Author: Mary Anne Wolf

Making the Case for Arbitration of Commercial & Construction Disputes

06.29.2023

Clients frequently ask their attorneys whether they should arbitrate their commercial and construction disputes instead of litigating in the court system. This question arises either when drafting the contract or, if the contract contains an arbitration clause, once a claim occurs. Claims that require analysis of complex contracts, government regulations, and technical issues, such as those that arise in the construction, environmental, and energy industries, are well-suited to arbitration.

Parties typically want the quickest and least expensive means to a fair result. This is true even for highly sophisticated businesses where the amount in dispute is high. Arbitration gives parties a high level of control in the dispute resolution process. It is specifically designed to provide an alternative to the onerous and expensive discovery and trial procedures required in litigation. Parties can tailor the discovery and schedule to the needs of the case, which drastically reduces the overall time and cost of reaching resolution.

Arbitration also allows parties to select an arbitrator with specialized knowledge necessary to decide the case, which is especially beneficial in complex cases. Because parties agree to arbitration in their contract, they have control over the process in a way that is not available in litigation. For example, the parties may designate the administrative body and applicable rules, require a three-arbitrator panel for a complex case, name a particular arbitrator, require confidentiality, or dictate the timeframe for the hearing.

The following four factors are key considerations in assessing arbitration:

Expertise of decision-maker – One of the most important benefits of arbitration is the parties’ ability to select the arbitrator. This affords parties an opportunity to designate a decision-maker with specific qualifications and expertise needed to understand the contracts, legal issues, engineering and technical facts, and expert evidence to be presented. The parties can also select someone with strong management skills to handle complex matters or difficult decisions. The benefit is two-fold: Fewer resources are needed to educate the decision-maker in the critical industry background information, and the risk of an unreasonable ruling is reduced.

Timeframe for resolution – The median time to resolution in commercial arbitrations is less than one year, whereas the time to trial in federal court is two to three years.* Because appeal rights in arbitration are limited, the award typically terminates the dispute and the expense. However, after a trial, the case could linger through the appeal process for several more years, thus increasing the expense.

In addition to direct cost saving, decreasing the resolution time creates an indirect cost benefit to industry. Because “time is money,” shaving years off the process results in significant savings that likely can be better used advancing the business than litigating a case. Businesses lose billions of dollars every year because of the inherent delays in the litigation process.^ These losses stem from uncertainty in the outcome, capital set aside as reserves for potential losses, open claims reported to insurers, investors, potential clients and auditors, and loss of employee hours and administrative costs expended in litigation. Arbitration offers an alternative to mitigate and control these costs.

Expense – Arbitration typically costs more upfront than litigation. The parties must pay the administrative costs and arbitrator fees, which vary depending on the time and complexity involved, but generally range from $20,000 for a $100,000 claim to $60,000 for a $1 million claim. The costs are shared among the parties, which decreases the per-party cost in multiparty claims.

However, parties can control the cost of arbitration. Discovery, depositions, and document production in complex cases can come with staggering costs. In arbitration, the rules governing discovery and evidence are less formal. Additionally, discovery is more limited, which encourages a streamlined process and reduces costs and time significantly.

Risks – An often-cited risk of arbitration is the lack of appeal right. An arbitration award can only be vacated on limited grounds of fraud, corruption, misconduct, or where an arbitrator exceeds their power.~ However, if the initial decision-maker has expertise in the industry and law involved, the expectation is that the decision will be a well-reasoned one that the parties can accept.

In contrast, a major risk of litigating a complex commercial dispute is the fact-finder’s lack of understanding of the issues, the escalating potential for nuclear verdicts, and the appellate court’s limited power to correct factual findings.

In sum, arbitration is a good choice for dispute resolution where parties want to control the risk of an unreasonable outcome, reduce the time and expense of the process, and select a decision-maker with special expertise in their industry.

About the author: Mary Anne Wolf is an engineer and attorney. She is on the panel of commercial and construction arbitrators for the American Arbitration Association. Her goal as an arbitrator is to assist parties in managing their case for efficient resolution, give a high level of attention to each party’s position, and achieve a fair result.

