Category: Workers’ Compensation

Louisiana Appellate Court Examines How Accidents are Defined under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law

Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

“An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.”

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

  • After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
  • The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
  • The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
  • After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
  • The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
  • Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
  • The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont’l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.

Judicial Interest Rate for Louisiana Hits a 17-Year High

The Judicial Interest Rate for 2024 in the State of Louisiana has been set at 8.75%. This is the highest the rate has been since 2007.

Generally, judicial interest is interest payable on a judgment that has not been satisfied. Depending on the underlying basis for the judgment, the date that the interest begins to accrue can be before the judgment is rendered. For example, La. R.S. 13:4203 provides, “Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.”

In Workers Compensation matters, La. R.S. 23:1201.3 states, “Any compensation awarded and all payments thereof directed to be made by order of the workers’ compensation judge shall bear judicial interest from the date compensation was due until the date of satisfaction. The interest rate shall be fixed at the rate in effect on the date the claim for benefits was filed with the office of workers’ compensation administration.”

La. R. S. 13:4202 sets forth the method for the annual calculation of judicial interest in Louisiana:  “The commissioner of financial institutions shall ascertain, on the first business day of October of each year, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approved ‘discount rate’ published daily in the Wall Street Journal. The effective judicial interest rate for the calendar year following the calculation date shall be three and one-quarter percentage points above the discount rate as ascertained by the commissioner.” In consideration of these factors set by statute, the Judicial Interest Rate for 2024 will be set at 8.75%.

For context, the historic rates for the last 20 years are:

2023-  6.50%

2022-  3.50%

2021-  3.50%

2020-  5.75%

2019-  6.00%

2018-  5.00%

2017-  4.25%

2016-  4.00%

2015-  4.00%

2014-  4.00%

2013-  4.00%

2012-  4.00%

2011-  4.00%

2010-  3.75%

2009-  5.50%

2008-  8.50%

2007-  9.50%

2006-  8.00%

2005-  6.00%

2004-  5.25%

Employer Finds Safe Harbor for Mailing Benefits Timely

When an employee is injured on the job and the employee’s request for workers’ compensation benefits is disputed, La. R.S. 23:1201.1 allows an employer to request a preliminary determination hearing (“PDH”) with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”). If the workers’ compensation judge rules at the PDH that benefits are owed, the employer has ten days to comply with the judge’s ruling. The First Circuit recently ruled that an employer can find “safe harbor” if it technically complies with the rigorous deadlines of the statute, which if missed can have profound consequences, subjecting the employer to penalties and attorney fees.

In Kilbourne v. Dixon Correctional Institute, the court recently affirmed a ruling that found an employer complied with La. R.S. 23:1201.1 and could not be subject to penalties or attorney’s fees when it mailed the disputed workers compensation benefits within ten days of the judge’s ruling at the PDH. The ruling was affirmed even though the employee did not receive payment within ten days of the hearing.

The employer in Kilbourne stopped issuing weekly workers compensation benefits after two doctors found the claimant’s ongoing complaints were unrelated to the work accident and the claimant could return to full duty work. The employee then filed a disputed claim with the OWC and requested reinstatement of his benefits. He also requested an award of penalties and attorney’s fees because he claimed the employer’s suspension of indemnity benefits was arbitrary and capricious. The employer requested a PDH to address these issues.

The OWC judge issued a preliminary determination that although the employee was owed supplemental benefits from the date his payments of benefits stopped, the employer was not arbitrary and capricious in its decision to stop payment. Within ten days of the mailing of the PDH ruling, the employer issued and mailed benefit checks to the employee and filed a form with the OWC to provide notice the employer was paying the benefits. Nevertheless, the employee disagreed with the PDH ruling and the matter went to trial.

At trial, the employee argued that he should have received penalties, attorney fees, and interest on the back benefits paid after the PDH ruling. The employee argued the employer failed to comply with section 1201.1 because he did not receive the indemnity benefits until more than ten days after the PDH ruling. However, evidence showed the benefit payments were postmarked and mailed within ten days of the receipt of PDH ruling.

