Federal Jury Finds For Employer in ADA Case

A recent decision from the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal re-affirms the merchant liability rules. In Carolyn R. Miller and Steven Rathjen v. Willis Communications, et. al., 19-787 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/24/20), the plaintiff was an elderly patron of an AT&T store. Plaintiff and her daughter were assisted at the customer service desk, and plaintiff took a seat in a rolling chair. When she attempted to stand up, the rolling chair moved, and she fell to the floor breaking a hip.

Plaintiff filed suit under the merchant’s liability statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.6. Per the statute, if a negligence claim is brought against a merchant by a person lawfully on the merchant’s premises for injuries sustained because of a fall, then plaintiff must prove: 1) that the condition of the merchant’s premises presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable; 2) that the merchant created the risk or had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition; and 3) that the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care to address the unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiff argued that an unreasonable risk of harm was created when she was given a chair on rollers on flooring allegedly unsafe for use with a rolling chair.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court. The appellate court reversed and entered summary judgment. The appellate court found that the critical element of plaintiff’s burden of proof was missing – any defect in the rolling chair. Plaintiff admitted that the chair was not defective. Instead, she argued that she should not have been given a rolling chair to sit in because of her age, obvious mobility issues, and because the rolling chair was unsafe on the flooring of the store.

Evidence was presented that: 1) plaintiff’s daughter was able to maneuver the rolling chair without incident; 2) the daughter did not believe that plaintiff would have trouble navigating the rolling chair; and 3) no other customer had ever fallen out of one of the rolling chairs. Simply, what occurred at the AT&T store was an accident, for which AT&T and its employees were not responsible. Plaintiff, well aware of her own physical limitations, chose to sit in a rolling chair that she physically was unable to get out of on her own. Based upon this evidence, the court reasoned that plaintiff did not prove that: 1) the rolling chair posed an unreasonable risk of harm; or 2) the merchant possessed actual or constructive knowledge of any defect.

Following decisions which imposed harsh standards upon retailers, the Louisiana Legislature adopted the merchant’s liability statute to limit recovery to cases involving true negligence. The Carolyn R. Miller decision demonstrates that the statute is properly used in motion practice to resolve cases where the merchant lacks advance knowledge of the claimed unreasonable risk. Sometimes, an accident is just an accident.

Virginia “Jenny” McLin is a partner at Keogh Cox who practices in the fields of corporate litigation, insurance defense and workers compensation defense. When she is not practicing law, Jenny can be found volunteering with the Junior League of Baton Rouge; cheering for the LSU Tigers with her husband Ryan; or shuffling her two kids to and from dance practice.

In a previous blog, we outlined developing law in the Louisiana appeals courts, and federal district courts in Louisiana on the issue of whether a claimant may maintain a separate cause of action against an employer for independent negligence when it is stipulated that the employee was in the course and scope of employment.¹ Most courts held a claimant could not maintain a separate action against the employer under these circumstances, reasoning that the employee’s fault would impute to the employer, and therefore, additional inquiry was not appropriate. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue and stated:

“(A) plaintiff may pursue both a negligence cause of action against an employee for which the employer is vicariously liable and a direct claim against the employer for its own negligence in hiring, supervision, training, and retention as well as a negligent entrustment claim, when the employer stipulates that the employee was in the course and scope of employment at the time of the injury.” (Emphasis added) See Martin v. Thomas et al., 21-1490 (La. 12/21/21), 328 So. 3d 1164.

This holding notably overturned the 1^st Circuit Court of Appeal ruling in Elee v. White, - - So.3d - - (La. App. 1 Cir 7/24/20), 2020 WL 4251974 and other Louisiana 5^th Circuit Court of Appeals decisions. The Supreme Court in Martin reasoned that “the initial assessment of fault required by the law is not bypassed due to the employer-employee relationship” and “shielding a potential tortfeasor from liability is not compatible with a comparative negligence regime.” The Court further stated that the possibility that both the employee and employer may be at fault is not “subsumed” by the employer’s admission on course and scope. In fact, if the fault of the employee is shown, then the issue of whether there is also fault on the part of the employer remains and must be decided by the evidence on a case-by-case basis.

