeling of the presiding judges. Critics argued this led to unpredictability within the law.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision reforms the two part test in an attempt to resolve this issue. The new test mandates that appellate courts consider damage awards in similar cases in the initial inquiry, to objectively consider whether the trial court abused its discretion under the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand. The second step of the test remains unchanged. If the court finds that the trial court abused its discretion, then the appellate court will look to recent cases to determine what is the highest or lowest award a reasonable trier of fact could have found and then reform the damage award accordingly.

This decision is a significant change in the law. It aims to increase predictability within the law and affords defendants objective standards by which to challenge damage awards. However, it remains to be seen how courts will implement this new test in practice.

References:

Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., LLC, 23-170 (La. 10/20/23), reh’g denied, 23-170 (La. 12/7/23), 374 So. 3d 135.