Accordingly, the trial court found that the employer was immune from an award of penalties and attorney fees pursuant to the “safe harbor” provision of section 1201.1. Interest also could not be owed on back pay when the employer complied with the statute. The First Circuit affirmed this decision on appeal. Although providing the claimant funds within 10 days of the PDH ruling remains the best practice for an employer, this ruling informs employers that they should find safe harbor from what could be significant penalties and attorney’s fees if they meet the technical requirements of the statute and mail their compliance with the judge’s ruling within ten days of the PDH.

Case Reference: Kilbourne v. Dixon Correctional Institute, 2022-0455,(La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22) ____So. 3d ___,2022 WL 16706951.

Workers’ Comp: “Failure to Answer” Results in Forfeiture of Benefits

A worker’s benefits may be forfeited if the employee is untruthful on a medical questionnaire (if the misrepresentations directly relate to the alleged injury) or prejudices the employer’s ability to recovery from the “Louisiana Second Injury Fund.” La. R.S. 23:1208.1 Some Louisiana courts have shown reluctance to deny workers’ compensation benefits based on the employee’s alleged failure to truthfully answer a medical history questionnaire. However, the court in Spillman v. Career Adventures, Inc., — So.3d —- 2021 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/11/21), 2021 WL 3523959, held that benefits were forfeited because the claimant provided false responses to several medical history questions and failed to answer a number of specific questions on a post-hire medical history questionnaire provided by his employer.

At trial, it was established that Spillman had pre-incident medical conditions to include:  1) injuries related to a 2007 work-related accident; 2) regional sympathetic dystrophy of the left foot; 3) COPD; 4) chronic pain from a gunshot wound in his left leg; 5) surgery to the AC joint of his right shoulder; 6) injuries from a 2018 motor vehicle accident to the right shoulder and right knee; 7) anxiety; 8) bipolar disorder; and 9) many other ailments.

Like many other employers, Spillman’s employer Career Adventures included with its employment packet a “Office of Workers’ Compensation Second Injury Board Questionnaire.”  Spillman failed to truthfully complete this questionnaire and checked “no” to specific questions which asked if he had experienced many of his known conditions such as COPD and bipolar disorder. Although Spillman took the time to respond to numerous “fill in the blank” questions, he purposefully skipped at least 10 inquiries.

Eleven months after hire, Spillman alleged he was injured at work while performing his duties as a welder.  At trial, Spillman’s family physician identified a torn tendon in the left elbow as a work-related injury. He further  testified that the tendon injury limited his activities and merged with his pre-existing injuries to create a greater total disability. The workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) ruled that Spillman violated La. 23:1208.1 by failing to truthfully answer certain questions. The Second Circuit “went further” in affirming the workers’ compensation judge, stating:

“We go further than the WCJ. All information which would have been disclosed had Mr. Spillman truthfully answered each and every question on the preemployment questionnaire must be considered …”

Therefore, the appellate court in Spillman found that both false answers and a failure to answer certain questions can qualify as a willful misrepresentation sufficient to cause a forfeiture of benefits under La. R.S. 23:1208.1 under certain circumstances.  

Simmons: No Bright-Line Rule as to Future Medical Specials?

The difference between the amount charged and the amount paid for medical treatment can be substantial.  Knowing the dollar amount of the medical specials that a plaintiff will be allowed to seek at trial is often critical in case evaluation and resolution.  In this context, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided a “bright-line” rule in Bozeman v. State, 03-1016 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So. 2d 692, that a plaintiff can only seek the amount actually paid for medical treatment, when it is funded by Medicaid. Our state’s highest court then added, in Simmons v. Cornerstone Investments, LLC, 18-0735 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So.3d 199, that only the amount actually paid for medical specials may be sought, when it is funded by workers’ compensation insurance. The “written off” amount is considered a “phantom charge” that the plaintiff will never pay.  Some questions remain as to how courts will apply the holding and analysis of Simmons.