References:

* AAA, Measuring the Costs of Delays in Dispute Resolution [online]; Micronomics, (March 2017), Efficiency and Economic Benefits of Dispute Resolution through Arbitration Compared with U.S. District Court Proceedings.

^ Efficiency and Economic Benefits, pp. 4-5, 16-23.

~ La. R.S. 9:4210 (LA Binding Arbitration Act); 9 USCA §10 (FAA).

Louisiana COVID-19 Immunity Laws

11.02.2020

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Louisiana legislature enacted and modified several statutes to limit the liability of individuals, businesses, and government agencies for exposure claims. However, the immunity is not absolute. While the immunity applies to “ordinary” negligence claims, it does not apply where acts are grossly negligent, wanton, or involve reckless misconduct. Further, as a condition to the protection afforded, the entity must show substantial compliance with the applicable COVID-19 procedures established by government authorities.

La. R.S. 9:2800.25, entitled “Limitation of liability for COVID-19” (the general immunity statute) provides that no person, business, or government entity shall be liable for injury or death resulting from exposure to COVID-19 through the performance of its business operations unless the entity failed to substantially comply with at least one set of procedures established by the federal, state, or local agency that governs the business operations, or the injury was caused by gross negligence or wanton, reckless misconduct. With respect to employer immunity, the statute provides that, regardless of whether an employee’s COVID-19 illness is covered under workers’ compensation law, the employee shall have no tort-based remedy against his employer unless the exposure was caused by an intentional act.

The exception to immunity in the general immunity statute calls into question the type of conduct that would rise to a level of gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined in Louisiana case law as “willful, wanton, reckless conduct that falls between intent to do wrong and ordinary negligence,” “lack of even slight care and diligence,” and “utter, complete or extreme lack of care.” While the definition does not provide a bright line rule, it reflects that the conduct must move well beyond simple negligence to defeat immunity.

For a business seeking to manage the risks arising from COVID-19, some best practices emerge: (1) monitor the COVID-19 procedures of government authorities to keep informed of the latest recommended or mandated procedures, (2) institute compliance protocols, (3) document and administer those procedures to show compliance, and (4) most obviously, avoid actions or omissions that may be construed as grossly negligent, wanton, or reckless.

Mary Anne Wolf is an engineer/attorney with a construction background who represents design professionals, contractors and others in construction litigation. She also gives seminars on the subject. She enjoys travel, yoga and encouraging her husband in his gardening and cooking endeavors.

Supreme Court Rules Against Broad Application of Indemnity Provision in Engineer’s Contract

06.03.2020

The Supreme Court ruling in Couvillion Group, LLC v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 2020 -00074 (La. 4/27/20) is a reminder that an indemnity claim must be sufficiently related to the principal demand and that contract indemnity provisions are to be strictly construed.

In Couvillion, the general contractor sued the owner of a public works port project for contract delay damages resulting from a cease work order issued to allow redesign of a fuel tank platform. When the contractor submitted its delay claim, the owner requested that its project engineer review it and make recommendations. The engineer recommended payment of a little over $1 million dollars. When the owner refused to pay, the contractor sued. In response, the owner filed a third-party demand against the engineer alleging that its recommendation was erroneous and excessive and that, if it was bound by the engineer’s recommendation, then the engineer must indemnify the owner.

On behalf of the engineer, Keogh Cox attorneys argued that the engineer should not be required to reimburse the owner for any delay costs and asked for dismissal through an exception of no cause of action. Code of Procedure Article 1111 provides that a defendant in a principal action may bring in any person who may be liable to him for all or part of the principal demand. Here, that was not the situation. The engineer was not liable to the owner for any part of the contractor’s delay claim because the engineer did not cause the delay. The delay damages were incurred before the engineer made a recommendation for payment. The events giving rise to the two claims were separate and distinct: the main demand arose from the project delay and the third- party demand arose from the engineer’s recommendation of the claim amount. The Court commented that the principal claim against the owner for delay damages was too attenuated from the owner’s claim against the engineer, thus the third-party demand was improper.

The owner also relied on the indemnity provision in the engineer’s contract that required the engineer to indemnify the owner against any and all claims for personal injury or “damages to property” that may arise from its services. The Court held that the plain meaning of the term did not include the economic-only losses related to the subject delay claim. The Court further reasoned that indemnity agreements are to be strictly construed, rejecting the owner’s broader interpretation.

