Lawsuit "Tripped Up" by Open and Obvious Defense

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently upheld as constitutional two statutes requiring the registration of sex offenders even when applied to a person who was found not guilty by reason of insanity. See State of Louisiana v. Isaiah Overstreet, Jr., 12 - 1854 (La. 3/19/13). While an ultimate resolution of this issue would cause the Court to measure the asserted personal interests of the defendant against the public's interest in safety, the defendant's challenges were rejected because he failed to properly raise and brief the constitutional issues.

In Overstreet, it was factually established that the defendant attempted to force himself upon co-eds at two universities. After his arrest, he was diagnosed as schizophrenic and consistently denied any recollection of the crimes. Overstreet was found not guilty by reason of insanity and continued in state-run mental facilities for over a decade until filing a Motion to be Released in 2010. The motion was denied as a consequence of his refusal to participate in sex offender treatment.

When he inquired about the potential release to a group home, he was advised that he would have to register as a sex offender. He then moved to declare LSA-R.S. 15:541(7) and 15:542 (the sex offender registration statutes) unconstitutional.

The Trial Court struck down the statutes as an affront to the Louisiana Constitution, giving conflicting oral and written reasons in support of the ruling. The Trial Court later explained in a per curiam opinion that the primary concern is one of capacity and that it would be unjust to require registration from one lacking capacity to do so.

At the Supreme Court, the defense attorney argued that an application of the registration statutes to Overstreet would violate due process and equal protection because he had not been convicted as a sex offender. In response, the State argued that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is not equivalent to an acquittal and that the registration statutes are not punitive but instead are designed to protect the public. The State contended that the defendant was a "sex offender" irrespective of the not guilty by reason of insanity defense.

The Louisiana Supreme Court did not address the merits of these positions. Instead, the Court held that the defendant had not sufficiently particularized the grounds for a constitutional challenge. The Court reasoned that legislation is presumed constitutional. As a result, if a party desires to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, that party must raise the unconstitutionality and specifically plead the basis of the alleged unconstitutionality.

The Overstreet Court reversed the Trial Court because it is the challenger's duty to sufficiently raise the constitutional objections. In so doing, the Court disregarded the Trial Court's sua sponte ruling ("on its own motion") that the sex offender registration statutes were unconstitutional because the Trial Court did not have the authority to raise these challenges.

While Overstreet did not resolve the ultimate issues of the constitutionality of the sex offender statutes in this setting, it did define the issues which would likely guide its decision should the issue ever be properly raised before the Court.

La Code Evid. Art. 704 addresses the use of expert testimony in Louisiana Courts and provides, “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Though the text of this article is simple, Louisiana trial courts often face questions about when an expert’s opinion crosses a line and invades the jury’s fact-finding function. These questions often arise in the context of Daubert hearings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1425.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Hulin v. Snow, where the Court was asked to review the extent to which an expert in a civil case could offer testimony that addressed the ultimate issues of law and fact in the case. The ultimate issue in the Hulin case, which involved parental care, was the alleged negligence of the defendants. The Court examined multiple tendered opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert, including expert testimony about the defendants’ negligence and credibility.

In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court ruled that it was improper for the expert to testify on the ultimate issues of whether the defendants were negligent or credible. It held that “(a)lthough experts may aid the trial court in the determinations of ultimate facts, the final conclusions drawn from those facts belong exclusively to the trier of fact.” The testimony of plaintiffs’ expert stated conclusions about these ultimate issues. Therefore, it was inadmissible.

However, the Court did allow the expert, a board-certified pediatrician, to opine on the parental care of the defendants. “Even though this testimony may embrace some of the ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, it is permissible.” It appears the Court found that this testimony did not state conclusions about ultimate issues, as the Court held that the trier of fact could accept or reject the expert’s opinions on parental care as they relate to ultimate facts.

Reference:

Hulin v. Snow, 2023-00530 (La. 6/26/23), --- So.3d ---, 2023 WL 4199310.

In Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014), the Supreme Court considered whether police officers could search the contents of a smart phone incident to an arrest. In Riley, an alleged gang member was arrested for possession of a concealed firearm. At the precinct, a police officer went through the arrestee's smart phone looking for evidence of other crimes and found a picture of the arrestee next to a car connected to a drive-by-shooting.

Before determining whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court looked to a trilogy of case.

The first two cases, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), held that searches incident to arrests are proper when necessary to protect evidence or officers.

The third, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), held that police may search a vehicle when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found, including containers located in the vehicle.

The Supreme Court determined that none of the justifications in the above cases were present in Riley. Unlike Chimel and Robinson, neither the evidence, i.e., the phone, nor the officers were in danger. While officers may examine the physical aspects of the phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon, a phone, once secured, poses no threat. Further, multiple options are available to prevent the destruction of evidence without invading the privacy of the arrestee, such as disconnecting the phone from the network or placing the phone in a "Faraday bag."

The Court also considered the prosecution's argument based upon Gant, which compared a cell phone to a physical container. In rejecting this rationale, the Court commented that classifying a smart phone as a physical container is "like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together." The Court's analysis was informed by the vast storage capacity of the modern cell phone.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that a smart phone could not be searched incident to arrest under the facts of the case. It will be interesting to observe the extent to which the Court's acknowledgment of the privacy concerns involved in smart phone technology may creep into civil discovery and evidentiary disputes.