When Filing A Lawsuit By Fax, FedEx Is Your Friend

The United States Supreme Court recently granted writs in a case that could affect the minimum contacts test used to find jurisdiction were a similar case brought in Louisiana. See Walden v. Fiore, 688 F. 3d 558 (2011). In Walden, the United States Supreme Court will decide whether to uphold the Ninth Circuit's ruling that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose primary contact with the forum state was his knowledge that the plaintiffs had connections to that state.

In Walden, airline passengers sued a DEA agent who allegedly violated their Fourth Amendment rights in seizing $97,000.00 in cash. At least some of the cash was won on a gambling trip to San Juan, Puerto Rico. The plaintiffs boarded the plane in San Juan with a planned stop in Atlanta in route to Las Vegas.

Once in Atlanta, a drug-detection dog "alerted" to one of the plaintiff's bags. The bags were searched and the $97,000.00 was seized under suspicion of a connection to drug activity. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were allowed to board their flight to Las Vegas and were promised return of the cash if they could establish its legitimacy.

It was alleged that one of the officers prepared and/or helped to prepare an allegedly false probable cause affidavit to facilitate the forfeiture of the cash to the government. Ultimately, the cash was returned.

The suit was filed in Nevada and was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. In refusing jurisdiction, the District Court cited to the fact that the agent's conduct was "expressly aimed" at Georgia.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, using a three-part test derived from Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802(9th Cir. 2004), held that the allegations were sufficient to satisfy the "forum-related conduct" prong of the test for specific jurisdiction. Therefore, Nevada jurisdiction was reasonable.

The Ninth Circuit agreed that the officer's seizure of the cash was "expressly aimed" at Georgia and did not support jurisdiction. However, the Ninth Circuit believed that the false probable cause affidavit aspect of the case supported jurisdiction in Nevada.

The Court reasoned that the officer was aware of the plaintiffs' significant connections with Nevada because: the plaintiffs had told the officer that they were going to Las Vegas; some of the funds originated from Las Vegas; and, background checks were run on the plaintiffs after they returned to Nevada. Under these facts, the Court concluded that the officer expressly aimed his conduct at Nevada when he prepared the affidavit and thus subjected himself to the jurisdiction of a Nevada Court.

The facts of Fiore set the stage for an important jurisdictional ruling.

Plaintiff Brady Hardisty and a coworker attempted to use chains attached to a tractor to pull a Caterpillar bulldozer from the mud. A chain snapped and struck plaintiff in the head and face. Hardisty sued Caterpillar under allegations that its product was unreasonably dangerous. Caterpillar filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing Hardisty was not engaged in a “reasonably anticipated use” of its product. Both the trial court and the appellate court identified “material issues of fact” in denying Caterpillar’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, and entered summary judgment for Caterpillar.^

Caterpillar cited its Operation Manual that warned against the use of chains and gave a safer alternative. Hardisty asserted that material issues of fact existed as to whether Caterpillar “knew or should have known” that users were not following product warnings. Hardisty offered opinions from its expert witness that: (1) Caterpillar knew of the danger because it warned against the use of chains and (2) experience showed that the use of chains was a common practice in the industry.

The Hardisty court reasoned that the expert’s own “experience” was insufficient to refute Caterpillar’s evidence that it received no report of prior similar accidents. However, the Court cited to earlier case law for the proposition that even actual knowledge would not defeat the motion, stating:

The jurisprudence has recognized that knowledge of the potential and actual intentional abuse of a product does not create a question of fact on the question of reasonably anticipated use when the manufacturer expressly warned against the danger of such misuse.

In a recent case handled by Keogh Cox, the federal Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants, citing Hardisty for the proposition that a manufacturer may reasonably expect that its users will follow “clear and direct” product warnings. See Friels v. Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al.

References:

^Hardisty v. Walker, 25-00239 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So,3d 774.

Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al., No. 24-30688, 8/15/25. Opinion not designated for publication. 5^th Cir. R. 47.5.

The liability of a premises owner for third-party criminal acts has been the subject of many decisions issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court. But recently, the Court clarified how to analyze this issue in the context of summary judgment. In Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc. (Windsor Court), the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and held that Windsor Court was not liable for a robbery that occurred in its courtyard.

The factual background is simple: Campbell was a frequent guest at the Windsor Court. He decided to approach a vehicle near the entrance to the courtyard when he pulled a “substantial amount of cash” to show the female occupants in the vehicle. He placed the money back in his pocket and talked with them for one minute and forty-six seconds. When he pulled the cash from his pocket a second time, one of the occupants grabbed the cash and the vehicle sped away dragging him with it. Campbell then sued the Windsor Court alleging negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, failure to ensure the safety of its guests, etc.

The importance of this decision is found in how the Court analyzed the case to reach its conclusion that summary judgment was proper: The Court noted that it was not modifying prior duty/risk analysis but was clarifying how the analysis is to be conducted—The issues of “duty” and “scope of duty” are separate inquiries that require separate analysis.

In Campbell, the Court acknowledged that “duty” is a question of law for the court. It then concluded that “(w)hether a particular risk falls within the scope of that duty, by contrast, ‘is fact sensitive and ultimately turns on a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of that duty.’” However, the court continued, “‘(t)he determination of legal cause/scope of the duty involves a purely legal question.’” The Court conducted an historical analysis noting that prior decisions had “merged the concept of duty and scope of duty into a single consideration.”

On the threshold question of duty, the Court acknowledged that in the context of third-party criminal activity, Windsor Court, as an innkeeper, owed a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its patrons from criminal acts of third parties. Having found this duty, the Court then concluded that “Campbell cannot meet the ‘scope of the duty’ element of his claim.” In other words, “the scope of the duty owed by the Windsor Court did not encompass the risk of the particular harm and Injury Mr. Campbell suffered.”

Here the court asked whether this particular risk and injury were “foreseeable.” The Court examined multiple factors to find that the robbery was not foreseeable, but the Court further noted “perhaps even more important to our decision is the manner in which the robbery occurred.” Campbell was not unexpectedly accosted, but his own actions placed him in peril. As such, the Court found no “ease of association” between Windsor Court’s duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its guests and the risk that the guest would voluntarily approach an unknown vehicle and flash a sizable pile of cash.

Justice Crain concurred in the opinion and noted that “scope of duty can be resolved on summary judgment if reasonable persons could not disagree that the manner of the injury is either within or beyond the scope of the duty.” Justice Crain also noted that the manner of injury must be analyzed in the context of “foreseeability” from the perspective of the premises owner and have an “ease of association” between the duty and the manner of injury—this analysis is necessary to “avoid making a defendant the insurer of all persons against all harms.” Thus, he agreed with the majority that Campbell was unable to establish the scope of duty element.

Reference:

Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc., 2024-00840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So. 3d 573.