Construction Law: The Limits of Anti-Indemnity in Louisiana

05.01.2018

Louisiana’s anti-indemnity statute applicable to construction contracts, R.S. 9:2780.1, became law in 2011. The statute renders unenforceable any provision in, or collateral to, a construction contract that purports to indemnify or hold harmless a person from liability for its own negligence, or has the effect of doing so. Since the law’s passage, few court decisions have interpreted its seemingly broad language and many questions remain as to the law’s full impact.

The obvious intent of the anti-indemnity law is to avoid shifting liability away from a party at fault to another person. To this end, the language in the statute nullifies any agreement that has “the effect of holding the person at fault harmless.” But what about “limit of liability” provisions? Arguably, such provisions have the effect of holding harmless the party at fault. Does a limit of liability provision, otherwise valid and enforceable under Louisiana law, run afoul of the anti-indemnity statute? After all, those parties with superior bargaining power in construction contracts will seek to insulate themselves from liability to the fullest extent allowed by law, and will look for alternatives to the indemnity provisions that now expressly violate public policy.

One court recently held that R.S. 9:2780.1 does not prohibit a limit of liability provision in a construction contract. In Patriot Contracting, LLC v. Star Insurance Company, (E.D. La. 3/01/2018), the construction contract contained a provision that excluded liability of the architect for good faith decisions made during contract administration. The plaintiff/contractor alleged that the architect was negligent in its contract administration duties and caused it to suffer economic loss. The court dismissed the claim, rejecting the contractor’s argument that the provision violated the anti-indemnity law.

The Patriot court explained that the statute prohibits an indemnity agreement, i.e., where one party agrees to reimburse a second party for damages for which the second party becomes liable to a third party. However, the anti-indemnity law did not impact the provision that excluded the contractor’s right to recover from the architect. Thus, at at least according to one court, parties in construction contracts are still free to include limit of liability provisions.

Mary Anne Wolf is an engineer/attorney with a construction background who represents design professionals, contractors, and others in construction litigation. She also gives seminars on the subject. She enjoys travel, yoga, and encouraging her husband in his gardening and cooking endeavors.

Do You Have the “Right to Remain Silent” in Business Dealings?

04.05.2017

As a general rule in Louisiana, a party involved in business dealings may keep silent, but exceptions exist. Sure, where information is volunteered that may influence the other party’s conduct, that information must be truthful, but is there a duty to disclose information harmful to your position? According to one recent decision, the answer may be “yes.”

In Parkcrest Builders, LLC v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 2017 WL 193500 (E.D. La. 2017), the court highlighted a wrinkle in the general rule of silence. According to the Parkcrest court, a party to a proposed transaction may have a duty to disclose any information that an ethical person would disclose. This duty complicates matters for a party wishing to disclose as little as possible in order to protect its interests in an arms-length negotiation. It also raises a question: can a party be sued in fraud if they don’t divulge enough information to satisfy the other party?

“Fraud” is defined as a misrepresentation or suppression of a material fact, made with the intent to obtain an unjust advantage or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other party. La. Civil Code article 1953. In order to prove fraud by silence, there must exist a duty to disclose.

Parkcrest involved a public project to construct new affordable housing units where the owner terminated its contract with the contractor and sued the contractor’s bond company. In the suit against the bond company, the owner alleged fraud and claimed that the bond company improperly concealed (1) its intent to rehire the defaulted contractor to complete the project, and (2) the nature of the bond company’s agreement with the contractor. According to Parkcrest, these allegations, if proven, were sufficient to prove fraud by silence.

Given that the law allows recovery of economic losses arising from a party’s reasonable reliance upon information provided by another, businesses need to be careful in what they say, and even in what they don’t say.

When You Can’t Sue – Limits on Contractor Liability

01.25.2017

Louisiana law protects building contractors from liability for past projects that otherwise could extend for an indefinite period of time. La. R.S. 9:2772 prohibits any lawsuit against a contractor for damages arising from a construction project five years after: (1) the date project acceptance was filed into the public records; or, if no acceptance was filed, (2) the date of occupancy. This five-year period is referred to as the “peremptive” period.

