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Case on a Wire - Last Minute Fax Filing

Published on: March 13, 2013

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that a request for service of process made by facsimile filing within ninety days from the filing of the petition, but not perfected until after the ninety days has passed, is a timely request for service of process under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1201. See Brenda Morales and Jerson Rodriguez v. State of Louisiana Through the Board of Supervisors of LSU Through Earl K. Long Medical Center, 12-2301 (La. 1/11/13), --So.3d---.

In reaching its decision, the Morales court addressed whether Louisiana's Facsimile Filing Statute, LSA- R.S. 13:850, required both the payment of fees and the receipt of the original request for service before service is considered to have been requested. Under Louisiana procedure, the petitioner has 90 days to request service upon all defendants. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1201. When service is not timely requested, the case can be involuntarily dismissed without prejudice on the motion of another party. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1672(C). This dismissal can result in a later bar to the claim if the re-filed suit is then prescribed and the defendants can show bad faith in the failure to request service or the suit involves a claim against the state or a political subdivision of the state.

In Morales, the Louisiana First Circuit had found that the request for service was not timely because the fax filing fees were not paid by the attorney until after the ninetieth day. The First Circuit relied on the Louisiana Supreme Court's previous ruling in Trachant v. State of Louisiana, Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, 08-0978 (La. 1/21/09), 5 So.3d 832 which stated that "[a] valid request for service under La. R.S. 13:6107(D)(1) is made when the clerk receives the request for service and can then act on it." The First Circuit reasoned that a clerk cannot act upon a request for service when there is no original request and the corresponding fees had not been paid. However, Trachant did not involve fax filing and instead considered whether a request for service is effective when it is placed in the mailbox or when it is received by the clerk. This is sometimes referred to as the "mailbox rule." The Trachant court held that actual receipt of the request was required.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Morales disagreed with the First Circuit and found that the clerk can "act upon" receipt of the facsimile filing. The Court emphasized that LSA- R.S. 13:850(A) provides that a facsimile filing "shall be deemed complete at the time that the facsimile transmission is received and a receipt of transmission has been transmitted to the sender by the clerk of court." The Morales Court harmonized its ruling with Trachant by finding that the Court has always held that the receipt of the request must occur within the 90 day period.

Even after Morales, a request for service of process should be followed by the prompt mailing of the original signed document and the required transmission fee. However, Morales indicates that Louisiana's highest court is likely to give consideration to preserving a claim when interpreting the otherwise strict requirements of Louisiana's Facsimile Filing Statute.

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Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

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Sudden Shifts - Burden Shifting under Louisiana Law

Winning or losing in court often comes down to who possesses the burden of proof. Like a driver at a four-way stop, a litigant has to know when it is their turn.

Civil Procedure Article 966, the "Summary Judgment Article," provides that the mover bears the burden of proof. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this burden in Dan Veuleman & Jody Veuleman v. Mustang Homes, LLC, 2013-C-190 (La. 4/5/13), - So. 3d - in the context of insurance coverage.

The general rule in Louisiana is that an insurer bears the burden of proving that a loss falls within a policy exclusion. In Veuleman, the insurer argued that the loss was excluded through a "work product" exclusion. However, the "work product" exclusion contained a "subcontractor" exception. The plaintiffs argued that the work was performed by a subcontractor and should for that reason be covered under the policy.

At the hearing, the insurer introduced its policy as evidence of the exclusion. However, it offered no evidence to show who performed the work at issue. The plaintiffs attempted to introduce an affidavit to establish that the work was performed by a subcontractor. The court of appeal rejected the affidavit as insufficient and concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish that their claims were spared from the work product exclusion.

The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed. It stressed that the insurer, not the plaintiff, possessed the burden of proving that the policy exclusion applied. The Court stated that "[t]he insurer offered no proof to accomplish its burden." Id. at 1.　

The Veuleman Court held that the appellate court "erroneously shifted the burden of proof on the motion for summary judgment" to the plaintiffs and that the insurer had the burden to show that "the exception [to the exclusion] is not met." In keeping, the Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The Veuleman decision reminds that a litigant should be aware when it is their turn to go.

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Louisiana Supreme Court Clarifies “Reasonably Anticipated Use” in Product Liability Claim

Plaintiff Brady Hardisty and a coworker attempted to use chains attached to a tractor to pull a Caterpillar bulldozer from the mud. A chain snapped and struck plaintiff in the head and face. Hardisty sued Caterpillar under allegations that its product was unreasonably dangerous. Caterpillar filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing Hardisty was not engaged in a “reasonably anticipated use” of its product. Both the trial court and the appellate court identified “material issues of fact” in denying Caterpillar’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, and entered summary judgment for Caterpillar.^

Caterpillar cited its Operation Manual that warned against the use of chains and gave a safer alternative. Hardisty asserted that material issues of fact existed as to whether Caterpillar “knew or should have known” that users were not following product warnings. Hardisty offered opinions from its expert witness that: (1) Caterpillar knew of the danger because it warned against the use of chains and (2) experience showed that the use of chains was a common practice in the industry.

The Hardisty court reasoned that the expert’s own “experience” was insufficient to refute Caterpillar’s evidence that it received no report of prior similar accidents. However, the Court cited to earlier case law for the proposition that even actual knowledge would not defeat the motion, stating:

The jurisprudence has recognized that knowledge of the potential and actual intentional abuse of a product does not create a question of fact on the question of reasonably anticipated use when the manufacturer expressly warned against the danger of such misuse.

In a recent case handled by Keogh Cox, the federal Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants, citing Hardisty for the proposition that a manufacturer may reasonably expect that its users will follow “clear and direct” product warnings. See Friels v. Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al.

References:

^Hardisty v. Walker, 25-00239 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So,3d 774.

Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al., No. 24-30688, 8/15/25. Opinion not designated for publication. 5^th Cir. R. 47.5.