The rationale behind Simmons is that any discount in the amount of medical expenses given to the workers’ compensation carrier does not constitute a “collateral source” because the plaintiff did not give anything in exchange for the discount.  Roughly six months after Simmons, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of the plaintiff’s total past medical expenses.  Love v. Nelson, 2020-1050 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/13/21), 2021 WL 118936, *1.  Relying solely upon Simmons, the appellate court stated, “[T]he amount of medical expenses charged above the amount actually incurred is not a collateral source … .  Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion, and the motion in limine is granted and evidence of medical expenses not actually owed and paid by or on behalf of plaintiff … is excluded from evidence at the trial.”  Id

Federal courts, relying upon Simmons, have held that the collateral source rule does not apply to third-party-funded past medical expenses.  See Collins v. Benton, Civ. A. No. 18-7465, 2021 WL 638116, *5, 8 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2021).  However, see Lee v. United Rentals, Inc., Civ. A. No. 18-977, 2021 WL 2184763, *3 (M.D. La. May 28, 2021), where the court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the plaintiff’s past medical expenses not paid by workers’ compensation.  Only the amounts paid by the employer/workers’ compensation carrier would be presented to the jury in support of the plaintiff’s past medical expenses.  The court then added:

“However, there are two matters left in contention: first, may the Plaintiff offer evidence of the amounts charged by Plaintiff’s providers in connection with his back injury which [the employer] refused to pay?  Second, may Plaintiff present evidence of the market rate for Plaintiff’s future medical needs or is he relegated to the amounts set out in the Workers’ Compensation Fee Schedule?  As to both items, Simmons is not controlling.”

In other words, the federal court in Lee found that Simmons applied only to past medical expenses, but it did not apply to future medical expenses (i.e., the plaintiff would be allowed to present the full amount of anticipated future medical charges to the jury).  As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Lee court applied the law of the state.  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).  The findings in Lee may be correct, but, until it is definitively resolved by legislative act or by the Louisiana Supreme Court, parties will likely continue to debate what impact the reasoning of Simmons will have as to future medical charges past the date of trial. If, as held in Lee, the reduced workers’ compensation rate is irrelevant to future medical specials, then plaintiffs will seek the full future medical charges. This blog does not address the potential impact of the “Civil Justice Reform Act of 2020” which can reduce a plaintiff’s ability seek full medical charges for cases arising after January 1, 2021 in some circumstances.

Worker’s Comp Death Benefits Claim Survives Dismissal

In Rowland v. BASF, 20- 278 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/29/21), 2021 WL 1170326, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that a claim for death benefits filed by a widow whose husband died from an occupational disease was not prescribed, even though her deceased husband’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits would have been time-barred.

The claimant’s husband was exposed to asbestos from 1969 to 1989 while working for BASF. He was diagnosed with occupationally-related asbestos in 2001 and passed away on July 27, 2018. A claim for Workers’ compensation death benefits against BASF was filed on December 26, 2018.

BASF filed an “Exception of Prescription &/or Motion for Summary Judgment” and argued the widow’s claim was derivative of her husband’s cause of action. BASF contended that, because the employee’s claim would have been prescribed, her claim for death benefits also prescribed. In response, the claimant argued suit was timely because it was filed within one year of the employee’s death as required by La. R.S. 23:1031.1(F). The Worker’s compensation trial judge granted the exception of prescription.

The First Circuit reversed, accepting the claimant’s argument that the claim was timely because it was filed within one year of death. The court rejected BASF’s argument that the death benefit claim could be pursued only if the deceased husband had filed a Worker’s comp claim prior to his death.

In support of dismissal, BASF also cited La. R.S. 23:1231(A), which provides there is no right of action to pursue death benefits if the claim is not filed within two years of the employee’s last treatment. However, the Rowland court did not address this issue because BASF had not filed an Exception of No Right of Action and did not factually establish when the deceased employee last received treatment for asbestos. Moving forward, the viability of the claim will depend upon whether her husband died within two years of the last treatment related to the occupational disease.