This law is broad enough to bar untimely claims of breach of contract and negligence, as well as failure to warn of dangerous conditions. It also covers all conceivable building activities: design, construction, consultation, planning, evaluation, construction administration, and land surveying. It applies both to residential and commercial construction. It also covers claims of property damage, personal injury, and wrongful death brought by any person. The only noted exception is where a contractor’s fraud caused the damages.

The law is meant to establish a specific date to cut off the contractor’s liability. Under the law, nothing can interfere with the running of a peremptive period. After it expires, the claim no longer exists.

Construction litigation in this area often focuses on commencement of the peremptive period. For instance, in Celebration Church, Inc. v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, 16-245 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), the owner of a shopping center sued its property insurer for roof damage related to Hurricane Isaac. The insurer prevailed in defending the claim based on defective roof repairs made following Hurricane Katrina. The owner then filed suit against the roofer who made the repairs after Hurricane Katrina. To avoid the peremptive defense, the owner argued that peremption did not begin to run until substantial completion of the entire shopping center. The court rejected this argument and held that the law is specific in defining the date of commencement of the peremptive period. It began to run when the tenants first occupied the space. By the time suit was filed, the owner’s claim no longer existed.

Because construction defects may not surface for years, a claim may be barred before the owner even discovers the problem.

Risky Business : “Foreseeable” Damages in Commercial Transactions

01.19.2017

Intuitively, contracting parties in commercial transactions understand that legal consequences follow a breach of contract: If a party fails to deliver a product as promised, the breaching party can be liable for the cost to correct the breach; but what is that cost?

Say, for example, a business cancels an order to provide parts to a long-time customer because the relationship has gone sour. Legally, the liability for that breach of contract may extend beyond the cost of the order. A breaching party is liable for damages that are a direct consequence of the failure to perform and that were foreseeable at the time the contract was made, which may include lost profit. If the breach was intentional or malicious, the party’s liability may extend even to direct damages that were not foreseeable.

The business that cancelled the order now faces a jury’s decision to identify the direct and foreseeable losses, a decision that, by its nature, is vague. However, the law imposes a limit on the jury’s prerogative to decide the damages. Even for a bad faith breach of contract, liability arises only for the direct, immediate consequences of the breach and there should be no liability for damages determined to be remote, indirect, or that have no necessary relation to the breach.

In a recent case, a jury found that a defendant boat engine manufacturer breached its contract with plaintiff boat manufacturer by cancelling a purchase order for engines, and further, that the engine manufacturer was in bad faith. The jury awarded $1.8 million in foreseeable lost revenues and $1.3 million in unforeseeable lost profits. The trial court threw out the “unforeseen” portion of the award because it was not a direct damage, and emphasized that a breaching party does not “become the insurer for all misfortunes that may arise from the breach.”

The boat manufacturer had argued that the cash flow expected from the sale of the boats rendered engine-less by the breach would have been invested in more personnel and capital to grow its northwest division. But, because of depleted cash flow from lost sales, that opportunity was lost. The court found, as a matter of law, that this loss was not a direct consequence of the breach, and thus, regardless of the bad faith, was not a recoverable contract damage. Simply, loss of cash flow in one part of the business that had a ripple effect in a separate division was too indirect to be a recoverable damage. See Marine Power Holding, LLC v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 2016 WL 7241560 (E.D. La. 12/15/2016).

By contrast, courts have found that loss of cash flow is recoverable where directly related to the damages suffered, such as where breach of a contract to deliver chickens to a chicken farmer caused the forced sale of the chicken farm. See Volentine v. Raeford Farms of La., 50-698 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/16), 201 So.3d 325.

Failure to perform on a contract exposes a business to more than it may realize. Understanding this risk allows for smarter decisions before the breach.

Fourth Circuit Brings Clarity to Peremption Statute in Suit Against Design Professional

02.15.2016

The question addressed in MR Pittman Group, LLC versus Plaquemines Parish Government, 2015-0396 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/2/15) was whether the five-year peremptive period set by La. R.S. 9:5607 displaces Louisiana’s general one-year prescriptive period set by La. C.C. art. 3492, when applied to tort claims against design professionals. Finding a contractor’s claim against the project engineers prescribed, the MR Pittman court held that the one-year prescriptive period governs tort claims against design professionals.