The consequences of this decision remain to be seen, but it is expected that claimants may also pursue employers separately on theories such as negligent hiring, supervision, and entrustment. The scope of such discovery will remain within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

By: John P. Wolff, III and Richard W. Wolff

¹Louisiana Appeal Courts Prohibit Direct Negligence Claims Against Employer; US District Court Uses Rule to Limit Discovery - Keogh Cox

The country was recently captivated by the Johnny Depp and Amber Heard trial, arguably the most high-profile defamation case in recent history. Following a colorful trial, a Virginia jury found that a 2018 Washington Post op-ed by Heard defamed Depp. As a result, Depp was awarded $10 million in compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages. At the same time, the jury awarded Heard $2 million dollars in compensatory damages for defamatory statements made by one of Depp’s attorneys, ostensibly on Depp’s behalf. The trial had millions of people asking a number of different questions, including the basic question “What is defamation?” Recent Louisiana cases such as Yanong v. Coleman, 53-933 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/21), 317 So. 3d 905, 911, reh’g denied (June 24, 2021), writ denied, 21-01107 (La. 11/10/21), 326 So. 3d 1249 help to provide an answer.

As explained in Yanong, a party claiming defamation in Louisiana must prove four elements:

(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;

(2) an unprivileged publication to a third party;

(3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and

(4) resulting injuries.

**To prove the third element of “fault,” malice must be shown.

The Yanong court explained that claims of defamation must be balanced against the right to free speech found in the state and federal Constitutions.

Louisiana recognizes two categories of defamatory words: (1) words that are defamatory per se and (2) words that are defamatory in meaning. Id. at 9. Words that are defamatory per se “expressly or implicitly accuse another of criminal conduct, or which by their very nature tend to injure one’s personal or professional reputation, without considering extrinsic facts or circumstances.” Id. When words are deemed defamatory per se, there is a presumption of fault on the part of the defendant that may be rebutted by showing that the statement was true or protected by a privilege such as fair commentary on a matter of public concern. Id. Words that are defamatory in meaning are words that, when taken in context, “a listener could have reasonably understood the communication to have been intended in a defamatory sense.” Id. at 9-10. Proof of words that are defamatory in meaning creates no presumption of fault.

Louisiana defamation suits frequently arise in the employment context. However, defamation claims in the employment context face obstacles. Such cases sometimes fail on the second element, publication to a third party, because “inter-corporate communications…[are] merely a communication of the corporation itself,” meaning an employer may need to communicate the alleged defamatory statement to an outside third party outside for it to be considered “published to a third party.” Cook v. Par. Of Jefferson, 2022 WL 19350, at *11 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2022). However, defamation claims do not always fail on the publication element and they are not limited to “A-list” celebrities or multi-million dollar cases.

In Yanong, the Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed a $15,000 compensatory damage award to a plaintiff who successfully proved that statements made by defendants on a podcast show and on Facebook were defamation per se. Yanong, p. 8. Under the facts of the case, the defendants on a live “podcast” expressed on multiple occasions their belief that the plaintiff was a victim of sex-trafficking and that she was purchased by her much-older husband. Id. at 1. The defendant(s) also labeled the plaintiff’s marriage as “legalized prostitution,” and stated that they had contacted foreign authorities to inform them the plaintiff was a victim of “trafficking.” Id. at 2. The statements continued onto social media, where one defendant insinuated the plaintiff’s husband purchased her from a catalogue or an internet matchmaking site. Id.

On appeal, the defendants argued the plaintiff did not prove the publication element of her case. Id. at 5. The appellate court found this contention meritless. The defendants “were fully aware they were engaging” in communications with third parties, they were recoding a podcast, were “shown onscreen on all the broadcasts,” and made comments that showed “they were aware that they had an audience and third parties were engaged in the interactive broadcast.” Id. at 17-19. Thus, the Second Circuit found Plaintiff met her burden on the publication element and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at. 20.

While the publication element can present a hurdle in some cases, the publication need not be in a national media source as featured in the Depp-Heard case. The Yanong decision reminds that statements made on social media and podcasts can meet the required standard.

A Decade Old Article Finds New Life: Televised Testimony - Keogh Cox.