Keogh Cox Secures Dismissal Of Alleged Chemical / Environmental Exposure Case: Worker’s Compensation Immunity

In Million v. Exxon Mobil, et al., plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer and pulmonary embolisms in 2016. Plaintiff had worked in the chemical industry for 40 years. In his suit, filed in the United States Middle District Court, plaintiff alleged that long-term exposure to toxic chemicals during his employment caused his cancer.  While the suit alleged that Million’s former employers created an unsafe work environment, he admitted in deposition that he was provided both safety equipment and safety training during his employment.

Andrew Blanchfield, managing partner at Keogh Cox, represented one of the former employers and filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to enforce the protections of Louisiana worker’s compensation law. Under the law, worker’s compensation benefits are generally an employee’s exclusive remedy against an employer for work-related injuries or illnesses. An employer is therefore entitled to immunity from tort claims unless the employee can prove that employer committed an “intentional act.”

To prevail under an intentional act theory, a plaintiff is required to show that the employer’s act was “intentional” and “substantially certain” to result in injury to the plaintiff. In support of the motion to enforce immunity, the former employers cited to plaintiff’s admissions in deposition as to the efforts made for his safety and to the absence of evidence sufficient to show intentional conduct substantially certain to cause injury. The district court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims. This month, the dismissal was upheld by the  United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Million v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Exxon Chem. Co./ Exxon Ref., No. 20-30002, 2020 WL 7054051 (5th Cir. Dec. 1, 2020).

This case illustrates the interplay between general Louisiana tort law and the Louisiana worker’s compensation law and shows that courts will require substantive evidence of an intentional act to maintain a tort suit against an otherwise immune employer.    


Chelsea Payne is an associate at Keogh Cox and has been practicing for three years. Her practice mainly relates to construction law and complex litigation. Chelsea enjoys playing tennis and spending time with her family.

Summary Judgment Dismissing Unwitnessed Workers’ Comp Accident Affirmed: No Corroborating Evidence

The recent decision in Gibson v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, 20-0033 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/27/20), 2020 WL 507804 re-affirms that a workers’ compensation claim based on an unwitnessed accident is subject to pretrial dismissal where there is no corroborating evidence.

In Gibson, the plaintiff, a department manager for Walmart, claimed injury while picking up boxes. Although no one witnessed the incident, the plaintiff claimed that two managers working nearby were made aware of the accident and injuries almost immediately.

Walmart denied the claim in response to numerous “red flags.” For example, the two managers identified by the claimant denied any knowledge. Also, the first reference in a medical record to the alleged June accident came in mid-October.

Walmart filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff did not satisfy her evidentiary burden. In response, Gibson countered that the conflict between her testimony, the co-workers’ testimony, and the medical records created genuine issues of material fact to be decided at trial. The OWC trial court granted summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.

In affirming the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit Court determined that Gibson’s testimony, standing alone, did not create a genuine issue of material fact. The general rule regarding unwitnessed accidents in worker’s compensation cases is well defined. Under this rule, an employee may prove by his or her testimony alone that an unwitnessed accident occurred only if the employee can establish that: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker’s version of the incident; and (2) the worker’s testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, L.L.C., 10-0245 (La. 1/19/11), 56 So. 3d 215, 218.

Because evidence such as the delay in medical treatment raised doubt and Gibson lacked other corroboration, the dismissal of her claim was upheld. Gibson reminds that questionable unwitnessed accident claims without corroborating evidence can and should be dismissed via pretrial motion, notwithstanding the “relaxed rules of evidence and procedure” in workers’ compensation courts.


Ed Stauss is a partner with Keogh Cox. His practice relates mainly to workers compensation defense and the subrogation recovery. Ed is an avid and long time fan of the professional and major college sports teams in the area. He also enjoys running year-round, from 2 milers & 5Ks in the spring and summer to half marathons and full marathons in the fall and winter.

