Insight

Keogh Cox's Win Prevents Plaintiff from Recovering Louisiana Lottery Jackpot

Published on: February 28, 2014

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana grants defendant, Circle K's, Motion to Dismiss concluding that plaintiff has no right to claim loss of opportunity to win the Louisiana Lottery Powerball jackpot, $103,100,000.00, because of an expired ticket issued in error.

This matter arose from plaintiff's purchase of two sets of Powerball tickets on or about January 19, 2012. The drawing that was the subject of the purchase was to be held on January 21, 2012 with a jackpot of $103,100,000.00. Sometime after the drawing date, plaintiff discovered the purchased tickets were printed on January 18, 2012 and worthless for the January 21, 2012 drawing. Plaintiff filed suit seeking damages in the amount of the Powerball jackpot.

After removal to Federal Court, on behalf of Circle K, Keogh Cox moved to dismiss the suit by claiming that Louisiana law affords no relief to plaintiff for the alleged claims. Specifically, Louisiana law explicitly precludes any relief to the plaintiff.

Keogh Cox cited La. R.S. 47:9009 which states "that there shall be no liability on the part of and no cause of action shall arise against the corporation, its governing board, staff, agents, vendors, or employees, arising out of or in connection with the issuance, failure to issue, or delivery of a lottery ticket."

Moreover, Keogh Cox asserted that the Louisiana Statute precludes payment of prize money on the basis of lottery tickets produced or issued in error. The United States District Court found merit in these assertions after extensive briefing and arguments by Keogh Cox attorneys, John P. Wolff, III, Nancy B. Gilbert, Richard W. Wolff and Mark Assad.

The United States District Court found that Circle K was statutorily exempt from the suit and, under the directives of the lottery itself, it is the sole responsibility of plaintiff to verify the accuracy of the game play. Plaintiff failed to do so and, as such, was barred from suit.

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Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

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Claims for Indemnity and Defense Brought Prior to a Liability Determination Are No Longer Premature

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that a claim for defense and indemnity may be asserted before a judicial finding of liability. The Court’s decision overruled prior decisions that held claims for defense and indemnity were premature until it was determined that damages were actually owed and the party claiming indemnity sustained a loss.

In Daniel Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, the plaintiff alleged he was injured when he drove over a downed power line that belonged to Cox Communications. Evidence showed Cox Communications contracted with Cable Man to provide services, maintenance, and repair for its telecommunication companies. The contract covered maintenance and repair of the subject phone line.

The contract included an indemnification provision that required Cable Man to indemnify and defend Cox Communications from any and all claims relating to Cable Man’s work, Pursuant to the contract, Cox Communications sent Cable Man a request to tender defense and indemnification under the contract. Cable Man refused the tender and Cox Communications filed a cross-claim against Cable Man asserting that it was owed defense and indemnification. In response, Cable Man filed an Exception of Prematurity and maintained that the claim for indemnity had not accrued because there had not been a judgment or a finding a Cable Man’s fault or liability.

The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Exception of Prematurity and stated that “It is well-established that claims for indemnity, as well as claims for defense arising under an indemnity agreement, are premature prior to a determination that damages are actually owed and the indemnitee sustains a loss.” The court reasoned that the lawsuit was still pending against both parties and no liability determination had been made. Therefore, under the “well-established” law, Cable Man owed no obligation to Cox Communications for indemnity and costs at the time Cox asserted its cross-claim.

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit’s decision and Cable Man’s claims of prematurity were denied. Acknowledging such claims for indemnification previously were considered premature, the Court held the law moving forward should allow for a claim for indemnity, whether in a third-party demand or a cross-claim, that is raised during the course of litigation and before a finding of liability. Further, the Court recognized potential inconsistencies with prior judicial determinations and stated, “in light of our ruling today, to the extent any prior jurisprudence can be interpreted otherwise, we now clarify that such a claim for indemnity is not prohibited before a liability adjudication.”

This ruling makes clear that “asserting a claim for indemnity, arising out of the same facts and circumstances, is not premature before a judicial finding of liability.” The right to collect on an indemnity agreement continues to be determined upon a finding of liability or loss, but a claim for indemnity can now be asserted in the same proceeding.

References:

Daniel Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, et al, 2023-CC-01358 (La. 5/10/24); 386 So.3d 270.

Insight

Supreme Court Clarifies Requirements of Unjust Enrichment Claim

Under Louisiana law, unjust enrichment is a cause of action that is based in equity and provides that no one should be enriched at the expense of another. The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) no other available remedy at law. The Supreme Court recently addressed the fourth element regarding the absence of justification for the enrichment.

In H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, a grass cutting contractor entered into a contract with the Parish for grass cutting in certain areas. The Parish separately contracted with a second contractor for weed control of the same areas. During the contract period, the grass cutting contractor notified the Parish that there was unanticipated weed growth and suggested that the weed control contractor was not properly applying the herbicide. The grass cutting contractor alleged that its work became more expensive because of the weed control contractor’s failure to perform its contractual obligation.

The grass cutting contractor sued the Parish alleging unjust enrichment. The Parish filed an exception of no cause of action, claiming that there was no claim for unjust enrichment because a contract existed between the parties. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that the contractor could bring a claim for unjust enrichment because there was no contractual claim between the contractor and the Parish, as both parties fulfilled their contract obligations.

The Supreme Court reversed, noting that a claim for unjust enrichment requires a showing that there was an “absence of justification or cause for the enrichment.” The Supreme Court held that when a contract exists between the parties, it serves as the law between them, and that contract is the legal cause or justification for the enrichment. Therefore, the contract between the contractor and the Parish was in fact the justification for the enrichment such that it could not be “unjust.” The Supreme Court dismissed the contractor’s suit against the Parish.

Reference:

H&O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson, 24-554 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), writ granted, decision rev'd sub nom. H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, 2025-00086 (La. 5/20/25), 408 So.3d 958.

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La. Supreme Court Rules 10-year Contract Prescription Applies to 1st Party Claims Against Insurer

In a first-party action obtained by assignment for excess liability against an insurer, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Smith v. Citadel Insurance,19-00052 (La. 10/22/19) ruled that the claim against the carrier is subject to the 10-year contract prescription period under La. law, stating:

“For the above reasons, we hold an insurer’s duty of good faith owed to its insured under La. R.S. 22:1973 does not exist separate and apart from an insurer’s contractual obligations. The duty of good faith is codified in La. R.S. 22:1973, but this duty is an outgrowth of the contractual and fiduciary relationship between the insured and the insurer, and the duty of good faith and fair dealing emanates from the contract between the parties. Thus, first-party bad faith claims against an insurer are governed by the ten-year prescriptive period set forth in La. C.C. art. 3499. Consequently, Ms. Smith’s first-party bad faith claim against GoAuto, brought pursuant to an assignment of rights from the insured, was subject to a 10-year prescriptive period and is not prescribed.”

The concurring justice noted that it was not necessary to engage in the protracted discussion concerning the duties of insurers relative to first-party claims. Nevertheless, the court offered an in-depth discussion of these duties.

John P. Wolff III

Senior Partner
Contracts
Federal Courts