Louisiana Appeal Court Finds Nonparty “Nonresident” Industrial Site Owner Is Subject to Louisiana’s Subpoena Power

Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

"An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration."

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

• After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
• The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
• The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
• After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
• The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
• Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
• The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont'l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.

Picture it – you purchase a new home in a quiet, family-friendly neighborhood. On your first night, you notice that the neighbors are having a party – a big loud party. Your haven of peace and tranquility is interrupted by thumping bass and the shrieks of people jumping into a pool. The next day, the neighbors are gone, and the block is quiet again. However, the party returns the next weekend, bigger and louder than before. You do some research and find the house is listed on a popular website for short term rentals. What do you do?

This is the exact question that was posed to the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Marina Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Cahill. In that case, the Marina Homeowner’s Association filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment against the owner of the house on the basis that the use of the home as a short-term rental violated the covenants of the homeowner’s association. In response, the property owners argued that the covenants had expired and were no longer applicable. Therefore, they claimed they were free to use their property as they saw fit.

Many homeowners in Louisiana are familiar with building restrictions. Authority for the issuance of building restrictions is found in Louisiana Civil Code article 775. A building restriction is a real right under Louisiana Civil Code article 777. However, Louisiana Civil Code article 778 provides that if there is doubt as to the existence, validity, or extent of building restrictions, the issue should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immovable. These articles also provide a subsequent purchaser of the immovable property is also bound by the building restrictions if they are recorded in the public records.

The building restrictions for the subdivision at issue provided that the restrictions had a term of twenty years and then would renew automatically in ten-year periods. These restrictions bound the original property owners and all subsequent property owners. The court found that even though the original twenty-year term for the building restrictions had expired, the restrictions would automatically renew unless amended by the Association. Therefore, the property owner’s house was subject to the building restrictions.

Importantly for this case, the building restrictions specifically prohibited the use of the property for any reasons other than residential purposes. Therefore, the operation of a short-term rental was a violation of the building restrictions.

The Homeowners Association prevailed in this case – the property owners were no longer able to use their property for short term rentals. As the moral of the story – to be a good neighbor – it helps to follow the rules. And it is always important to check the fine print to know what those rules are!

References:

Marina Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Cahill, 56,423 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 420 So. 3d 782.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that failure to pay filing fees necessary to add a defendant does not invalidate the proceeding as to other defendants. Prior to the ruling, Louisiana courts held that a failure to pay for one defendant invalidated the entire proceeding.

In Kirt v. Metzinger 2019-C-1162 (La. 04/03/20), plaintiffs requested a medical review panel after the death of their mother due to complications after surgery. Plaintiffs named three defendants—two doctors and the hospital. A letter from the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board (PCF) was mailed to the plaintiffs, confirming that the defendants were qualified under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, and informing the plaintiffs that they were required by La. R.S. 40:1231.8 to pay a filing fee of $100 per named defendant within forty-five days of the mailing of the letter. Plaintiffs responded, requesting to add two additional defendants to the panel, one of whom was an unidentifiable nurse. Plaintiffs also included payment of $500.

The PCF responded that it was unable to add the nurse without proper identification. Three weeks later, plaintiffs notified the PCF they were also unable to identify the nurse. Upon request, Parish Anesthesia was added to the panel instead. Nearly five months later, plaintiffs provided the PCF with the identity of the nurse in question and requested she be added. The PCF sent confirmed the addition and requested another $100 filing fee which was never paid. Nevertheless, the medical review panel thereafter determined that none of the defendants, including the nurse, breached their standard of care. Suit followed against all defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the failure to pay the additional filing fee invalidated the proceeding as to all defendants. The trial court granted this motion, and the appellate court affirmed. Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that the failure to pay the additional $100 filing fee did not invalidate the entire proceeding. The court observed that separate confirmation letters sent by the PCF provided a different forty-five day period during which to pay the filing fee tied to each individual defendant.

The Kirt court stated: “[t]he notion of ‘one filing fee’ for every panel proceeding cannot be reconciled with the different payment deadlines that arise when the PCF sends separate letters confirming defendants’ qualified status. A single filing fee cannot be subject to different payment deadlines.” The court dismissed only the nurse and remanded the remainder of case to the lower courts.

Chad A. Sullivan is a partner with Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd. Prior to becoming an attorney, he worked as a licensed Registered Nurse. He utilizes his background in nursing on a daily basis in his law practice that primarily focuses on automobile liability, medical malpractice, nursing home litigation, healthcare professional licensure and discipline, and products liability.