Coronavirus and Workers Compensation in Louisiana

In Louisiana, workers compensation benefits can be owed if an employee sustains an accident or develops an occupational disease arising out of and occurring during the course and scope of their employment.  The definitions and burdens of proof differ for each.

An accident is defined by La. R.S. 23:1021 as:

(1) “Accident” means an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.

An occupational disease is defined by La. R.S. 23:1031.1 as:

B. An occupational disease means only that disease or illness which is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such disease. Occupational disease shall include injuries due to work-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis of any type, mental illness, and heart-related or perivascular disease are specifically excluded from the classification of an occupational disease for the purpose of this Section.

C. Notwithstanding the limitations of Subsection B hereof, every laboratory technician who is disabled because of the contraction of any disease, diseased condition, or poisoning which disease, diseased condition, or poisoning is a result, whether directly or indirectly, of the nature of the work performed, or the dependent of a laboratory technician whose death is the result of a disease, diseased condition, or poisoning, whether directly or indirectly, of the nature of the work performed shall be entitled to the compensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said laboratory technician received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

As used herein, the phrase “laboratory technician” shall mean any person who, because of his skills in the technical details of his work, is employed in a place devoted to experimental study in any branch of the natural or applied sciences; to the application of scientific principles of examination, testing, or analysis by instruments, apparatus, chemical or biological reactions or other scientific processes for the purposes of the natural or applied sciences; to the preparation, usually on a small scale, of drugs, chemicals, explosives, or other products or substances for experimental or analytical purposes; or in any other similar place of employment.

Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, any disability or death claim arising under the provisions of this Subsection shall be handled in the same manner and considered the same as disability or death claims arising due to occupational diseases.

In general, if an employee can prove that they were exposed to Coronavirus at work, and that the particular exposure caused them to contract Coronavirus disease, they may be able to prove a compensable accident.  The burden of proof is a tough one, of course, because it would seem to be nearly impossible for an employee who contracts the Coronavirus to prove the contraction resulted from work as opposed to exposure in some other environment.  However, it is important to note that one Louisiana court did find that a claimant was able to meet that burden when he contracted the West Nile Virus by proving to the satisfaction of the Workers Compensation Judge, rather incredibly, that a particular mosquito bite occurring at work was the cause.  Allen v. Graphic Packaging,   51,080 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1/11/17), 211 So.3d 1219.   If a claimant is able to prove the occurrence of an accident, then the usual workers compensation medical and indemnity benefits would be payable depending on medical needs, disability status, or even death benefits if the employee expired as the result of such an accident.

For an employee to be able to prove that their contraction of Coronavirus disease fits within the definition of an occupational disease, they would have to prove that it was “due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to” their employment.  Some healthcare workers and others in related fields who become infected would seem to have an easier time proving their cases than others whose work would not customarily lead to such exposures.  The definition above includes laboratory technicians (which could be an expansive list as defined) who contract a disease as the result exposure to something that they are working on/with.  The statute also provides some timing elements for claim filing and causation presumption, most of which would not seem to apply because of novel nature of the current Coronavirus outbreak.  As with claims asserted as accidents, the usual medical and indemnity benefits would be payable depending on the circumstances of the individual worker.

For additional details on the Allen case, please review Keogh Cox blog “One Particular Mosquito: West Nile Virus Found to be a Compensable Workers’ Compensation Claim” by clicking here:  https://keoghcox.com/one-particular-mosquito-west-nile-virus-found-compensable-workers-compensation-claim/.

Is Timing Everything Where Workers Compensation Benefits are Forfeited Based on Fraud? It Depends…

In Moran v. Rouse’s Enterprises, LLC, 19-2392019(La. App.5 Cir. 12/26/19)- – – So. 3d – – -, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit held that there is a forfeiture of all benefits when a worker’s compensation claimant commits fraud, regardless of when the fraudulent conduct occurs. The court declined to follow opinions from the First and Third Circuits concluding otherwise.

In Moran, the claimant obtained treatment for injuries to her back, right knee, and right shoulder after a slip and fall at work for Rouses supermarket. In her deposition, the claimant Moran testified that she experienced knee pain only once before her fall; it was “years ago” and not “serious.” Moran also claimed that she experienced no prior shoulder or back pain. However, medical records established:

•             Complaints of knee pain on at least 8 separate occasions between 2012 and the job injury;

•             Complaints of right knee, right wrist, and back pain after a slip and fall in 2013; and

•             A right shoulder impingement diagnosis 2 months before the on-the-job accident.

Rouses and its workers compensation carrier affirmatively alleged a violation of La. R.S. 23:1208, Louisiana’s workers compensation fraud statute, following the claimant’s deposition. Paragraphs “A” and “E” of section 1208 provide in pertinent part:

A.            It shall be unlawful for any person… to willfully make a false statement or representation… for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment under…this Chapter.    

***

E.            Any employee violating this Section shall… forfeit any right to compensation benefits under this Chapter.

As part of their fraud defense, the defendants specifically denied responsibility for all worker’s compensation benefits, i.e. benefits that that might have otherwise been due both before and after the fraudulent deposition testimony.

Following trial, the workers compensation judge determined that Moran carried her burden of proving the occurrence of on-the-job injury and disability. Nevertheless, the trial court also ruled that the claimant made false statements for the purpose of obtaining workers compensation benefits in violation of section 1208, thereby forfeiting the right to both the pre and post-deposition benefits that she was claiming.

On appeal, Moran argued that the forfeiture requirement of section 1208 applies prospectively only. Moran cited opinions from the Louisiana First and Third Circuits. After addressing the statute and the case law, the Moran court affirmed the decision of the workers compensation judge finding that the forfeiture of benefits provided for in of Section 1208 is clear and unambiguous. The opinion states that “…if the legislature had intended to limit the application … it would have clearly expressed that in the statute.”

There are no Louisiana Supreme Court opinions which specifically address whether the Section 1208 forfeiture applies retroactively or prospectively only. Given the defined split in the Louisiana appellate courts, the issue is ripe for consideration by the state’s highest court.


Ed is a Keogh Cox partner who litigates Worker’s Compensation, automobile and premises liability as well as subrogation claims. He is an avid runner and enjoys traveling with his wife Jennifer and their three children.

The Louisiana Supreme Court rules that amount billed by healthcare providers beyond what has been paid by a Workers Compensation insurer is NOT a collateral source that is recoverable against tort defendants

In a very important ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court, a tort defendant is no longer liable for any “actual charges” by medical providers above the amount paid by a Workers Compensation insurer pursuant to promulgated Workers Compensation fee schedule . In Simmons v. Cornerstone Investments, LLC,  2018-cc-0735 (La. 5/18/19), the court concluded:

“…the amount of medical expenses charged above the amount actually incurred is not a collateral source and its exclusion from the purview of the jury was proper.” See http://www.lasc.org/opinions/2019/18-0735.CC.OPN.pdf

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the development of the collateral source rule under applicable jurisprudence noting that the genesis of the collateral source rule:

“Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution. Under this well-established doctrine, the payments received from the independent source are not deducted from the award the aggrieved party would otherwise receive from the wrongdoer.” See Louisiana Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 02-2349, p. 6 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 734, 739.

Essentially, the court asks two questions when assessing whether the collateral source rule should apply. First, does the claimed benefit arise from some payment, wage deduction or other contribution by the Plaintiff that would diminish the plaintiff’s patrimony?  Second, will the goal of tort deterrence be promoted by allowing the windfall?  In a series of cases culminating in the case at bar, the court has been limiting the application of the collateral source rule in a number of contexts.

The court in Bozeman v. State, 03-1016 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So.2d 692, found that the collateral source rule did not apply when Medicaid was the payor such that the defendant could not be responsible for any amounts above what Medicaid paid to the provider. The court reasoned that it would be “unconscionable” to require taxpayers to pay the bills and then let a plaintiff recover the full undiscounted medical expenses and “pocket the windfall.” The court continued by noting in “Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607 (La. 5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945, this court found the collateral source rule did not apply to prevent the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier from receiving a credit for workers’ compensation benefits paid by her employer, even though the plaintiff paid for the UM coverage herself.” In Hoffman v. 21st Century North American Ins. Co., 14-2279 (La. 10/2/15), 209 So.3d 702, the court held that the collateral source rule does not apply to attorney-negotiated medical discounts. The court also looked at the US 5th Circuit in Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2016), that the collateral source rule does not apply above any amounts actually paid by the employer in the context of the LHWCA.

In each of the instances outlined, the court noted that the patrimony of the plaintiff was not impacted by limiting recovery to the amount of medical bills actually paid. Moreover, the court noted that the goal of tort deterrence is not negatively impacted, and that allowing a plaintiff to recover a windfall in this context is tantamount to an award of punitive damages that are not recoverable absent statutory authority which is not present in this context.   The Simmons decision now extends that same logic to cases where a Workers Compensation insurer has paid the medical benefits pursuant to the Louisiana Workers Compensation Law.

This ruling will have significant impact on the evaluation, settlement and trial of tort cases that have corresponding Workers Compensation claims.

Submitted by John P. Wolff, III (Partner)

Workers’ Compensation: A Recent Louisiana Decision Revisits a Fundamental Issue

Historians call it “The Grand Bargain.” At its heart, the workers’ compensation law is a bargain, an exchange between the employer and the employee. In this bargain, the employee without having to prove his employer’s negligence receives the benefit of continued income and medical treatment. In return, the employer, even if it is at fault, receives protection from tort suits. However, for this bargain to apply, the accident must have occurred within the “course and scope” of employment. But the question of when an accident is considered to have occurred in the “course and scope” is not always as simple to answer as it might otherwise appear.

The issue of course and scope has been litigated many times, in many forums. The recent decision in Jackie Holden v. Mike’s Catfish Inn, Inc. and Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, 2017 CA 1056 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/27/18) explores course and scope in the context of an employee who was on break.

In Holden, the plaintiff was “clocked in” and on the premises of her employer. When her daughter called and asked to meet her outside, the plaintiff took an employer-sanctioned work break, walked outside, and fell on the steps, causing injury to her left knee. She filed a tort suit against her employer alleging negligence for failing to remove a foreign substance which allegedly caused her to fall. The employer sought to dismiss the suit under the contention that the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for the fall was workers’ compensation.

The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by the employer’s workers’ compensation protections and plaintiff appealed. The sole issue before the appellate court was whether the plaintiff was in the course and scope. Plaintiff argued that she was on break and had left her designated work duties to speak with her daughter such that her activities at the time of the fall were not work-related. The employer countered that plaintiff remained on the clock during her break and was on the employer’s premises when she fell.

In assessing course and scope, courts consider the time of the accident, the place where the accident occurred, and the employee’s activities at the time of the accident. “An accident occurs in the course and scope of employment when the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of her duties during work hours, either on the employer’s premises or at other places where employment activities take the employee.” Holden at p. 6, citing, McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc., 02-1539 (La. 7/2/03), 851 So. 2d 1135.

In ruling against the plaintiff, the Holden court colorfully concluded:

“An employee who is getting paid, is on her employer’s premises, and is on an approved work break is in the course and scope of her employment whether she is visiting her daughter, getting a breath of fresh air, smoking a cigarette, or walking outside to drink a diet coke.”

While workers’ compensation is a bargain, Holden reminds that it is a bargain workers will continue to try to escape.

 

Virginia “Jenny” McLin is a partner at Keogh Cox who practices in the fields of corporate litigation, insurance defense, and workers’ compensation defense. When she is not practicing law, Jenny can be found volunteering with the Junior League of Baton Rouge; cheering for the LSU Tigers with her husband, Ryan; or shuffling her two kids to and from dance practice.